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1.1 inTroDucTion
The policy- and decision-making context has changed significantly in the last decades. In 
the contemporary age of late modernity, the classical modernistic institutions of policy- 
and decision making are increasingly facing difficulties in realizing legitimate and effective 
political responses by themselves (Beck et al., 2003; Dryzek, 1990; Hajer, 2003a). A number 
of transformations in contemporary societies can be identified as important factors in this 
diagnosis. Without having the ambition to be all-encompassing, one could at least mention 
two major changes of particular interest for this thesis. One major change concerns the 
increasing complexity of public issues accompanied by a highly fragmented institutional 
landscape. The second concerns a changing societal context in which traditional politi-
cal authority is increasingly questioned and citizens often demand more direct forms of 
political engagement when their interests are at stake. These changes and their implications 
for traditional government are further elaborated in the next sections of this introductory 
chapter.
Partly in response to these challenges, network forms of governance have arisen in the last 
decades (e.g. Kickert et al., 1997; Kooiman, 1993; Rhodes, 1996; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). 
Governance networks refer to a web of relationships between government, business, and 
civil society actors. Within governance networks, policy- and decision making become the 
subject of interactive processes between these actors. These network forms of governance 
are often born out of frustration with modernistic institutional practices (Hajer, 2003a, 
2009) and growing mutual interdependencies in contemporary society (Koppenjan & 
Klijn, 2004). With the complexity of many contemporary public issues as the starting point, 
governance networks can be considered as a response to the limits of hierarchical–instru-
mental policymaking (Wagenaar, 2007). The rise of governance networks can be observed 
in a variety of policy domains (see for example Dryzek, 2010, for a short overview). In this 
thesis, governance networks in the fields of water management and urban development are 
subjected to empirical analyses (this research context is more elaborated in section 1.5).
With the rise of network forms of governance, scientific debates and research about their 
democratic implications and performance have also started. Although there is academic 
consensus that governance networks as an empirical phenomenon have gained a foothold 
in liberal democracies, empirical research on their democratic implications and their per-
formance have only just begun (e.g. Dryzek, 2010; Edelenbos et al., 2010; Klijn et al., 2010a; 
Sørensen & Torfing, 2007; Torfing & Triantafillou, 2011). Governance networks are con-
sidered to have potential in terms of efficacy in dealing with complex public issues. This is 
often an important reason for governments to engage in network forms of governance. They 
could mobilize additional resources, improve the quality of policy- and decision making in 
terms of a more integrated approach to these issues, develop more innovative solutions, and 
improve the coordination between interdependent actors (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). How-
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ever, this is far from self-fulfilling. Reflecting on various studies on governance networks, 
Torfing et al. (2012: 126–127) note that the effectiveness of governance networks depends on 
the inclusion of relevant and affected actors, participants’ willingness to exchange or pool 
resources, and the capacity to develop common conceptions of problems, solutions, and 
decision-making premises. Many things can go wrong in this respect. For example, relevant 
stakeholders may be excluded by social or cognitive closure of key actors in the policy arena, 
or opportunistic behavior between actors may foster defensive and non-cooperative strate-
gies, and give rise to damaging conflicts (Ibid).
Furthermore, governance networks give rise to fundamental questions in terms of demo-
cratic legitimacy. According to the literature, they could undermine certain democratic 
values such as political accountability and political equality (e.g. Bogason & Musso, 2006; 
Dryzek, 2007). Governance networks do not make the role of government obsolete, but they 
clearly challenge hierarchical notions of steering and vertical accountability structures. In a 
network setting, it is much less clear who is accountable for what tasks than in a traditional 
hierarchical setting (Bekkers et al., 2007). On the other hand, they have democratic potential 
because a diversity of (affected) stakeholders, such as citizens, civil society organizations, 
and businesses, have more room for direct engagement (e.g. Edelenbos et al., 2010; Hajer 
& Wagenaar, 2003; Sørenson and Torfing, 2007). In this respect, they offer new ways of 
connecting public policymaking to citizens and stakeholders, overcoming the constraints 
and limitations of representative democracy and party politics (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007). 
However, the question of what kind of legitimacy and how this legitimacy of governance 
networks can be achieved is still highly debated in the literature.
Besides the academic importance of further examining the democratic implications and 
performance of governance networks, various governments have turned their interest to 
stimulating and capturing the gains of governance networks in which civil society actors 
take a greater role in dealing with public issues. Particularly, the discourse of the so-called 
Participation Society in the Netherlands and the Big Society in the UK are clear examples 
in this respect (see Kisby, 2010; RMO, 2013; Rob, 2012). Stimulating network forms of 
governance in which society can take a greater role in the production of public value and 
dealing with public issues is an appealing strategy for governments in times of economic 
crisis and budget deficits. At the same time, this increases the importance of the question 
of what this means in terms of democratic legitimacy and performance, and how this could 
be enhanced.
The focus of this thesis: examining the role of boundary spanning
This thesis aims to contribute to the search for explanatory factors that could enhance 
the performance and democratic legitimacy of governance networks. My focus is on the 
management of interaction between governmental and non-governmental actors. More 
specifically, I use the concept of boundary spanning to examine the management of interac-
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tion between public, private, and societal actors within governance networks. The research 
objective of this thesis is to describe the role of boundary spanners in these governance 
networks and to test their effects on the performance and democratic legitimacy. The ques-
tion addressed in this thesis is: In what way and with which effects do boundary-spanning 
activities impact upon the democratic legitimacy and performance of governance networks in 
the field of urban development and water governance?
Boundary-spanning activities are addressed in the literature as an important factor in gov-
ernance networks for building sustainable inter-organizational relationships (e.g. Sullivan & 
Skelcher, 2002; Williams, 2002), but empirical research on their effects on the performance 
and democratic legitimacy of governance networks is relatively scarce. This thesis aims to 
contribute to the literature on this topic in at least two important ways. Previous research 
has indicated the importance of boundary-spanning activities of network managers or 
meta-governors as a factor that enhances the performance of governance networks (e.g. 
Klijn et al., 2010a; Sørenson & Torfing, 2007). However, the issue of democratic legitimacy 
is not addressed much in this relationship (Dryzek, 2010; Torfing & Triantafillou, 2011). 
According to several authors, a fundamental reason for this is that the nature of governance 
networks does not fit with the assumptions of traditional models of democracy, complicat-
ing empirical analyses in this respect (Dryzek, 2007; Sørensen, 2002; Torfing et al., 2012).
Furthermore, as policy- and decision-making processes in governance networks evolve 
at the boundaries of different public, private, and societal organizations, the boundary-
spanning activities of a variety of individuals are likely to matter for the performance of 
governance networks. Although this is recognized in the literature, by far most of the at-
tention goes to the role of (representatives of) central and/or governmental actors (e.g. lead 
organizations, network managers, politicians) (e.g. Cristofoli et al., 2014; Klijn et al., 2010a; 
Meier & O’Toole, 2007; Sørensen & Torfing 2009). There is a scarcity of empirical research 
with a broader focus, i.e. on formal and informal boundary spanners originating not only 
from official responsible organizations, but also from societal organizations, NGOs, and 
community organizations (cf. Van Hulst et al., 2012). Therefore, and in addition to much 
of the literature on network management, this research examines the influence of bound-
ary spanners with various organizational backgrounds, especially non-governmental, to 
empirically examine their influence on the legitimacy and the performance of governance 
networks. This is specifically important if governance networks in which civil society actors 
are playing a more central role are increasing, such as those emerging around citizen initia-
tives. In this thesis, I therefore focus on two types of governance networks around water 
management projects and urban development projects: governance networks in which 
governmental actors have a more leading and initiating role, and governance networks that 
are the result of self-organizing citizens. This is further elaborated in section 1.6.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the following two sections, the changing 
policy- and decision-making context is further elaborated by focusing on the two above-
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mentioned major changes. Their implications for modernistic forms of policy- and decision 
making are discussed in section 1.4. Section 1.5 discusses the rise of governance networks as 
a response to these changes, and section 1.6 elaborates the concept of governance networks 
and the way the concept is used in this thesis. Subsequently, indicators for measuring the 
democratic legitimacy of governance networks and governance network performance are 
introduced in section 1.7 and 1.8. Section 1.9 goes deeper into the concept of boundary 
spanning as an important factor to consider in relation to the democratic legitimacy and 
performance of governance networks. Section 1.10 closes this introductory chapter with 
an outline of this thesis, which is presented as a number of international peer-reviewed 
articles and a book chapter in an international edited volume. These are introduced in the 
last section of this chapter.
1.2 complex public issues
Many contemporary policy challenges are characterized by complexity. Complexity refers 
to the compounded and boundary-crossing character of public issues. According to many 
public administration scholars, a major change in the last decades has been the increasing 
complexity of public issues (Hajer, 2003a; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Teisman et al., 2009; 
Wagenaar, 2007). These authors argue that complexity of public issues is not a new thing, 
but that it has become more severe due to an increasing interdependency of policy areas, 
policy levels, and policy actors (Torfing et al., 2012). Contemporary policy challenges in 
fields such as water management, urban development, healthcare, poverty reduction, 
employment policy, environmental protection, and crime prevention often do not fit the 
organizational boxes into which governments and policy analysts tend to place policies (e.g. 
Chisholm, 1989; Edelenbos & Teisman, 2011; Peters, 1998). They are interrelated with other 
issues and governmental fields of action.
Before proceeding, it is useful to be a bit more specific about the term complexity, as 
it could refer to many things. Building on one of the most famous works on complexity 
and complex systems coming from Simon (1996), Dryzek (1990: 59) paraphrases Simon 
and defines complexity as “nonsimple relationships among elements sufficient to render the 
properties of a system capable of apprehension only as something more than the sum of the 
system’s parts”. Complexity stresses the interactions and interrelationships between parts 
of systems. This makes the ‘whole’ system largely unpredictable. In this thesis, complexity 
stands for the compounded character of policy issues and the variety of interrelationships 
between actors in this respect. Complex public issues are hard to demarcate as they cross 
different boundaries, such as physical and geographical boundaries, administrative and 
institutional boundaries (e.g. governmental levels and sectors), and social boundaries (e.g. 
between social and economic groups).
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Because of their cross-boundary character, elements of the ‘puzzle’ are always missing. 
For example, possible effects are unknown because of the unpredictable behavior of humans 
or of social-ecological systems in a broader sense. Gathering more information for scientific 
analysis is therefore not sufficient to come to the objectively best solution (Rittel & Webber, 
1973). Furthermore, information about complex public issues is in itself often contested. 
Different actors often disagree about what certain information means, as this also depends 
on the perspective from which they approach this information. Complex public issues are 
therefore typified as unstructured: they are grounded in different value frameworks rather 
than arising from gaps in scientific knowledge (Hisschemöller & Hoppe, 1996). In this 
sense, proposed solutions for complex public issues are not true or false, but at best good or 
bad (Rittel & Webber, 1973).
The boundary-crossing nature of complex public issues implies that they cannot be 
understood and addressed in isolation (Head & Alford, forthcoming). For example, water 
management as a field of governmental action is strongly related to other fields of gov-
ernmental and non-governmental action, such as agriculture, recreation, mining, ecology, 
environmental affairs, and urban and regional planning (Edelenbos & Teisman, 2013; Lubell 
& Lippert, 2011). These different parts are somehow connected with one another. Actions 
or events in one of these parts reverberate through the system in unforeseen ways, add-
ing up to unpredictable and unintended outcomes (Wagenaar, 2007). The complexity of 
water governance issues and urban development issues, the context of this thesis, is further 
elaborated in section 1.5.
1.3 a changing socieTal conTexT
In addition to the increasing complexity of public issues, the societal context of policy- and 
decision making has changed significantly. Society has become far more characterized by 
plurality and horizontal relationships, and this presents challenges for the legitimacy of 
political representation and for hierarchical governmental steering. This is elaborated in 
this and the following section.
Increasing plurality and the rise of the assertive, emancipated citizen
It has become more or less common knowledge that contemporary Western societies are 
highly heterogeneous, characterized by increasing value pluralism (Castells, 1996). There 
is a plurality of societal groups, each joined around common interests and common value 
systems that differ from those of other groups. Furthermore, these interest groups tend to 
be more issue-oriented (Stolle & Hooghe, 2005) and have increasing capacities to chal-
lenge governmental action. Education levels, socio-economic resources, access to political 
information, and other ‘resources of citizenship’ have increased substantially over the past 
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several decades (Dalton, 2008). Citizens nowadays have, generally speaking, more time, 
money, and access to information and networks to influence public policy; and they de-
mand more direct involvement when their interests are at stake. This has contributed to 
the horizontalization of society. As far back as the late 1970s, sociologist Abram de Swaan 
(1979) made the analysis that society was increasingly characterized by transformation from 
a so-called demand-household towards a negotiation-household. He noted that this trans-
formation especially took place in modern welfare state arrangements in which citizens and 
employees increasingly obtained rights to participate in various sectors.
“Generation by generation, people are becoming less deferential to authority […], are 
more interested in self-government; and […] are keenly attentive to their powers over 
their own biographies,” as Mark Warren (2009: 7) put it. This is what the philosopher Gijs 
van Oenen calls the rise of the emancipated citizen (Van Oenen, 2011).1 As a consequence, 
authority, in whatever sense that may be, is more questioned than ever before. With the rise 
of the emancipated and more assertive citizen, several authors note that contemporary chal-
lenges in relation to gaining legitimacy for policy- and decision making are not so much the 
result of democratic failure, but rather of democratic success (e.g. Dalton, 2004; Van Oenen, 
2011; Warren, 2009). Arriving at legitimate decisions increasingly requires negotiation and 
deliberation between governmental actors and a plurality of societal interest groups. This 
causes tensions with the representative model, based on hierarchical steering (cf. Klijn & 
Skelcher, 2007; Rob, 2010).
Less participation and less trust in traditional institutions of representative democracy
There seems to be consensus among political scientists that there has been a decline in 
citizens’ participation in the traditional forms of political engagement that have been part 
and parcel of the representative democratic system in the last decades (Bang, 2009; Dalton, 
2008; Klingemann & Fuchs, 1995; Marien et al., 2010; Peters, 2010). This decline is mostly 
demonstrated by citizens’ decreasing membership of political parties and by decreasing 
electoral participation; but other institutionalized forms of political engagement, such as 
participation in or membership of big-interest organizations, are also declining (Bang, 
2009; Marien et al., 2010). The level of decline of course varies among countries, but, even 
1  Here, emancipation refers to the process in which man learns ‘to think for himself ’; or, to put it somewhat 
differently: the process in which man increasingly, individually and collectively, comes to the belief that the act 
of thinking is not dependent on any external authority (Van Oenen, 2011). This means that man can develop and 
form himself by his own thinking. The human spirit becomes an instrument by which ‘truth’ can be distinguished 
from superstition and rationality from madness. According to the philosopher Gijs van Oenen, enlightenment 
could be approached as a process of emancipation (Van Oenen, 2011). Enlightenment and the related processes of 
modernization are about a way of thinking and of knowledge acquisition. This triggered a process of emancipa-
tion, as it released man from restrictions of ignorance and immaturity. This process started in the 17th century 
and could be argued to be ‘fulfilled’ in philosophical terms at the end of the 18th century, and, in societal terms, 
‘realized’ in the ‘60s and ‘70s of the 20th century. 
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in political systems such as the Nordic European countries that have long histories of active 
voting and other forms of political participation, there has been a drop (Peters, 2010; War-
ren, 2009).
The decline in traditional forms of political engagement could be largely explained by the 
abovementioned processes of individualization, increasing value pluralism, and an erosion 
of traditional social boundaries. Because of these processes, it is becoming more difficult for 
political parties to represent (parts of) the population (Dalton, 2008). In addition, several 
political scientists argue that many political parties are increasingly focused on governing 
and are de-emphasizing their representative role (Peters, 2010). They could increasingly be 
characterized as ‘cartel parties’ (Katz & Mair, 1995), who try to maintain their place in the 
cartel of governing structures rather than relating directly to the public.
There is also substantial empirical evidence of citizens’ increased distrust of political au-
thorities (politicians, political parties, officeholders) in many Western democracies (Dalton, 
2004). This could also affect trust in the political system (its institutions). Summarizing the 
findings of extensive cross-country comparative research, Dalton (2004: 46) noted: “affec-
tive attachments to political parties are weakening in almost all contemporary democra-
cies, and confidence in political parties as institutions is also declining. Moreover, these 
sentiments are carried over to parliaments and the institutions of representative democracy 
more generally.” The same goes for the Netherlands. There is a decrease in citizens’ trust in 
political authorities, although a substantial decrease in trust in the political system is not 
that clear (Rob, 2010).2
Although citizens seem more reluctant to engage in traditional institutions of representa-
tive democracy, this does not directly mean that citizens are less politically active. Instead, 
several authors argue that new forms of civic engagement are on the rise in most liberal 
democracies (Dalton, 2008; Marien et al., 2010; Stolle & Hooghe, 2005). One of these forms 
is not so much focused on influencing traditional institutions of representative democracy, 
but on self-organization of citizens to deal with public issues which are of their direct con-
cern. In a break from traditional forms of citizen engagement that existed within – and were 
largely shaped by and focused on influencing – traditional institutions of representative 
democracy, active citizens increasingly want to engage in informal and loosely structured 
organizations to advance their policy agendas.
2  This decreasing trust does certainly not mean that citizens have lost faith in democracy per se. As Dalton noted 
(2004: 47): “Even though contemporary publics express decreasing confidence in democratic politicians, par-
ties, and parliaments, these sentiments have not carried over to the democratic principles and goals of these 
regimes.” On the contrary, ideals central to democracy, such as equality, transparency, and tolerance of diverse 
perspectives, have increased. This is an important difference from previous periods of political dissatisfaction, 
for example during the interwar period and the anti-system assaults following the Second World War. 
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Self-organization by citizens as a new form of political engagement
In the words of Bang (2009: 126): “citizens no longer primarily get their political identity 
from their identification with political parties.” Active citizens and social groups increas-
ingly show their self-organizing ability to challenge governmental action and to develop 
well-founded plans through citizens’ initiatives (Bakker et al., 2012; Hurenkamp et al., 2006; 
Marien et al., 2010). Whereas various scholars, of whom Putnam (2000) is probably the 
most famous, have argued that there has been a decline in civic engagement (more or less 
since the 1960s), more recent studies have noted that it is rather the form of civic engage-
ment that is changing (Marien et al., 2010; Stolle & Hooghe, 2005). In these new forms of 
civic engagement, citizens organize themselves through informal and loosely structured 
organizations that tend to be more issue-oriented (Bang, 2009; Hurenkamp et al., 2006; 
SCP, 2011; Stolle & Hooghe, 2005). Initiators of these self-organizing initiatives are driven 
by personal experiences or an interest in taking care of their own neighborhood or com-
munity, often in reaction to a (new) governmental intervention or a societal event. Hajer 
(2003b) used the metaphor of ‘citizens on stand-by’: citizens are generally relatively passive, 
but, when policy interventions interfere in their personal life sphere or living environment, 
then they become active and politically engaged. In these circumstances, they are triggered 
to become involved. They are emerging in different domains, for example in the realm of 
neighborhood or community governance (e.g. Boonstra & Boelens, 2011; Van de Wijdeven, 
2012), healthcare (e.g. Hurenkamp et al., 2006), and the energy sector (Seyfang et al., 2013).
In this thesis, self-organization of citizens refers to bottom up initiatives which are citizen 
or community driven, which aim to deal with a specific set of public issues and which have 
the ambition to set up sustainable cooperation among citizens in this respect (cf. De Moor, 
2013). These so-called local stakeholder or citizen initiatives are interesting for dealing 
with complex public issues. Take for example community initiatives in the field of urban 
regeneration. Such initiatives bring about development that starts from within the urban 
area itself, enhancing the chance of the regeneration fitting local needs and circumstances, 
and enhancing the commitment of the involved local stakeholders and therefore the imple-
mentation of visions and plans (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002; Wagenaar, 2007). However, the 
difficulty of putting local initiatives by non-state actors into practice is also well noted in the 
literature, for example because of these actors’ lack of resources and power (e.g. Chaskin & 
Garg, 1997) or the difficulty of making effective connections with governmental institutions 
to guarantee implementation (e.g. Edelenbos, 2005; Healey, 2006).
1.4 implicaTions for moDernisTic governmenTal insTiTuTions
Several authors have concluded that the abovementioned challenges in relation to the 
increasing complexity of public issues and the changing characteristics of society lead to 
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pressures on our modernistic governmental institutions, in terms both of their performance 
and of their legitimacy (Dryzek, 1990; Hajer, 2003a; Wagenaar, 2007; Head & Alford, 
forthcoming). This diagnosis is based on the mismatch between some fundamental steering 
principles of modernistic governmental institutions on the one hand, and the nature of 
complex public issues and characteristics of contemporary society on the other. These steer-
ing principles could be characterized as a logic of hierarchical–instrumental policymaking 
and functional differentiation rooted in the modern conception of rationality (e.g. Beck et 
al., 2003; Dryzek, 1990; Wagenaar, 2007). Although these principles are nuanced in reality 
and do not provide an actual description of how governmental organizations behave, they 
still largely structure the actions of civil servants as they are part and parcel of the institu-
tional logic of governmental organizations (Hajer, 2003a; Torfing et al., 2012).
Pressures on the principle of the primacy of politics
A first steering principle of Western liberal democracies is that of representative democracy 
and the primacy of politics. Elected officials make decisions about collective goals, leaving 
implementation to administrators or to decentralized or privatized actors. For governmen-
tal organizations, this means that administrators are – in the end – always accountable to a 
political principal. This is reflected in the hierarchical structure of governmental organiza-
tions. A pre-given public selects its leaders who will ensure that its ideas, interests, and value 
preferences are represented in the councils of representative democracy. The notion of a 
pre-given public means that defining this public is not in itself the outcome of a political 
process (Sørensen, 2002). “The concept of representation is the means by which the abstract 
notion of a sovereign people is transformed into a concrete sovereign capable of governing 
society” (Sørensen, 2002: 695). Or, as Hoppe (2011: 167) put it: the core of liberal representa-
tive democracy is “the non-violent, legible, controllable and reversible transformation of the 
manifold and inconsistent needs, problems, beliefs, emotions and volitions of individuals 
and groups in society into authoritative and legitimate expressions of collective will.”
Because complex public issues often cross different territorial scales or governmental lay-
ers, this principle comes under pressure. It is challenged when public issues do not fit within 
demarcated territorial scales or layers of government. As Hajer aptly put it (2009: 30): “the 
primacy of the politics presupposes that the council of elected representatives confers 
legitimacy on the decisions it takes. Yet when policy problems do not respect the territo-
rial scales, this system breaks down.” In short, the institutional structure of representative 
democracy does not match with the boundary-crossing nature of complex public issues.
Furthermore, as every complex public issue mobilizes its own variety of ‘publics’ (more 
or less mobilized groups of affected stakeholders, shareholders, and experts), the legitimacy 
generated by electoral democracy does not automatically carry over to these ‘issue-seg-
mented constituencies’ (Warren, 2009). The rise of network forms of governance could in 
this sense be seen as the “intellectual and practical reflection of a trend towards problem-
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specific, pragmatic arrangements for social and political decision-making” (Hoppe, 2011: 
167). Governance networks are polycentric, and the relevant demos for decision making 
then consists of those affected by the complex issue(s) at stake (Dryzek, 2007). In this sense, 
there is no one single all-purpose demos, but rather multiple demoi that could exist at differ-
ent levels, below, above, and across the state.
Instrumental rationality and hierarchical–instrumental policymaking versus complex public issues
A second steering principle is that of instrumental policymaking, which is based on the mod-
ern conception of rationality. According to several sociologists and political scientists, this 
modern conception of rationality is part of the existing institutional order of policymaking 
in the postwar era in Western societies (e.g. Beck et al., 2003; Dryzek, 1990; Hajer, 2003a). 
This does not mean that this conception of rationality determines institutional structures, 
but it plays an important role in legitimating and justifying particular practices, such as 
determining what (policy) expert knowledge is. This modern conception of rationality is 
concerned with ordering and systematizing reality in order to make it more predictable and 
controllable. According to Dryzek (1990), this modern conception of rationality demands 
two things: firstly, instrumental rationality, which may be defined “in terms of the capacity 
to devise, select, and effect good means to clarified ends” (Dryzek, 1990: 3–4). Instrumental 
rationality, or goal-instrumental action, emphasizes efficiency. The second requirement is 
the idea of rational choice: choices should be made “through reference to a set of objective 
standards” (idem).
This instrumental rationality plays an important role in the way governmental organiza-
tions are structured and legitimize their actions. In this line, Max Weber argued that instru-
mental rationality provided the justification and organizing principles for bureaucracy, the 
typical form of governmental organizations. He discovered that bureaucratic organizations 
standardize and structure the working process by focusing on a functional division of labor, 
hierarchical supervision, and the formulation of explicit, stable rules and norms to guide 
organizational activities (Morgan, 1997). In terms of management, this instrumental ratio-
nality is reflected in a rational–technical approach to making decisions and dealing with 
complexity by analytical problem disaggregation (Dryzek, 1990). It is aimed at breaking 
down a complex phenomenon into components in order to control it and to be able to deal 
with it efficiently. Simon’s decomposition–coordination thesis is a famous elaboration of 
this strategy. Divide the totality of tasks into parts and make an organization responsible 
for specific task performance. The relations between the parts can be managed by some 
coordination from the top. Decomposing and analyzing public issues with the help of a 
so-called ‘policy tree’ is a famous example. An overall solution to the policy issue is assumed 
to be achieved by devising a solution for each subset and aggregating these partial solutions. 
This strategy can be effective for well-bounded problems and under conditions of a stable 
environment. Simon (1996) calls these problems ‘near-decomposable’, meaning that the in-
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teractions among the parts are weak but not negligible. Each organization or organizational 
unit can concentrate and specialize on solving one particular part.
However, when confronted with complex public issues, such a strategy can become 
counterproductive. As Dryzek (1990: 62) aptly noted: “growing complexity can frustrate the 
decomposition strategy, for interactions across the boundaries of sets and subsets become 
too rich, irrespective of the quality and veracity of the theory informing decomposition and 
the intelligence with which the tree is drawn.” Complex public issues are characterized by 
significant relationships across boundaries, the difficulty of bounding these issues, and the 
political character of this process. Any intervention on the basis of a disaggregation strategy, 
by one of the parts, may merely displace (sub-)problems across set boundaries.
Furthermore, the environment of organizations dealing with complex public issues is 
often dynamic, as a variety of actors are involved and the behavior of these actors is not 
that predictable. A further limit to the disaggregation strategy “arises with its need for clear, 
simple, and uncontroversial goals, for dissensus on such goals will mean like dissensus in 
problem definition, problem disaggregation, and the direction of problem solving in the 
various subsets” (Dryzek, 1990: 62). Setting goals for complex public issues in contemporary 
society has become more difficult given the high value pluralism.
Functional differentiation and specialization versus complex public issues
Furthermore, as ‘products’ of modern society, governmental organizations are character-
ized by functional differentiation and specialization (Beck et al., 2003; Luhmann, 1977).3 
They are organized into different segments of partial responsibility such as finance, the 
economy, social welfare, infrastructure, and urban and landscape planning. In this way, or-
ganizations and structures have evolved in which tasks and functions are clearly demarcated 
and defined, and organized hierarchically through clear lines of responsibility (Edelenbos 
& Teisman, 2011). This is also in line with the strategy of the rational–technical approach 
to dealing with complexity by analytical problem disaggregation and equipping specific 
organizations with a specialized task for which they are accountable.
At the beginning of the 20th century, different management theories – classical manage-
ment and scientific management – emphasized the efficient functioning of organizations. In 
contrast to Weber, theorists and practitioners of these movements (Fayol, Mooney, Urwick, 
3  According to many sociologists, modern societies are characterized by functional differentiation into relatively 
autonomous, but interdependent subsystems (Luhmann, 1977; Beck et al., 2003). This notion of functional differ-
entiation is a useful heuristic tool to analyze the transition from the early modern to modern society. In contrast 
to traditional societies, structured by stratification, modern societies are rather structured by a specialization 
into different functions. In this process of specialization, different social entities, called subsystems, focus on 
specific activities by which they develop their own methods, procedures, behavioral structures, and so forth. In 
this way, and in a very broad sense, one can distinguish for example the political system, the economy, and the 
law system. Functional differentiation as a main organizing principle can be observed not only at society level, 
but also at the level of governmental organizations (Edelenbos & Teisman, 2011). 
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Taylor) were firm advocates of bureaucratization. It is through the ideas of these theorists 
that so many mechanistic principles of organization have become dominant in our everyday 
thinking (see Morgan, 1997). Within these theories, management is conceptualized as a 
process of planning, organization, command, control, and coordination. “By giving detailed 
attention to patterns of authority and to the general process of direction, discipline, and 
subordination of individual to general interest, the classical theorists sought to ensure that 
when commands were issued from the top of the organization they would travel through-
out the organization in a precisely determined way to create a precisely determined effect” 
(Morgan, 1997: 20–21). Scientific management theory, introduced by Taylor, approached or-
ganizations scientifically in order to make them function more efficiently. Scientific analysis 
of the organizational working processes led to work becoming specialized and standardized 
to perform tasks as quickly as possible in order to shorten the entire working process. The 
principle of separating the planning and design of work from its execution is one of the 
most far-reaching elements of Taylorism, as it ‘splits’ the worker, advocating the separation 
of hand and brain. One of the great attractions of Taylorism rests in the power it confers to 
those in control.
Although not so radically applied as the scientific management theorists prescribed, the 
division of labor and the specialization of tasks continue to be basic organizing principles, 
including within governmental organizations. Around the turn of the century, many West-
ern countries adopted approaches – labeled as New Public Management (NPM) (Pollit & 
Bouckaert, 2004) – largely to realize savings in public expenditure and to make the opera-
tions of government more efficient and effective. NPM reforms are also imbued with the 
notion of functional differentiation and specialization (Edelenbos & Teisman, 2011): they 
focus on vertical specialization or devolution and on horizontal differentiation based on 
the principles of disaggregation and (thus) single-purpose organizations (Christensen & 
Lægreid, 2007). NPM includes a shift towards more measurement and quantification, for 
example in the form of performance indicators and/or explicit standards, and a preference 
for more specialized and autonomous organization units rather than large bureaucracies. 
“In the NPM school, complexity, uncertainty and risk are coped with through the use of 
top-down control (at arm’s length) with a strong emphasis on specifying goals and output 
indicators, formal accountability, data collection and transparency” (Edelenbos & Teisman, 
2011: 14).
According to several authors, NPM has reinforced fragmentation in the public sector, 
and NPM practices have been ill-suited to deal with complex public issues (Christensen 
& Lægreid, 2007; Head & Alford, forthcoming) – firstly, because NPM stresses a rational–
technical approach as described above. Such a model assumes that each public organization 
has settled goals, a supportive political environment, and control over the resources and 
capabilities necessary to deliver on the goals (Head & Alford, forthcoming). Such assump-
tions certainly do not necessarily apply in the presence of complex public issues. Next, to the 
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extent that such practices hold “managers responsible for a specific set of programs or for 
serving a specific set of clients, […] they tend to isolate from each other those programs that 
may actually have subterranean connections in respect of certain wicked problems. This 
fragmentation manifests itself in tensions between program-based subcultures, competing 
policy priorities, and, at worst, turf wars within and between agencies” (Head & Alford, 
forthcoming: 10).
A functionally differentiated setting of specialized organizations with demarcated tasks 
and responsibilities delivers a big challenge for developing effective responses in reaction to 
public issues that cross these specialized boundaries. Separate actions guided by sub-goals, 
individual timeframes, and action schemes may become rather dysfunctional on a larger 
system level aiming to solve public issues. A side effect of relative autonomy for differenti-
ated and specialized sub-parts is the evolution of local norms, values, and languages tailored 
to the requirements of the unit’s work (Leifer & Delbecq, 1978). This could act as a barrier to 
cooperation, communication, and coordination across boundaries. As Edelenbos and Teis-
man (2011: 13) noted: “Functional specialization creates a structure that is supposed to be 
a system of cooperation but often turns out to be a system of competition. The governance 
capacity of the public system full of specialized units on different levels of government and 
dealing with different parts of the public interest is called into question.”
Legitimacy ‘pressures,’ not so much legitimacy ‘crisis’
Do the above-described changes add up to some general legitimacy crisis of modernistic 
political institutions, as was famously predicted by Crozier et al. (1975) reporting for the 
Trilateral Commission in the 1970s? Although there are clearly improvements to be made, 
such a claim goes too far. Governments, civil society, and businesses have been creative in 
experimenting and participating with new forms of participatory governance. Legitimacy 
pressures show up particularly in response to specific complex public issues. As Warren 
(2009: 7) aptly put it:
The reason is that there are many points of adjustment and deflection in the developed 
democracies, so the broad legitimation pressures show up not as a general system cri-
sis, but rather issue by issue and policy by policy, in protests over airport expansion, 
medical coverage, poverty issues, changes in regulation of genetically modified organ-
isms, forest management, struggles over neighborhood development, energy pricing, 
and so on.
As further described below, I particularly focus on complex issues in the field of water man-
agement and urban development. In line with other authors (e.g. Beck et al., 2003), Warren 
(2009: 7) therefore suggests that we have “something like pluralized ungovernability,” rather 
than a general system crisis. This pluralized ungovernability is driven by the abovemen-
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tioned developments of increased complexity of public issues, increased fragmentation of 
the state apparatus, and rising demands for empowered participation.
1.5 The emergence of neTwork forms of governance as a response
As a reaction to the abovementioned challenges of boundary-crossing issues, fragmenta-
tion, and rising demands for empowered participation, we have witnessed the emergence of 
governance networks in the last decades (e.g. Kickert et al., 1997; Kooiman, 2003; Rhodes, 
1996; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). Governance networks emerge as a result of interdepen-
dency between relatively autonomous actors around complex issues. In governance net-
works, policy- and decision making become the subject of interactive processes between 
governmental and non-governmental actors, such as citizen groups, private business, and 
societal interest groups. Governance network scholars tend to regard governance networks 
as being grounded in a specific mode of coordination and communication that distin-
guishes them from hierarchies and markets (see for example Kooiman, 2003; Rhodes, 1996; 
Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). In the words of Dryzek (2010: 121): “They differ from hierarchies 
in being relatively flat and in their lack of clear relations of domination and subordination 
(though they can feature substantial political inequalities).” They differ from markets in 
that relationships between actors are more focused on explicit coordination and “generally 
include a mix of collaboration, negotiation, persuasion, and mutual adjustment, rather than 
competition” (ibid).
This is not to say that the role of the state is becoming obsolete. From an empirical per-
spective, governance networks exist beside traditional forms of government (Torfing et al., 
2012). They challenge, but also supplement, traditional forms of government in realizing 
legitimate and more effective policy- and decision making (e.g. Klijn & Skelcher, 2007). As 
Torfing et al. put it: interactive forms of governance are not so much replacing government, 
but adding “a new layer on top of the old layer of hierarchical government and the recently 
added layer of competition-based market regulation and managerialism associated with 
New Public Management reforms” (pp. 11–12).
The increasing attention on network forms of governance in the last decades does not 
mean that non-governmental actors previously did not have an active role in policy- and 
decision-making processes. Policy- and political decision making have probably never been 
the exclusive and closed domain of governments, as for example in the pluralistic and cor-
poratist models of policy- and decision making already addressed. However, these models 
were still grounded in the assumption of a clear separation between the public and the 
private realm and imbued with a notion of top-down steering (Torfing et al., 2012). Gover-
nance networks often include state actors, but they do not necessarily provide governmental 
actors a central network position. Further, within governance networks, the boundaries 
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between the public, private, and societal domain become more blurred, and governing 
becomes a result of negotiated interaction between governmental organizations, societal 
organizations, citizen groups, and/or private businesses. The plurality of interconnected 
policy arenas and the multiple actors engaged in policy- and decision making is far more 
stressed by governance network scholars, as is the more horizontal interaction between 
interdependent governmental and non-governmental actors (e.g. Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; 
Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). Furthermore, the self-organizing capabilities of societal actors 
are more emphasized within the governance network paradigm. On the one hand, govern-
ments have become more dependent on self-organizing user groups, private businesses, and 
societal interest groups to implement their decisions. At the same time, citizens and societal 
interest groups increasingly show their self-organizing ability to develop policy alternatives 
and mobilize political support for their views (Marien et al., 2010; Warren, 2009).
The emergence of network forms of governance within the field of water management and urban development
This thesis focuses on complex public issues in the field of water governance and urban 
development. These are perfect fields of research for studying the main question of this 
thesis concerning the way and the extent to which boundary-spanning activities contribute 
to the democratic legitimacy and performance of governance networks. Both fields contain 
complex public issues that are increasingly addressed by network forms of governance.
Many contemporary water issues are characterized by significant complexity because of 
their boundary-crossing nature (Bressers & Lulofs, 2010). Water has multiple manifesta-
tions, multiple functions, and multiple values. This makes water projects complex and hard 
to manage, touching upon the interests of many stakeholders. As a consequence, the rise 
of network forms of governance has been observed in the Dutch water sector – a sector 
traditionally characterized by a dominance of technocratic experts coupled with a top-
down governmental approach (Edelenbos & Teisman, 2013; Kuks, 2004; Van Buuren et al., 
2012; Van der Brugge et al., 2005; Wolsink, 2006). This change in the water management 
regime has been induced by the changing nature and scope of water problems on the one 
hand, and the professionalization of interest groups, the expanded role of provinces and 
municipalities in water management, and the emancipation and activation of citizens on the 
other. Van der Brugge et al. (2005: 164–165) make the following analysis about this growing 
complexity and the consequences for the involvement of a variety of stakeholders in many 
contemporary water projects (cf. Edelenbos et al., 2013; Van Buuren et al., 2012). Because 
of increasing spatial claims from agriculture, industry, traffic, housing, and infrastructure 
as a result of growing economic development, increased population density, and chang-
ing lifestyles, water managers can no longer optimize one particular utility function but 
have to manage across multiple utilities and multiple stakeholders. At the same time, the 
continuous subsidence of soil, the rising sea level, and the land’s decreasing capacity to 
retain water due to loss of nature areas have resulted in pressure from water on land. In 
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this changing landscape, it becomes increasingly clear that conventional water-management 
strategies, such as the fast drainage of redundant water, canalizing rivers, and the construc-
tion of dams and dikes, are not solely effective anymore and are also confronted with serious 
implementation barriers resulting from increasing interdependencies between a variety 
of actors with different perspectives on water problems. As a result, contemporary water 
projects, developed in response to compounded water problems, are increasingly embedded 
in governance networks.
Within the field of urban development, comparable transitions towards network forms of 
governance have been observed (e.g. Healey, 2006 Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Just like water 
management, urban developments, such as urban regeneration initiatives, touch upon vari-
ous utility functions and stakeholders. Urban development projects are boundary-crossing 
public issues, often including a mix of spatial functions such as infrastructure, housing, 
social facilities (schools, sports facilities), business areas, commercial strips, and green/
recreational areas. They often involve a variety of governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, such as housing associations, private developers, societal interest groups, 
and different governmental organizations (e.g. local government, water boards, regional 
government, executive road agency). According to the literature on urban governance, 
urban development projects are nowadays embedded in dynamic network environments, 
in which different governmental agencies, commercial actors, not-for-profit organizations, 
and residents reshape urban areas and are dependent on one another. As Häikiö (2007: 2148) 
put it: “In the face of increasing complexity, conflict and social change, networking can be 
seen as an empowering strategy for local governments […]. They are pooling their resources 
and skills and co-ordinating their objectives with business companies, NGOs and local citi-
zens to achieve the required policy outcomes.” According to Lowndes and Skelcher (1998), 
the emergence of these networks around urban development projects, besides increasing 
resource interdependencies, are often driven by a demand to provide integrative responses 
to complex urban issues within an increasingly fragmented organizational landscape.
1.6 governance neTworks in This Thesis
Two types of governance networks
As in the case of water management or urban development projects, governmental actors 
often need to engage other governmental actors, civil society actors, and businesses in order 
to achieve certain policy outcomes, resulting in network forms of governance. However, as 
described in section 1.3, governance networks could also emerge on the initiative of civil 
society actors or private businesses. In these networks, driven by self-organizing citizens, 
governments play a less dominant role. In this respect, Bogason and Musso (2006) spoke 
of governance networks as spanning a continuum from those with a genesis in the state to 
The rise of governance networks and the need for boundary spanning 31
those that are progeny of civil society organizations. At the same time, as they also admitted, 
this distinction should not be overblown as the development of governance networks (con-
cerning both the network itself and the governance process) is often the result of push–pull 
processes between governmental and non-governmental actors.
In this thesis, I focus on two types of governance networks around water management 
projects and urban development projects: networks in which governmental actors have 
a more leading and initiating role and networks which are the result of self-organizing 
citizens. In this latter type, citizens and/or private businesses have a more leading role. To 
examine the boundary-spanning activities of non-governmental actors, this latter type of 
governance networks could be expected to provide more in-depth knowledge in this respect. 
The first type of governance networks is expected to provide more knowledge concerning 
the boundary-spanning behavior of public managers. Because there is already substantial 
literature on the connective activities of public managers, quantitative research is used to 
test hypotheses in this field of research. In section 1.10, the different methods used in this 
study are further elaborated.
The concept of governance networks in this thesis
The term governance alone has many different connotations, such as corporate or good gov-
ernance, governance as new public management, and governance as multi-level governance 
(Klijn, 2008; Rhodes, 1996). In this thesis, governance networks are defined as more or less 
stable patterns of social relations between mutually dependent actors, which form around 
public issues, and which are formed, maintained, and changed through interactions between 
the actors involved (based on Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; cf. Kooiman, 1993; Rhodes, 1996; 
Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). This definition stresses the network character of governance 
processes. Although governance networks often strive towards the formulation and promo-
tion of common objectives, goals and interests of actors often strongly differ.
The above definition of governance networks does not say anything about the degree 
and the quality of interaction and the level at which common objectives are formulated, 
let alone achieved. This distinguishes this conceptualization from the literature on policy 
implementation networks around public services (Klijn, 2008). These policy implementa-
tion networks have – usually – a clearer goal and are often characterized by high-density 
groups of actors (e.g. Meier & O’Toole 2007; Provan & Kenis, 2008). The interrelationships 
between the different organizations in the networks that are part of this thesis are more 
loosely coupled. They are issue-specific networks (cf. Dryzek, 2010; Warren, 2009) because 
they emerge around specific urban development projects or specific water issues, where for 
example city representatives, private project developers, and residents form a temporary 
actor network to develop and implement the project.
In addition to the more horizontal character of interaction between governance network 
actors, this issue-specific character is another crucial difference compared with the institu-
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tional logic of representative democracy. The actors or ‘the people’ involved in governance 
networks are less bound and more dynamic. Warren put this as follows (2009: 8): “In 
electoral democracy, ‘the people’ are those who live within the boundaries of a state, and 
they are represented (typically) through territorial constituencies. ‘Peoples’ [in governance 
networks], are in effect, brought into existence in response to issues, and often dissolve 
when issues are resolved.” Governance networks are thus more dynamic. They have more 
potential for dealing with complex public issues in a more tailor-made fashion. They are 
potentially “more adaptable to the ‘all affected’ principle of democracy” (ibid).
If governance networks are a response to the shortcomings of representative democracy 
and its hierarchical–instrumental notion of policymaking, how then can their democratic 
legitimacy be assessed? And since many different actors with different interests and thus dif-
ferent preferences or policy goals are included, how then can their performance be assessed? 
In the next two sections, the way in which the democratic legitimacy of governance net-
works and the way in which governance network performance is approached and measured 
are addressed. The individual chapters, when necessary, also address these issues.
1.7 DemocraTic legiTimacy in This Thesis: focus on DemocraTic 
ThroughpuT legiTimacy
How can the democratic legitimacy of the policy- and decision-making processes that 
evolve in governance networks be measured? How one assesses the democratic perfor-
mance of governance networks depends largely on the democratic model one picks and the 
way one approaches governance networks in relation to the dominant liberal representative 
model of democracy. It is clear from the outset that traditional models of democracy tied 
to state sovereignty and electoral authorization and accountability fare badly when applied 
to governance networks (Dryzek, 2010). In the words of Dryzek (2010: 123): “Networks do 
not hold elections; they do not have an electorate, an opposition, or any obvious alterna-
tive set of power holders.” In governance networks, there are no clear constitutional rules 
and norms that determine what a legitimate decision is (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005; Mathur & 
Skelcher, 2007).
As argued above, governance networks could be considered as a response to the limits of 
representative democracy and its hierarchical–instrumental notion of policymaking. It is 
precisely their flexibility and un-predetermined structure that make governance networks 
potentially valuable for dealing with complex issues and generating democratic legitimacy 
according to other standards. They can supplement representative democracy to the extent 
that they are more capable of providing influence to those who are particularly affected by 
certain decisions (e.g. Dryzek, 2007; Klijn & Skelcher, 2007; Warren, 2009). We have to 
stress the adverb potentially here, as it follows from the outset (because of their context-
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specific character) that governance networks differ tremendously in their relative level of 
democratic legitimacy or performance, no matter what model is taken as the normative 
basis. In line with other scholars, I therefore do not approach governance networks as an 
alternative to representative democracy, but as an important supplement (cf. Chambers, 
2003; Torfing et al., 2012). They are a response to the limits of representative democracy, 
especially when it comes to dealing with complex public issues; but this requires other 
criteria to assess their democratic legitimacy.
In chapter 3, it is argued that the deliberative model of democracy is relatively well suited 
to evaluate the democratic legitimacy of governance networks as a supplement to repre-
sentative democracy. Deliberative democracy is not usually thought of as an alternative to 
representative democracy, but rather as an expansion of it (Chamber, 2003). Deliberative 
models of democracy are grounded on the idea that democratic decision making should be 
based on mutual exchange of argumentation and not on the aggregation of predetermined 
preferences. They focus on the communication processes of opinion and will-formation that 
precede voting. This means that deliberative democratic models assume that individuals’ 
preferences are not fixed but can change in debate and political dialogue (Held, 2006). This 
distinguishes deliberative models of democracy fundamentally from aggregative models 
of democracy, which generally take preferences as given, defined prior to political action 
(Dryzek, 2007).
Building on this deliberative democracy point of view, I use the concept of throughput 
legitimacy to assess the democratic legitimacy of governance network processes. In contrast 
to input legitimacy – which refers to the extent and traditional representativeness of citizen 
influence on policy formulation (‘government by the people’) – and output legitimacy – 
which refers to the effectiveness of policy- and decision-making to achieving specified goals 
(‘government for the people’) (Scharpf, 1998), the notion of throughput legitimacy focuses 
on the democratic and participatory quality of the decision-making process (Bekkers and 
Edwards, 2007; Risse and Kleine, 2007).4 It is based on the interactions of the actors in the 
governance network and the extent to which affected stakeholders are directly included in 
the decision- and policy-making process (‘governing with the people’).
It is the process of deliberation itself and the conditions of the process that are important 
for generating throughput legitimacy. As Manin noted (1987: 351–352): “the source of legiti-
macy is not the predetermined will of individuals, but rather the process of its formation, 
that is, deliberation itself.” This deliberation and argumentation process generates more or 
less support for certain measures. Furthermore, for this deliberation process to be success-
ful, the communication process between actors in governance networks has to be open and 
4  The phrases ‘government by the people’ and ‘government for the people’ are the famous words of the U.S. 
president Abraham Lincoln. He used the phrase ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’ in his 
Gettysburg Address in 1863.
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transparent, or at least conform to a number of rules and practices that are all connected to 
the process of discussion, information, plurality of values, and so forth. Besides transpar-
ency, the inclusiveness of the process is an important consideration. According to Dryzek 
(2007), a deliberative model views a decision as legitimate to the degree that all affected 
by it have the right, opportunity, or capacity to participate in deliberation about the deci-
sion in question (see also for example Cohen, 1989; Manin, 1987). And Dryzek (2007: 268) 
continued: “While there can be problems in operationalizing this ideal […], as a criterion 
it can be applied as a matter of degree.” To empirically examine the democratic legitimacy 
of governance networks around complex water or urban projects, I focus on democratic 
throughput legitimacy. Due deliberation, the transparency of the decision-making process, 
and the degree of inclusion of affected stakeholders are important indicators in this respect.
1.8 neTwork performance in This Thesis
There has been much discussion in the governance literature on how to measure the 
performance of governance networks. There is no particular best approach (e.g. Provan 
& Milward, 2001). In dealing with complex public issues, actors have different goals, and 
it is thus difficult to pick a single goal by which to measure the policy solutions and deci-
sions emerging from governance network processes. Furthermore, measuring performance 
is problematic because decision-making processes are often lengthy, and actors’ goals can 
change over time. Goal displacement is the negative term for this phenomenon, and learn-
ing is the positive term (see Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). In short, there are no objective 
standards against which to evaluate or score the performance of governance networks.
One way to deal with this measurement problem is to measure the ex-post satisfac-
tion of networked policy solutions and formal decisions. This is a relatively simple and 
frequently chosen solution (Torfing et al., 2012). Key individuals in the network are asked 
to evaluate the outcomes on various dimensions. In the survey-based articles of this thesis, 
this approach is used. I use Klijn et al.’s (2010) previously tested scale. They used perceived 
network performance as a proxy for measuring network performance (see also, for example, 
Hasnain-Wynia et al., 2003). This scale consists of multiple criteria. As policy problems 
in networks are complex and require innovative and integrative solutions, these are two 
indicators of network performance (cf. Sandström & Carlsson, 2008). Integrative in this 
sense means that different spatial functions/utilities are included in the policy solutions. 
Other indicators of this scale address whether the outcome solves relevant policy problems: 
the problem-solving capacity and robustness of the solution (Provan & Milward, 2001) and 
the impact of stakeholder involvement on the project results (‘recognizable contribution’) 
(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Lastly, the relation between costs and benefits is a feature of 
performance that is often applied (Klijn et al., 2010a).
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Hence, the term network performance in this thesis refers to this multi-criteria scale. This 
scale includes the effectiveness, the innovative character, the integrative nature, and the 
robustness of policy solutions.
1.9 bounDary-spanning acTiviTies wiThin governance neTworks as 
a crucial variable
According to the literature, governance networks could be an interesting way to develop 
effective responses to complex societal issues, but this depends largely on the quality of 
interaction between the different stakeholders on the one hand, and the interaction between 
network processes and governmental institutions on the other (e.g. Edelenbos, 2005; Hajer 
& Wagenaar, 2003; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Good network performance in terms of 
problem-solving capacity, broad societal acceptance, and innovative and integrative policy 
solutions to complex public issues are less likely to emerge if interactions are characterized 
by hard-nosed bargaining, deadlocks, and conflicts about knowledge. For good outcomes 
to emerge, governance networks require the inclusion of relevant and affected actors, the 
willingness of the participants to exchange or pool resources, and the development of 
common conceptions of problems, solutions, and decision-making premises (Torfing et al., 
2012). The boundary-spanning activities of public managers could play an important role in 
this respect (e.g. Feldman & Khademian, 2007; Williams, 2002). These boundary-spanning 
activities include the building of sustainable relationships, mutual exchange of information, 
and coordination across organizational boundaries (see below).
Alongside the interactions between actors in the network, the difference in institutional 
logic between governance network processes and traditional governmental institutions 
gives rise to challenges in terms of mutual alignment and coordination. Proposed policy 
solutions produced in governance networks, characterized by more informal interaction 
between a variety of stakeholders, could easily change or even evaporate when they have 
to pass through formal policy- and decision-making structures and arenas (Edelenbos, 
2005; Healey, 2006). For example, deliberated policy solutions and/or the variety of policy 
directions created by governance network processes – one of the potential strengths of the 
network mode of governance – could be endangered by cherry-picking behavior on the 
part of decision makers. Furthermore, integrative policy solutions to complex public issues 
emerging in governance networks could be endangered by sector-based approaches within 
governmental organizations. On the other hand, negotiated targets or proposed policy solu-
tions could undermine or challenge existing governmental policies and/or governmental 
routines and roles (e.g. Termeer, 2009).
These tensions arising from a misfit between the institutional logic of governmental orga-
nizations and that of a governance network mode require mutual translation, coordination, 
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and alignment between these different spheres. This could contribute to the democratic 
anchorage of governance network processes within traditional institutions of representative 
democracy (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). This could also improve the chance of proposed 
policy solutions and strategies developed in governance networks being accepted and imple-
mented. In addition to connecting different actors from the realm of government, society, 
and business, translation of policy processes across governmental and non-governmental 
organizational boundaries and connecting governmental procedures with network pro-
cesses are important boundary-spanning activities that could enhance the performance and 
legitimacy of governance networks. Boundary spanners could play a key role in this respect.
Boundary spanners and boundary-spanning activities
Boundary spanners are specialized in negotiating the interactions between the organization 
and its environment in order to realize a better ‘fit.’ The concept of boundary spanners has 
its roots in organizational literature, according to which boundary spanners play a key role 
in the communication and coordination across intra-organizational boundaries that are 
needed because of functional task differentiation and specialization (e.g. Leifer & Delbecq, 
1978; Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). With the advent of contingency approaches to organiza-
tions, the importance of boundary spanners in the adaptation of organizations towards 
their environment became a vital subject of interest for organization scholars (Baker, 2008). 
By representing the organization towards the environment, but also by representing the 
environment within the organization, boundary spanners could provide the necessary 
information by which the organization could adapt to its environment. In this transfer 
of information or resources, environmental scanning and information filtration play an 
important role. In these conceptualizations of boundary spanners, the notion of boundary 
spanners’ internal and external linkage is stressed, so that they can both gather and transfer 
information from outside their sub-units (Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). To effectively accom-
plish a better fit between organization and environment, boundary spanners are engaged 
in three main (and interrelated) activities: 1) connecting or linking different people and 
processes across organizational boundaries, 2) selecting relevant information on both sides 
of the boundary, and 3) translating this information to the other side of the boundary.
In the literature on inter-organizational relationships and governance networks, the man-
agement of inter-organizational relationships as a boundary-spanning activity is further 
stressed (e.g. Baker, 2008; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002; Williams, 2002). Interdependency 
accounts of governance networks suggest that boundary spanners play a key role in the 
creation and maintenance of successful inter-organizational relations in order to manage 
interdependency (Baker, 2008). In this respect, boundary spanners could enhance trust 
between organizations; this in turn could enhance the performance of inter-organizational 
relationships (e.g. Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007; Klijn et al., 2010b).
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In this thesis, boundary spanning is understood as a combination of interrelated activities 
concerned with connecting different actors from the realm of government, society, and busi-
ness, building sustainable relationships between these actors, and connecting governance 
network processes with intra-organizational processes. Boundary spanners are skilled 
networkers, who have the ability to recognize and exploit opportunities to develop inter-
organizational relationships (Baker, 2008; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002; Williams, 2002). This 
means that they are able to empathize with others and that they have a feeling for the social 
construction of other actors. According to Tushman and Scanlan (1981: 291–292), boundar-
ies “can be spanned effectively only by individuals who understand the coding schemes and 
are attuned to the contextual information on both sides of the boundary, enabling them 
to search out relevant information on one side and disseminate it on the other.” Boundary 
spanners understand other actors’ needs (Ferguson et al., 2005); this enables them to search 
for shared meanings (Levina & Vaast, 2005). In this way, sustainable relationships with ac-
tors from different organizational backgrounds could be developed and maintained. Besides 
their interpersonal and inter-organizational skills, boundary spanners are considered to be 
entrepreneurs and innovators in the sense that they try to link different policy issues and 
policy streams across boundaries (Williams, 2002; cf. Kingdon, 1984).
Which boundary spanners?
There is a lot of ambiguity in the literature about who boundary spanners are. Some schol-
ars approach boundary spanners as those organizational members who have an explicit 
boundary-spanning role. Such people occupy a dedicated boundary-spanning role within 
the organizational structure, such as organizational members with a representational com-
munication role or so-called organizational gate-keepers, ‘protecting’ the organization from 
environmental turbulence. These organizational members are often involved in a one-step 
information flow and perform a more routine transacting organizational task (Tushman & 
Scanlan, 1981). Such a structural organizational role does not say anything about the way 
boundary-spanning activities are actually performed. In line with more network-oriented 
interdependency approaches (see Baker, 2008), I focus on boundary spanners-in-practice, as 
Levina and Vaast (2005) call them. These boundary spanners actively connect with other 
organizations and processes, build relationships between actors, acquire and select external 
information, and transmit/translate this internally and vice versa (a two-step information 
flow in the words of Tushman and Scanlan, 1981). Hence, in this thesis, I focus on individu-
als who are practicing high boundary-spanning activities.
The boundary-spanning activities of both governmental and non-governmental actors 
are examined in this thesis. The emphasis in the different chapters differs though. In part II, 
the boundary-spanning activities of public managers are the main focus. As policymakers, 
public managers are directly confronted with the functional limits of representative democ-
racy and with assertive stakeholders in dealing with complex public issues (e.g. Peters, 2010; 
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Warren, 2009). Furthermore, their boundary-spanning activities are likely to be related to 
the performance and democratic legitimacy of the networks in which they are engaged 
(e.g. Feldman & Khademian, 2007; Williams, 2002). The literature on network manage-
ment provides useful insights into this matter. In the literature on network management 
around complex spatial or environmental projects, four different categories of network 
management strategies can be distinguished (see Klijn et al., 2010a): (1) exploring content 
(creating more variety, organizing research, exploring the perceptions of different actors, 
and so forth); (2) arranging the structure of the interaction (securing a temporary organi-
zational arrangement for interactions); (3) establishing process rules (designing temporary 
agreements and rules to govern interactions); and (4) connecting (to actors, scales, devel-
opments, opportunities, and so forth). Although not so clearly distinguishable, the fourth 
management strategy particularly includes boundary-spanning activities. In chapter 3, this 
fourth boundary-spanning management strategy is further conceptualized as a connective 
management style.
In the case of governance networks in which citizens take a more leading role (part III), 
the role of non-governmental actors’ boundary-spanning activities is considered. Their 
impact upon the establishment and performance of these networks is examined. In the last 
chapter of part III, the effects of boundary-spanning activities of both governmental and 
non-governmental actors on the performance of governance networks are examined.
The effects of boundary spanners on democratic legitimacy and network performance examined
Especially within issue-specific governance networks based on more loosely coupled inter-
relationships between actors, the connective and coordinating activities of boundary span-
ners could be a crucial variable with regard to network performance or democratic through-
put legitimacy. As argued in the previous sections, governance networks have democratic 
potential because citizens, civil society organizations, and businesses have more room for 
direct engagement. In order to make this potential manifest, it is important that the diversity 
of stakeholders become included and connected to the processes of governance networks. 
As described in section 1.7, democratic throughput legitimacy is about the level of inclusion 
of stakeholders, the quality of the argumentation process, the opportunities for delibera-
tion, the transparency of the decision-making process, and the transparency of information. 
The boundary-spanning activities of public managers could play a key role in this respect 
(Feldman & Khademian, 2007; Torfing et al., 2012). They could bring stakeholders together 
in a constructive manner. They have a feel for the diversity of interests, for what is relevant 
for the different involved stakeholders and can provide opportunities for these stakeholders 
to engage. Moreover, boundary-spanning public managers take responsibility for connect-
ing this debate and communication in informal governance networks’ throughput to formal 
decision-making structures and policy processes.
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Dealing effectively with complex public issues requires a high flow of information be-
tween involved actors, coordination, and mutual alignment of a diversity of stakeholders 
(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Torfing et al., 2012; Wagenaar, 2007). With their role in increas-
ing the flow of information, and translating information and connecting individuals and 
processes across organizational boundaries, boundary spanners could positively affect 
the performance of governance networks. Although the effects of boundary spanning on 
individual organizational performance and inter-organizational collaboration and trust 
are (to some extent) reported in the literature (e.g. Ahearne et al., 2005; Leifer & Delbecq, 
1978; Tushman & Scanlan, 1981; Seabright et al., 1992), there is a lack of empirical studies, 
especially quantitative research, focusing on the functioning and presence of competent 
boundary spanners on the one hand, and governance network performance within these 
networks on the other. Furthermore, much of the attention is directed at the boundary-
spanning activities of (representatives of) central actors (e.g. lead organizations, network 
managers, politicians) (e.g. Cristofoli et al., 2014; Klijn et al., 2010a; Meier & O’Toole, 2007; 
Sørensen & Torfing, 2009). There is a dearth of empirical research with a broader focus, i.e. 
formal and informal boundary spanners originating not only from official organizations, 
but also from societal and community organizations and NGOs (cf. Van Hulst et al., 2012).
1.10 ouTline of This Thesis: sTrucTure of arTicles anD meThoDs
This thesis is presented in the form of a number of international peer-reviewed articles 
and a book chapter in an international edited volume. Four articles have been published 
or are currently in press: in Policy Sciences, Environment and Planning C, Water Resources 
Management, and European Planning Studies. The book chapter is published in a volume 
on interactive governance edited by Jacob Torfing and Peter Triantafillou (ECPR Press). 
These articles and the book chapter stand alone and can be read without the other chapters. 
Therefore there is sometimes a small overlap between them. The main differences relate to 
the methods (both qualitative and quantitative methods are used), the cases they analyze, 
and the emphasis on different bodies of knowledge (theories).
The articles and the book chapter are clustered in two parts (part II and part III). Part II 
focuses on the boundary-spanning activities of public managers within water governance 
networks and their effects on democratic legitimacy and network performance. In the first 
chapter of part II (chapter 2), a highly contested complex water issue is examined from a 
management perspective. The degree to which the managers engaged in boundary-spanning 
activities is discussed. This may provide insight into how boundary-spanning activities, or 
a lack thereof, relate to the legitimacy and performance of water governance networks. 
The second chapter of part II (chapter 3), using quantitative research, tests the relationship 
between boundary-spanning management, democratic throughput legitimacy, and network 
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performance. As the literature on public managers’ boundary-spanning activities is quite 
elaborate, this justifies the approach of testing theoretically induced hypotheses within this 
field of research.
Part III goes deeper into the boundary-spanning activities of non-governmental actors 
in governance networks. These boundary-spanning activities are less elaborated in the 
literature. Qualitative methods have been used to study the specific activities of these 
boundary spanners. One single in-depth case study (chapter 4) and one comparative case 
study (chapter 5) have been conducted in this respect. These case studies were also used to 
study the evolution of the interaction process between the self-organizing citizen groups 
and the governmental institutions, and the role of boundary spanners therein. Part III 
closes with a quantitative study (chapter 6), testing the effects of both governmental and 
non-governmental boundary spanners on trust and network performance within urban 
governance networks. The individual chapters go deeper into the specific methodological 
choices and techniques applied.
Part IV contains the concluding chapter (chapter 7) of this thesis in which the findings of 
all the studies are combined in order to answer the main research question. Furthermore, 
the results are reflected upon, and specific recommendations are made for future research.
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Part II
The need for boundary 
spanning by public managers 
in governance networks
As described in the introduction of this thesis, water managers often can no longer optimize 
one particular utility function, but have to manage across multiple utilities and multiple 
stakeholders due to increasing spatial claims from agriculture, industry, traffic, housing 
and infrastructure. Chapter 2 provides an in-depth case study about how pubic managers, 
confronted with a complex water issue, demarcate their project and whether they engage 
in boundary-spanning activities. The case was selected because of its contested nature. 
The case is about a governmental initiative to change the management of the water regime 
concerning the Haringvliet water basin in reaction to negative ecological and natural devel-
opments. However after more than 20 years no actual change in the water management has 
been implemented. As will be further elaborated in this chapter, conflicts between different 
governmental levels and between different stakeholders have been an important factor in 
this respect. This raises the question how the project has been managed: how did the public 
managers dealt with the complexity of the water management issue, to what extent did the 
managers spanned the boundaries between their project and the environment and what can 
we learn from this?
In the subsequent chapter (chapter 3), the relationship between connective management, 
democratic throughput legitimacy and governance network performance will be put to the 
test. The literature suggests that a management style which is based on a boundary-spanning 
strategy will enhance democratic throughput legitimacy, which in turn could positively in-
fluence the performance of policy- and decision-making concerning complex public issues. 
This will empirically be tested in this chapter. In this chapter, the term ‘connective manage-
ment’ will be used for a management style which is based on a boundary-spanning strategy, 
as this term connects better with the network management literature. Before the empirical 
test I will go deeper into the issue of democratic legitimacy of governance networks, as this 
is a highly debated issue in the governance network literature.

ChaPter 2
A contested complex water issue 
and a lack of boundary spanning
This chapter has been published in the Journal Water Resources 
Management as:
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absTracT
In this paper, we explore how managing actors’ boundary judgments influence the adapt-
ability of water governance. We approach this question by examining the relationship 
between the way water managers frame, and act in, complex water issues on the one hand 
and develop adaptive water governance strategies on the other. We define four categories 
of boundary judgments made by water managers in order to deal with the complexities 
in water governance issues. An in-depth case study analysis of an attempt to adjust the 
management of the water regime in the south-west Delta of the Netherlands is provided 
in order to reconstruct the water managers’ boundary judgments and their impact upon 
governance strategies used. We found that, most of the time, the water managers involved 
predominantly made tight boundary judgments. These tight boundary judgments seemed 
to hamper the mutual learning process among a variety of stakeholders that is needed to 
realize adaptive water governance. We argue that wide boundary judgments enhance the 
chance of realizing adaptive practices and build upon exploration, learning, and connection.
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1. inTroDucTion
Management of complex water issues is highly challenging, as managers have to deal with 
both the unpredictability of ecosystems and the complexity of social systems (Huitema et al., 
2009). Furthermore, water issues often cross different kinds of boundaries, such as physical 
and geographical boundaries (e.g. surface and ground water), different administrative and 
institutional boundaries (e.g. governmental levels and sectors), and social boundaries (e.g. 
between social and economic groups) (Mostert et al., 2008). In the literature on water man-
agement, it is therefore stated that actors have to use adaptive strategies to deal with both 
the uncertainty of ecosystem dynamics and the social system’s complexity (Olsson et al., 
2006). Accepting unpredictability, adaptive governance emphasizes learning and flexibility 
(Foxon et al., 2009).
However, many questions still remain about why certain water governance systems are 
able to bring such approaches into practice, whereas others are not (e.g. Mostert et al., 2008; 
Olsson et al., 2006). Reflecting on the realization of adaptive water governance in practice, 
Pahl-Wostl et al., (2011) note that there is a lacuna in the translation of political rhetoric 
into change at the operational level. Moreover, Huitema et al. (2009) make the case that 
“despite its obvious attractiveness as an idea, [adaptive (co-)management] is very hard to 
introduce and sustain in practice”. It seems difficult to implement or manage a transition 
towards adaptive water governance. The literature on adaptive governance, addressing the 
political dimension, pays attention to institutional factors, power relationships, and process 
conditions in this matter (e.g. Folke et al., 2005; Huitema et al., 2009; Olsson et al., 2006). 
As changes in water system management regimes touch upon the interests of many ac-
tors, this literature shows that, for adaptive water governance, public participation, social 
learning, and knowledge building among a variety of involved stakeholders are important; 
thus also addressing questions of legitimacy. This emphasizes both the importance, and the 
fragility and political character of actors’ cross-boundary interaction (Mostert et al., 2008; 
Edelenbos & Teisman, 2011).
Less attention is paid to the way water managers demarcate the complex social-ecological 
system with which they deal and how they interpret the relevance and impact of the inter-
dependencies they encounter. This is an important aspect to consider, as it influence the 
process of cross-boundary interaction that emerges in practice (cf. Mostert et al., 2008; Pel 
& Boons, 2010; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2011). In this paper, we elaborate such an analysis with 
the help of the concept of boundary judgments. This concept emphasizes the unavoidable 
need and act of actors to draw boundaries around their system of action. It focuses on the 
way in which actors cope with the complexities of everyday reality by demarcating and 
making sense of their surroundings (Luhmann, 1995). We approach adaptive governance as 
the way actors respond to dynamics and complexity regarding social-ecological issues (cf. 
Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007). We focus on the governance process and how managing actors deal 
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in an adaptive way with the dynamics resulting from the unpredictability and complexity of 
social-ecological systems. The “adaptive” part of the concept recognizes that water manage-
ment is a complex system that changes over time, such that policies must adjust to new 
information and insights about dynamic social and ecological processes (Medema, 2008).
In the next two sections, we elaborate the concept of boundary judgments. We then 
use the resulting analytical framework to analyze a case in which water managers tried to 
change the existing water governance regime in order to give ecological values more weight. 
However, during the implementation they are confronted with several difficulties, and after 
more than 20 years a new water governance regime has still not been realized.
2 TheoreTical framework: bounDary juDgmenTs anD aDapTive 
waTer governance
2.1 Boundary judgments: coping with complexity
The concept of boundary judgments has been developed within critical system thinking, 
and it refers to the assumptions about what should belong to the system in question and 
what should belong to its environment (Ulrich, 1987). As Pel and Boons (2010: 1251) put it: 
“Behind any apparently self-evident identification of systems there is judgment, and to be 
critical means to account for these constitutive ‘boundary judgments’.” According to Luh-
mann (1995), drawing boundaries is a way of coping with the complexity of everyday reality, 
and through these boundary judgments actors are able to make sense of their surroundings. 
Boundary judgments determine “what is in view and might be taken into account at the 
moment and what is out of view and thus excluded from consideration” (Flood, 1999: 92).
Actors make boundary judgments in order to cope with the complexities in their sur-
roundings, by demarcating what is included or excluded. In the literature on management 
within complex systems, a distinction is made between complexity reducing behavior 
versus complexity embracing behavior (Ashmos et al., 2000; Teisman, 2005; Uhl-Bien et al., 
2007; Edelenbos et al., 2012). Tight (or exclusive) boundary judgments focus on reducing or 
controlling complexity, whereby complexity is decomposed in isolated parts, and problems 
in those parts are first resolved in isolation and subsequently integrated with other problem 
fields (Axelrod & Cohen, 1999). It “…helps a manager to restrict his/her actions and atten-
tions to a […] system that can be known and controlled better” (Boons et al., 2009: 248). 
This means that internal or external dynamics of governance processes should be avoided, 
because it leads away from initially designed solutions. However, water issues cross all kinds 
of system boundaries, and tight boundary judgments could prevent the learning and joint 
knowledge building needed among a variety of actors, as emphasized in the literature on 
adaptive governance.
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Wide (or inclusive) boundary judgments start from a more holistic system approach (Hol-
ling et al., 1998) in which the cross-cutting characteristics of complex water issues are taken 
as the point of departure. Water managers with wide boundary judgments focus on the 
interdependencies of issues, actors, processes, and structures. This means that managers 
are oriented towards making meaningful connections (Edelenbos et al., 2012). This could 
lead to more inclusive water governance processes “…where ambitions and actions can be 
combined and consensus between possible diverging strategies more easily realized” (Boons 
et al., 2009: 248).
In order to analyze the boundary judgments of water managers in a systematic way, we 
have developed an analytical framework in which we distinguish four categories of bound-
ary judgments relating to different dimensions of complexity faced by water managers (table 
1).
2.2 Four categories of boundary judgments
In dealing with complex water issues, water managers have to make boundary judgments 
with respect to the substance of the issue at question. Which kinds of aspects and domains 
are involved? These demarcations could be typified as substantive boundary judgments. The 
choice of values that are considered relevant is important for these boundary judgments. 
For example, is the specific water issue about realizing ecological sustainability or about 
economic vitality, or both? Within political processes, substantive boundary judgments are 
often made explicitly when decisions are made concerning the priority of policy programs 
and related values; but technical experts examining water issues also make substantive 
boundary judgments, whether implicit or explicit (e.g. Dewulf et al., 2005; Koppenjan & 
Klijn, 2004).
A second dimension stems from the emergent dynamics during the governance process, 
resulting from interaction between involved actors (e.g. Ashmos et al., 2000; Koppenjan & 
Klijn, 2004). The way in which stakeholders are involved (the width and depth of participa-
tion) influences the governance process (e.g. Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006; Raadgever et al., 
2008). Water managers make participation boundary judgments regarding the involvement 
Table 1 Four categories of boundary judgments
Substantive boundary judgments Participation boundary 
judgments 
Structural boundary judgments Contextual boundary judgments
Demarcations concerning 
the content.
What is the issue about? 
Which domains and values 
are included?
Demarcations concerning 
the involvement of actors.
Which actors have to be 
involved, in which way and 
on which occasions?
Demarcations concerning 
the structure of the policy 
process.
Who is responsible for 
which part and how are 
the parts related?
Demarcations concerning 
the project and its 
environment.
Which external 
developments are 
relevant?
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of different actors at different junctures (cf. Ashmos et al., 2000). Hence, these judgments 
are about actors’ inclusion in, and exclusion from, the governance process and the depth of 
participation, influencing the specific interaction patterns emerging during the governance 
process.
Although involved stakeholders may come to consensus about the substantive issue at 
stake, designing and implementing policy measures is certainly not straightforward. A third 
dimension of complexity in this respect stems from the institutional fragmentation of the 
water governance system. Especially in more polycentric governance systems (Huitema et 
al., 2009), this structural complexity is relatively large (cf. Ashmos et al., 2000) as a result 
of the increasing specialization and fragmentation of the responsibilities concerning water 
among different organizations and sectors (Edelenbos & Teisman, 2011). Furthermore, 
the cross-cutting characteristic of water issues, including different jurisdictions and 
institutional domains or sectors, enhances this structural complexity. It often means that 
cooperation and coordination among a variety of governmental agencies is necessary to 
realize policy measures. This is challenging, as every pillar often has the tendency to defend 
its own interest (Edelenbos & Teisman, 2011). Regarding this structural complexity, actors 
make structural boundary judgments. Water managers have to make choices about how 
to organize their activities. These are demarcations regarding the structure of governance 
processes: demarcations of different phases and elements of a policy process, how these 
different parts are connected, and which agents are responsible for each part.
These three different dimensions of complexity are oriented towards the internal dynam-
ics within the specific governance process, resulting from the evolution of interpretations, 
actions, and interactions of involved actors. As complex water issues cross different geo-
graphical borders and governance levels, dynamics could also occur in the environment 
of the project. These external dynamics constitute a fourth dimension of complexity. An 
example of these external dynamics are so-called change events (e.g. De Bruijn et al., 2002; 
Teisman et al., 2009), such as abrupt political developments (e.g. changing coalitions), new 
knowledge concerning climate conditions, or changing conditions of another, but influenc-
ing (water) system. These external events could change the scope of the issue or the position 
of the issue on the policy agenda (Kingdon, 1984). Boundary judgments regarding these 
external dynamics could be typified as contextual boundary judgments. Water managers can 
differ in their (implicit) orientation and behavior to include or exclude developments in the 
surroundings or context of their project.
We stress that in reality these four categories are related. For example, participation 
boundary judgments also influence the values that are being considered, thereby influenc-
ing substantive boundary judgments. In our analysis, we also pay explicit attention to 
these interrelationships. In order to analyze the boundary judgments of water managers in 
our case study, we need to further conceptualize and operationalize the four categories of 
boundary judgments.
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3 operaTionalizaTion anD research meThoDology
3.1 Operationalization
On the basis of the distinction between the different categories of boundary judgments, we 
analyze the case by focusing on the following specific demarcations that actors make. We 
use a five point scale (from -- to ++) to indicate the tightness or wideness of the boundary 
judgments:
· To analyze the substantive boundary judgments, we examine the domain demarca-
tions indicating the extent to which different values are included in the project. Tight 
substantive boundary judgments are made when the project is (mainly) approached 
and developed from one functional domain, for example water quality. Wide bound-
ary judgments are made when different domains play a significant role in formulating 
measures;
· To analyze the participation boundary judgments, we examine the demarcations with 
regard to the actors involved. Tight participation boundary judgments are made when 
relatively few stakeholders in the policy process are (actively) involved and many are 
(implicitly) excluded. Wide boundary judgments are made when relatively many stake-
holders are actively involved in the policy process;
· To analyze the structural boundary judgments, we examine the demarcations with regard 
to the different parts of policy processes (e.g. policy development and implementation) 
and the coordination of actors’ responsibilities to act on these parts. Tight structural 
boundary judgments are applied when the project is divided into clearly separated parts 
by strictly defined responsibilities. Wide boundary judgments are made when parts of 
the project and related projects are approached as interacting and co-evolving;
· To analyze the contextual boundary judgments, we examine the way the responsible 
actors relate the project to its environment. Tight contextual boundary judgments are 
applied when the project is approached as relatively separate from the context. Develop-
ments on other scales are ignored. Wide boundary judgments are made when external 
dynamics are constantly taken into account. Attempts to connect the project with these 
external dynamics could easily lead to adaptation of the initially planned course of ac-
tion.
3.2 Methodology
In order to examine the relationship between actors’ boundary judgments and their re-
lationship with adaptive governance around complex water issues, we conducted an in-
depth case analysis of the decision to change the management of the Haringvliet sluices. It 
comprises an instrumental case study, in which the researcher uses a specific case to gain 
more understanding about a particular phenomenon of interest (Stake, 1995). The research 
design of a single in-depth case study does not enable us to develop generalized empirical 
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knowledge about achieving adaptive governance, but it does provide a detailed understand-
ing of how managers’ boundary judgments could be related to adaptive governance. The 
case has not been selected explicitly as an example of adaptive water governance. However, 
the case is about responding to ecological developments as a result of the policy goal to 
increase estuarine dynamics in the area. We are interested in whether and how water man-
agers implement adaptive strategies, and to what extent their boundary judgments relate to 
these. The case is especially interesting as it already takes more than 20 years to change the 
water management regime.
Boundary judgments can be reconstructed by ‘observation of observations’ (Pel, 2009: 
127). To enhance the internal validity of our research, we used triangulation of research 
methods and resources: in-depth semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and 
observations. At time of writing, we have been following the case for more than two years. 
All relevant written documents were subjected to detailed study, such as policy documents, 
memos, technical reports, and council minutes. Furthermore, we observed seven meet-
ings between stakeholders and experts concerning the issue. These occasions were used to 
observe stakeholder interactions and to check our findings derived from the interviews and 
the document analysis. We interviewed 15 key players who are representatives of the key 
stakeholders in the project. These interviews lasted two hours on average, and the interview 
reports were checked and controlled by the respondents. We focused on the boundary 
judgments of the main managing actors in the case, i.e. a national governmental agency 
(i.e. Rijkswaterstaat: RWS), and the regional government (the Province), responsible for 
enabling a change in the water management regime in the Haringvliet estuary. We therefore 
extensively interviewed these two actors (six interviews). We asked questions regarding the 
four types of boundary judgments (1) the scope of the issue, the problem to be resolved, and 
the consequences of possible measures, (2) the interaction process with other actors (e.g. 
the stakeholders involved, in what way, and on which occasions), (3) the structuring of the 
policy process, the allocation of responsibilities, and the relationships with other projects, 
and (4) the external developments relating to the project according to the actors, and what 
these meant or should mean for the project according to the respondents.
4 case DescripTion haringvlieT sluices
The Haringvliet sluices are part of the Dutch Delta Works built in reaction to the storm 
flood of 1953. The sluices were finished in 1970 and closed off the Haringvliet estuary from 
the North Sea (figure 1). This had major consequences for the surrounding social-ecological 
system. The closing off led to the disappearance of estuarial tides and turned the Haringvliet 
into a freshwater lake. This was especially valuable for safety, agriculture, and freshwater 
supply in the south-west Delta, particularly on the islands of Goeree-Overflakkee and 
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Voorne Putten. On the other hand, the closing off has led toward “a system with generally 
low natural ecological values [due to] the accumulation of contaminated sediments, disap-
pearance of intertidal areas and nursery grounds for fish, disturbance of fish migration, and 
less mixing of river and seawater” (Smit et al., 1997).
Figure 1 South-west Delta, haringvliet estuary (Source: Google earth)
In the 1980s, integrated water resource management (IWRM) was introduced in Dutch water 
management (Disco, 2002; Mostert, 2006). With its adoption, national government aimed 
at “optimal coordination of the wishes of society with regard to the functioning and func-
tions of the water systems … by means of an integral consideration of (these wishes and) the 
potential of the systems” (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 1985 in Mostert, 2006: 20). 
By the time of its adoption, this IWRM approach had a strong ecological emphasis. Disco 
(2002) speaks of the ecological turn in Dutch water management and the ‘ecologization’ of 
Dutch coastal engineering. In line with this changing paradigm on water management, na-
tional government started to investigate whether it was possible to change the management 
of the Haringvliet sluices to restore estuarine dynamics in the Rhine-Meuse estuary in 1988 
(see table 2). As a possible opening of the sluices was also considered to be important for 
the migration of fish as salmon and sea trout, this policy was connected to the Rhine Action 
Program for Ecological Rehabilitation, started in 1987 by the International Commission for 
the Protection of the Rhine (Smit et al., 1997).
After an environmental impact assessment, it was decided to open the sluices also during 
periods of high tides, allowing brackish North Sea water into the Haringvliet system. RWS 
concluded that the most appropriate policy scenario would be to change the management 
regime of the sluices in various steps. The first step was to open the sluices slightly (leave 
them ajar) in 2005. This decision was taken in June 2000 by the minister (henceforth: ‘the 
decision to change the management of the sluices’). In this way, learning could take place dur-
ing implementation about how best to achieve greater estuarial dynamics, and the effects 
for the users and stakeholders could be controlled. Although this first step will not improve 
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tidal dynamics, it was considered to be at least of direct value for enhancing the migration 
of fish as part of the Rhine Action Program. However, a higher level of salinity has nega-
tive consequences for different water system users, such as farmers and water companies. 
Therefore, two important conditions had to be met: (1) the salt intrusion should not move 
any further than a specified line and (2) the intakes for water for drinking and agriculture 
should be relocated before the sluices were opened. In this way, the functionality of the 
freshwater intakes was secured. RWS focused on realizing the first condition. In figure 2, 
the imaginary border with regard to the salt intrusion is shown. The Province was given 
responsibility for realizing the second condition. To meet this condition, freshwater canals 
have been developed (see figure 2).
However, during the policy development and implementation of these two conditions, 
the policy program was confronted with dynamics in the actor environment and in the 
Table 2 Overview of policy and decision-making process
Timeframe Events/marking decisions
1985-1994 Ecologization of Dutch Water management. Start of Rhine Action Program. Start of 
examinations to change the management of the sluices by national government
1994-1998 Environmental Impact Assessment
1998-2000 Decision to change the management of the sluices by national government
2000-2004 Delegation of part implementation program to the Province. Connection between nature 
development project Goeree-Overflakkee and relocation water intake points
2005-2009 Rejection of the relocation of the water intake points by Local Governments. Procedural 
struggles between the Province and regional stakeholders.
2010-2012 Decision to change the management of the sluices is reconsidered by the national 
government. Due to international agreements on fish migration, implementation of the 
decision is continued
 
 
Figure 2 Project area (Adapted from Province of South-Holland 2010) 
 
Figure 2 Project area and the compensating measures (adapted from Province of South-holland 2010)
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physical environment that created pressures on the direction, and the aim of the policy 
program. Ten years after the decision to change the management of the sluices, the policy 
program was provisionally cancelled in 2011 by national government as a result of a strong 
regional lobby. However, because of the international agreements on fish migration and 
possible financial consequences for non-implementation, national government eventually 
decided to proceed with implementation.
5 case analysis: bounDary juDgmenTs of managing acTors anD 
aDapTive governance
In this section, we analyze the boundary judgments of the managing actors: Rijkswaterstaat 
and the Province. We conclude this section with table 3, in which we provide an overview of 
the assessment of boundary judgments in relation to the realization or otherwise of adaptive 
water governance in the Haringvliet sluices case.
5.1 Analysis of the substantive boundary judgments
From the beginning, there was high uncertainty and ambiguity about the consequences of 
changing the management of the sluices. The water system users were critical with regard to 
RWS’ examinations concerning the consequences of the decision. Although the ecological 
effects were extensively examined, the economic effects were not. For example, it remained 
unclear what the economic risks of the decision would be for the farmers and drinking 
water companies.
5.1.1 rijkswaterstaat
Within Rijkswaterstaat, we observe a strong domination of water, ecology, and nature 
protection. In line with the ecological turn (Disco, 2002) and the IWRM approach in Dutch 
water management, the underlying values of nature and ecology have been shaping the 
decision about estuarial restoration. RWS concentrated heavily on water safety and water 
quality. Regarding the necessary compensating measures for freshwater on the islands (see 
figure 2), RWS initially aimed at pipe lines. “Until 2002 we thought pipe lines on the islands 
could be used as compensating measures. […] This meant that it would only have been a ‘case 
of water’ […] A typical Rijkswaterstaat project.” (Interview PM 3). Although the effects of the 
decision for other domains, such as agriculture were examined, they were not incorporated 
in the policy development and implementation. In this sense, they did not influence the 
aim and direction of the policy program. This changed in 2003 when it became clear that 
the project costs were underestimated and regional support for the decision was lacking. 
Therefore, it was decided to connect the development of the compensating measures with 
other domains. “We realized that we couldn’t make it by ourselves. We are going to broaden 
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the project. We are going to try to realize the compensating measures in broad area zones by 
which you could combine natural development, recreation, and water retention. In this way, 
you could include more financial resources […]. However, it also became far more complex.” 
(Interview PM 3).
As Rijkswaterstaat initially considered few domains, but later on more domains were in-
cluded, we assess the substantive boundary judgments as moderate (+/-).
5.1.2 Province
In the development of the compensating measures (figure 2), important criteria for the 
Province were the consequences for spatial planning and the natural environment. When 
the Province started to cooperate with the Goeree-Overflakkee Water Board and when 
connections were made with the Delta Nature project, water retention and recreation were 
also included. This led to an integral development plan in which these three values were 
important drivers. However, the inclusion of agriculture and economic development was 
avoided, despite initiatives of local stakeholders (i.e. farmers, inhabitants, and municipali-
ties) to realize this. The Province had somewhat conflicting goals in this respect. Because 
it was their responsibility to realize Delta Nature, there was little room for maneuver ac-
cording to the Province’s project manager: “Concerning alternatives in the area, there is little 
flexibility. We want to realize new nature. We are not going to transform existing nature. This 
automatically means that you have to sacrifice agricultural land” (Interview PM 5).
In all, the Province had a moderate consideration of domains (+/-), including recreation 
and water retention, but mainly excluding agriculture and local economic development.
5.2 Analysis of the participation boundary judgments
To implement the decision, the initiating parties were dependent on a variety of actors. For 
example, the water boards are responsible for water management on the islands, and the 
land is owned by local governments and private users. The relocation of the water intake 
points therefore needed the cooperation of the water boards, the local governments on the 
islands, and private owners. These actors had different interests and perceived the decision 
to change the management of the sluices in different ways. On both islands, there was in-
creasing resistance against the relocation projects and, in the end, also against the decision 
to change the management of the sluices.
5.2.1 rijkswaterstaat
The process organized by RWS in the development of the decision (1990–2000) was char-
acterized by a relatively low representation of stakeholders touched by the decision. RWS 
notes about this: “The somewhat small regional stakeholder representation was a consequence 
of the desire to keep the administrative complexity under control” (Interview PM 1). One 
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formal representative of each group of regional stakeholders was involved (i.e. one dike 
count for the different water boards and one mayor for the different local governments on 
the islands). The interaction with these representatives was mainly characterized by inform-
ing and consulting. After the decision, there was sporadic interaction between stakeholders 
and RWS. This interaction was about communication with stakeholders concerning the 
state of affairs. As RWS notes in this matter: “After the decision, the communication with the 
region became less frequent. A decision had been taken, so this was not considered necessary 
anymore.” (Interview PM 2).
To sum up: the interaction with regional stakeholders was mainly characterized by com-
munication and not co-production. Relatively few stakeholders were actively involved. 
Therefore we assess the participation boundary judgments as tight (-).
5.2.2 Province
The policy process with regard to the compensating measures on the two islands (see figure 
2) was characterized by low stakeholder involvement. At Goeree-Overflakkee, there was 
frequent interaction with only one stakeholder (i.e. the water board). The Province mainly 
developed the compensating measures internally and translated them into formal proce-
dures that were then communicated to local governments. The local government council 
(Bernisse) rejected the relocation in 2008. The Province responded by using procedural 
steering mechanisms in order to bypass the local government. This resulted in further de-
lays, procedural struggles, and juridical conflicts between regional stakeholders and the 
Province. This changed significantly at the end of 2009 when the Province decided to re-
consider the plans. At Voorne Putten, an interaction process with many local and regional 
stakeholders was set up. There were frequent interactions, and the process aimed to develop 
a freshwater route, taking into account the regional stakes as much as possible. The location 
and the form of the freshwater route were developed in co-production between the Province 
and the regional stakeholders. “The group [of stakeholders] came together every three weeks 
till the summer of 2010 [since March]. This resulted in a more positive attitude of the regional 
stakeholders. […] They are getting the feeling that they are being listened to seriously and they 
now really do have influence in the planning process.” (Interview PM 6).
As the involvement of regional stakeholders was initially weak, but changed later on 
as more stakeholders were included in the planning process, we assess the participation 
boundary judgments of the province as moderate (+/-).
5.3 Analysis of the structural boundary judgments
After delegation to the Province of the task of establishing compensatory measures, there 
was increasing ambiguity with regard to which governmental organization was responsible 
for which part of the policy program, and no one was assigned overall responsibility for the 
program (Kuijken 2010). Furthermore, the relocation of the water intake points interfered 
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with environmental and spatial development projects in the area. For example, on the island 
of Goeree-Overflakkee, there were provincial nature development projects running in the 
same spatial area as the planned relocations of the water intake points. This caused ambigu-
ity regarding the relationship between these projects and what they meant for the regional 
stakeholders.
5.3.1 rijkswaterstaat
A strong indicator of the structural boundary judgments in the case is the clear subdivi-
sion of the program into different subprojects and accompanying project responsibility. 
Although the administrative agreement between national government and the Province in 
2004 stated that the involved governmental actors should cooperate as much as possible, 
both actors mainly acted on their own until 2010. “In that period, we were operating at a 
distance. This was also in line with national policy […]. The […] integral execution of the com-
pensating measures is a responsibility of the Province. […] The position was that we shouldn’t 
interfere in the Province’s business. And vice versa, from the perspective of the Province: we 
don’t need any ‘busybodies’.” (Interview PM 3). In an evaluation of the project, commis-
sioned by national government, it is stated that “the complexity of the implementation is 
underestimated and has increased during the project [implementation]: there is a lack of 
one party taking responsibility for the overall program. […] The activities of the province 
and RWS are administratively not well coordinated and managed” (Kuijken 2010: 8). Since 
2010, this has been changing. There is now more or less joint responsibility, marked by 
the involvement of national government in the administrative steering group to realize the 
compensating measures.
In general, Rijkswaterstaat imposed a very strong division of the project into separate 
parts/subprojects and responsibilities, although this changed in the end. Hence, tight 
boundary judgments are made on this category (-).
5.3.2 Province
The Province focused on the development of the compensating measures on the two islands. 
In the development of the freshwater route on Goeree-Overflakkee, a connection was made 
with another provincial project, Delta Nature, dealing with wetland development. Thus, 
an area development program was set up. This coupling remained at project level: it was 
not addressed in the overall program, although both programs were about enhancing the 
natural transition in the Delta. As one of the project managers of the Province illustra-
tively notes: “Delta Nature is a separate project. There is a connection at the northern edge 
of Goeree-Overflakkee, but the two projects are independent of each other” (Interview PM 
5). Furthermore, inclusion of projects of local stakeholders was avoided or not actively 
managed. A typical quote is the following: “Local governments have their own agenda. They 
wanted to connect their own recreational plan to the area designated for the compensating 
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measures. This was a political issue in the local council and an important reason for rejecting 
the relocation. We were sucked into a process that we had nothing to do with.” (Interview PM 
5). The Province was focused on realizing her own project and was rather surprised by these 
local interferences.
In all, the Province made a strong division into subprojects and therefore we assess the 
structural boundary judgments as tight (-).
5.4 Analysis of the contextual boundary judgments
In order to assess the contextual boundary judgments, we identified three concrete external 
dynamics mentioned by a majority of the respondents as highly important. Firstly, there 
was a growth of blue-green algae in a connected freshwater basin (Volkerak Zoommeer) 
(1). As a solution to this issue, it was planned to increase the level of salinity of this water 
basin. This measure could also affect the level of salinity in the Haringvliet. Secondly, in-
creasing attention was paid to the future availability of fresh water in the Netherlands, as 
part of the increasing awareness of the climate change issue (2). A national Delta Program 
was set up, in which freshwater availability was an explicit theme. The decision to change 
the management of the sluices would affect the availability of freshwater in the south-west 
Delta. Thirdly, in cooperation with different provincial governments, water boards, and the 
national government, an integral program with regard to the whole south-west Delta was 
developed in which freshwater, ecological resilience, and economic vitality were key themes 
(3). In this cooperation, decisions were prepared regarding the water governance in the 
south-west Delta in the near future, but also for the long term. Changes in Haringvliet water 
governance pose consequences for this integral policy program and vice versa.
5.4.1 rijkswaterstaat
Before the decision to change the management of the sluices was made, developments 
in, and consequences for, connected water systems and areas were taken into account by 
RWS. However, once the decision was made, new external dynamics did not influence the 
direction or aim of the policy. This indicates a tight boundary with regard to the context. 
Regarding the developments in the Volkerak Zoommeer, one of the respondents notes: “The 
developments in the Volkerak have no relationship with the decision to change the manage-
ment of the sluices. There is a possible leakage of salt water, but that is also the case without 
the decision to change the management of the sluices.” (Interview PM 1). After the decision, 
management focused solely on technical implementation. Connections with emerging 
policy programs and issues in the environment were not made in a mutual way. The project 
was framed as conditioning for other policies in the south-west Delta.
To sum up: Rijkswaterstaat was not receptive to external dynamics; therefore we assess 
the contextual boundary judgments as tight (-).
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5.4.2 Province
The Province also made tight boundary judgments regarding the relationship between the 
program projects that it manages and the context. The policy was that connections with 
other projects (e.g. nature development, recreation) were only allowed if these connections 
would not slow down the process. This was an important reason for not making a connec-
tion with the integral policy development of the south-west Delta.
Overall, the Province had a very closed attitude towards external dynamics; therefore we 
assess the contextual boundary judgments as very tight (--).
Table 3 provides a summary and assessment of the boundary judgments made by the two 
managing actors for the four categories.
Table 3 Boundary judgments of the two main managing actors in the haringvliet sluices case
Type of boundary judgment Rijkswaterstaat (RWS) Province
Substantive · The water system mainly judged from the 
domains of water and ecology
· Later, the domains of water retention and 
recreation are partly included
Assessment: +/-
· The freshwater routes mainly considered 
from the domain of nature development
· Later, the domains of water retention and 
recreation are partly included
Assessment: +/-
Participation · During the preparation of the decision, 
stakeholders are consulted
· After the decision there is sporadic 
contact between RWS and regional 
stakeholders. Interaction is mainly 
characterized by one-side communication
Assessment: - 
· Until 2009, few stakeholders actively 
involved
· After 2009 process management changed. 
More intensive interaction process with 
diverse regional stakeholders to develop 
the freshwater routes.
Assessment: +/-
Structural · The project is clearly separated into 
different parts. RWS demarcated its 
responsibility around the technical 
preparation of the sluice management. 
Communication with the other managing 
actor (the Province) is weak
Assessment: - 
· Focus on the compensating measures; the 
realization of the freshwater routes
· Later, connections made with other 
provincial projects in the region. At the 
end of the process these projects are 
deliberately uncoupled
Assessment: -
Contextual · After the decision new developments 
in the field of water governance in the 
surrounding area and climate adaptation 
do not result in any changes of the 
direction or aim of the project
Assessment: -
· The project is considered to be a condition 
for other programs in the south-west Delta 
area
Assessment: -- 
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5.5 Boundary judgments and adaptive governance in the case
Our case study reveals that there is little adaptive water governance as mutual learning 
processes between a variety of stakeholders did not take place. The interaction process 
was highly conflictive. Project management was mainly characterized by tight boundary 
judgments. RWS displayed a strong focus on ecological values. Because the Province had a 
strong orientation towards nature development, including with regard to its responsibilities 
in the Delta Nature program, a strong connection between these two actors was established. 
However, these rather tight substantive boundary judgments conflicted strongly with 
the values and interests of regional stakeholders, rooted in agricultural land use and the 
protection of freshwater availability. This tension was increased by tight boundary judg-
ments on participation and structure by the managing actors who tried to keep control 
of the governance process by demarcating the issue, clearly dividing responsibilities and 
restricting the participation of other stakeholders. Pressures from the environment of the 
project increased during the implementation process. Non-supportive behavior by impor-
tant stakeholders, decreasing political support for ecological restoration, and cost overruns 
brought the project to the edge.
These pressures resulted in an important broadening of the project scope in 2004. RWS 
and the Province decided to realize the compensating measures in broad area zones by 
which more functions could be combined. Connections emerged between the Haringvliet 
sluices project and Delta Nature. More inclusive boundary judgments emerged with regard 
to substance, although the domain of agriculture was not included in the planning process, 
despite stakeholders representing this domain being among the fiercest opponents of the 
project. Furthermore, boundary judgments with regard to structure, participation, and con-
text remained relatively tight, and connections with regional stakeholders and their agendas 
were not made. Increasing delays, because of procedural struggles between the Province 
and local stakeholders, resulted in a loose coupling between both projects. The broadening 
of the project scope was declined.
6. conclusions anD Discussion
In this article, we examined how water managers demarcate complex water issues. This ap-
proach makes it possible to increase our understanding of why certain governance processes 
prove more adaptive than others. Water managers’ specific boundary judgments influence 
the specific connections in which they invest.
Before drawing conclusions from our research, we want to stress several important re-
search limitations. We are fully aware that care must be taken in generalizing the insights 
from this case study as it is simply one case in one specific country, i.e. The Netherlands. 
The specific patterns from the case suggest that the relative dominance of tight boundary 
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judgments was not supportive to the adaptability of the governance process. More empirical 
research (comparative and quantitative) is needed to provide more evidence for this rela-
tionship. Secondly, we did not examine the factors or conditions which were influencing 
the construction of these boundary judgments. Furthermore, and in relation to this, we did 
not include (transnational) external factors influencing the adaptability of the governance 
process in the specific and local project of Haringvliet sluices. For example, as mentioned 
in our case description, an important factor concerns the international agreements on 
Ecological Rehabilitation in this respect. These international agreements conditioned the 
project of changing the sluice management to a large extent and were an important reason 
why national government decided to continue with the implementation of the decision in 
2011 and contributed to the tight focus on ecological restoration. Despite these limitations, 
we believe that our analysis provides useful new insights into adaptive water governance.
A first insight emerging from the case study is that adaptive water governance seems to 
be conditioned or hampered by tight boundary judgments. Limiting the scope for decision-
making, the level of participation and focusing upon formal competencies and initial 
ambitions, conflicts with stimulating or allowing for variety and flexibility. Although tight 
boundary judgments could reduce feelings of uncertainty or provide a feeling of control for 
managing actors, they also make the project vulnerable for growing pressures in the project 
environment, due to conflict and resistance as we have seen in this case.
Boundary judgments regarding substance, participation, structure and context, are im-
portant aspects to be considered in achieving adaptive water governance in practice. These 
boundary judgments are interrelated and can reinforce each other. In the case we observed 
that actors holding tight boundary judgments around nature development and ecology eas-
ily find each other, but mainly excluded other stakeholders with other interests and values. 
Tight participation boundary judgments increase the chance of fixation on certain solutions 
or values (see also Termeer & Koppenjan, 1997). Tight substantive boundary judgments 
decreases the potential value for other actors to engage in water governance processes (tight 
participation boundary judgments).
Tight boundary judgments by organizations initiating and facilitating the process evoke 
pressures from the environment of the project which destabilize the existing tight boundary 
judgments and lead to temporarily opening up them. More room is created for participa-
tion, and new substance (ideas, interests, etc.). A learning process emerges in which new 
connections are made and progress in terms of process is made.
However, our final conclusion is that (tight) boundary judgments are rather persistent. 
When pressures become less strong and complexity as a result of a more adaptive approach 
becomes apparent and less easily to manage for managers, tight boundary judgments get 
revived and diminish the explorative and learning focus that is characteristic for adaptive 
water governance processes. In this sense, broad boundary judgments implies (the need 
for) connective capacity as the complexity of water issues and governance processes is 
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more embraced (Edelenbos et al., 2013). This is however a very challenging task as making 
and maintaining connections require specific managerial skills. The literature speaks of 
boundary spanners: persons who manage the interface between organizations and their 
environment (e.g. Williams, 2002). These are individuals with specific skills, who are able to 
operate at the boundaries of different (sub)systems. These persons are effective networkers, 
who understand the social constructions and coding schemes of other actors and institu-
tions. Further research is needed to clarify the relationship between boundary spanning 
and the occurrence of (wide) boundary judgments. The presence and role of boundary 
spanners could be an important additional aspect to consider in research on adaptive water 
governance.
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absTracT
In this article, we empirically examine the relationship between connective manage-
ment, democratic legitimacy, and network performance in governance networks around 
complex water projects in The Netherlands. Realizing effective and legitimate solutions in 
such a context is highly challenging, as a variety of interests are at stake, and actors often 
disagree about goals of the water issue at stake. Although previous research has indicated 
the importance of network management for the performance of governance networks, the 
issue of democratic legitimacy is not much addressed in this relationship. Building on the 
literature, we expect to find that throughput legitimacy has a partly mediating role in the 
relationship between connective management and network performance. The results, based 
on survey research, indicate that governance networks have indeed democratic potential 
but, in order to make this potential manifest, network managers can play a key “connective” 
role. Furthermore, the results confirm our hypotheses that throughput legitimacy positively 
affects network performance and has a mediating effect on the relationship between con-
nective management and network performance. Network managers can create important 
conditions for the evolution of a democratic governance process, but are dependent on the 
way stakeholders interact with one another and the democratic quality of that interaction.
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inTroDucTion
This article is about connective management, democratic legitimacy, and network perfor-
mance of governance networks around complex water issues. Complex water issues cross 
different kinds of boundaries, such as physical and geographical boundaries (e.g. surface 
and ground water), different administrative and institutional boundaries (e.g. governmental 
levels and sectors), and social boundaries (e.g. between social and economic groups) (Van 
Meerkerk et al., 2013; Van der Brugge et al., 2005). Therefore, these projects are often devel-
oped and implemented in networks of interdependent actors, who employ dynamic interac-
tion and negotiation processes with each other and who lack clear relations of domination 
and subordination (although power inequalities certainly exist) (Dryzek, 2010; Hajer, 
2009). Realizing effective and legitimate solutions in such a context is highly challenging, as 
a variety of interests are at stake, and actors often disagree about goals of the water issue at 
stake (Edelenbos et al., 2013a).
This article examines the role of connective management in reaching legitimate and quali-
tatively good outcomes in governance networks around complex water issues. It is there-
fore strongly related to the academic debate on the democratic legitimacy of governance 
networks, which developed in the last decade (e.g., Sørensen, 2002; Hajer and Wagenaar, 
2003; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007; Klijn & Skelcher, 2007; Dryzek, 2010). Up till now, there 
is no consensus among academics what governance networks mean in terms of democratic 
legitimacy, while their presence and role in policy and decision-making is hard to ignore in 
contemporary Western society. According to several authors, a fundamental cause is that 
the nature of governance networks does not fit with the assumptions of traditional models 
of democracy in this respect (Sørensen, 2002; Dryzek, 2007) (this will be further elaborated 
in the theoretical sections). In governance networks, there are no clear constitutional rules 
and norms that determine what a legitimate decision is (Hajer & Versteeg 2005; Mathur & 
Skelcher, 2007). At the same time, various scholars argue that governance networks have 
democratic potential because a diversity of (affected) stakeholders, such as citizens, civil 
society organizations, and businesses, has more room for direct engagement (e.g., Hajer & 
Wagenaar, 2003; Sørenson & Torfing, 2005).
Although previous research has extensively analyzed the role, and indicated the im-
portance of network management for the performance of governance networks (see for 
example Kickert et al., 1997; Meier & O’Toole, 2007; Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Klijn et al., 
2010), the issue of democratic legitimacy is not much addressed in this relationship, which 
holds especially for (quantitative) empirical research (cf. Bogason & Musso, 2006; Sørensen 
& Torfing, 2009; Torfing and Triantafillou, 2011). In this article, we empirically examine 
this relationship, by analyzing survey research among participants involved in governance 
networks around complex water projects in The Netherlands. We examined the relation-
ship between connective management, the level of throughput legitimacy, and network 
performance. The notion of throughput legitimacy is based on the deliberative model of 
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democracy, which goes relatively well with the nature of governance networks (Dryzek, 
2010). Throughput legitimacy focuses on the democratic quality of the decision-making 
process. It is about how input (ideas, plans, expression of interests) is processed throughout 
the policy-making process. It is the process of deliberation itself and the conditions of the 
process that are important for generating this kind of democratic legitimacy. Building on 
the literature, we expect to find a positive relation between (1) connective management, (2) 
democratic (throughput) legitimacy of governance networks, and (3) network performance. 
In line with previous research, we expect that the connective activities of network managers 
positively influence network performance, but that legitimacy has a partly mediating role 
in this relationship. Before we go deeper on these relationships, we will first specify the 
characteristics of the governance networks we are talking about.
conTexT of research: governance neTworks arounD complex 
waTer projecTs
Characteristics of Governance Networks
In contemporary public administration theory it is recognized that interdependent sets of 
actors provide input to many decision-making processes (e.g., Kickert et al., 1997; Pierre, 
2000; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009). This has led to a developing body of research on so-called 
governance networks. In this article, the concept of governance networks refers to more or 
less stable patterns of social relations between mutually dependent actors around boundary 
crossing public issues, and which are formed, maintained, and changed through interac-
tions between the involved actors (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Despite the differences in use 
and meaning among scholars, certain main characteristics and presumptions of governance 
networks can be identified:
1. They emerge and evolve around boundary crossing public issues that cannot be resolved 
by one actor alone but require collective actions of more actors (Sørensen & Torfing, 
2009). These issues cross different organizational, jurisdictional, geographical, societal, 
and/or functional boundaries, and have a multi-value character (Kickert et al., 1997);
2. Therefore there is relatively high interdependency between actors to deal with these 
issues (Scharpf, 1978). The different actors around boundary crossing public issues have 
to join their resources and knowledge to achieve qualitatively good outcomes (Agranoff 
& McGuire, 2001);
3. These interdependencies require interactions between various actors, which show some 
durability over time (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004);
4. Steering within these interactions is complicated, because each actor is relatively au-
tonomous in the sense that network participants typically have limited formal account-
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ability to network-level goals (Provan & Kenis, 2008), and each actor has his/her own 
perception about the policy problems and solutions (Teisman, 2000).
Governance networks around complex water projects
Also in the Dutch water sector a transition from a technocratic top-down governmental 
approach towards a more open, network oriented governance approach has been observed 
(Van Buuren et al., 2012; Van der Brugge et al., 2005; Wolsink, 2006). This change in the 
water management regime has been induced by the changing nature and scope of water 
problems on the one hand and the professionalization of interest groups, the expanded role 
of provinces and municipalities in water management and the emancipation and activation 
of citizens on the other hand. Many contemporary water issues are characterized by signifi-
cant complexity due to their boundary crossing nature. Water has multiple manifestations, 
multiple functions and multiple values. This makes water projects complex and hard to 
manage, touching upon the interests of many stakeholders. Van der Brugge et al. (2005: 
164-165) make the following analysis about this growing complexity and the consequences 
for the involvement of a variety of stakeholders in many contemporary water projects (cf. 
Van Buuren et al., 2012; Edelenbos et al., 2013a). Due to increasing spatial claims from 
agriculture, industry, traffic, housing and infrastructure as a result of growing economic 
development, increased population density and changing life-styles, water managers can no 
longer optimize one particular utility function, but have to manage across multiple utilities 
and multiple stakeholders. At the same time, the continuous subsidence of soil, the rising 
sea level and the decreasing capacity to retain water due to loss of nature have resulted in 
pressure from water on land. In this changing landscape, it becomes increasingly clear that 
conventional strategies of water management, such as the fast drainage of redundant water, 
canalizing rivers and the construction of dams and dikes, are not solely effective anymore 
and are also confronted with serious implementation barriers due to increasing interde-
pendencies between a variety of actors with different perspectives on water problems. As a 
result, contemporary water projects which are developed in response to compounded water 
problems are embedded in governance networks.
These are the networks that we examined in our survey on complex water projects (see 
also the section ‘methods’). The results of our survey confirm that these projects match the 
characteristics of governance networks as mentioned above:
· task complexity: in 51 percent of the cases respondents indicate that, 3 or more spatial 
functions (such as nature development, housing, water retention, recreation, etc.) play 
a relatively large role in the project, and in 26 percent of the cases, 4 or more spatial 
functions are at stake;
· large networks of actors: The networks around these projects include different public 
organizations (e.g., local governments, national government, water boards), societal 
(interest) organizations (e.g., environmental groups, agriculture associations), private 
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firms (e.g., project developers), and citizen groups (e.g., affected residents organized in 
an association). 90 percent of the respondents indicate that they participate in a water 
project with more than 5 actors involved, and in 53 percent of the cases more than 10 
actors are involved;
· strong interdependencies: 77 percent of the respondents state that they are strongly 
dependent on other actors within the network of which they are part.
connecTive managemenT anD neTwork performance
In the governance network literature, network management is seen as an important factor 
for realizing good network performance (for example, in terms of innovative, acceptable, 
and durable solutions) (Kickert et al., 1997; Meier & O’Toole, 2001, 2007; Agranoff & Mc-
Guire, 2001; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). In this article network performance refers to the 
substantive results of the actor network in relation to the specific water project, such as the 
problem solving capacity of the project results, the innovative character, and the impact of 
involvement of the stakeholders on the project results (see also section “methods”). In the 
literature on network management around complex spatial or environmental projects, four 
different categories of network management strategies can be distinguished (see Klijn et 
al., 2010): (1) exploring content (creating more variety, organizing research, exploring the 
perceptions of different actors, etc.); (2) arranging the structure of the interaction (securing 
a temporary organizational arrangement for interactions); (3) establishing process rules 
(designing temporary agreements and rules to govern interactions); and (4) connecting (to 
actors, scales, developments, opportunities, etc.). In particular, the connective management 
style is supposed to be an effective management strategy in governance networks (Williams, 
2002; Edelenbos et al., 2013b; Van Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2014). Edelenbos, Van Buuren, 
and Klijn (2013b) consider a connective management strategy to be a specific boundary 
spanning activity that is focused on interrelating actors (government, business, society), 
layers (national, regional, local level), and domains or sectors (infrastructure, housing, 
water management, nature development, etc.). O’Toole, Walker, Meier, and Boyne (2007) 
have shown that connecting is common among managers in both the US and the UK.
Effective managers develop an intense and wide variety of contacts with actors in the 
network (Meier & O’Toole, 2001, 2007). Research on network management shows that net-
work management activities that are focused on developing relations between actors from 
different organizations through for example selective (de)activation and boundary span-
ning activities have a significant impact on achieving good (process and content) outcomes 
(Klijn et al., 2010). Connective network managers bring about new interactions between 
actors with different interests and problem perceptions, creating opportunities for learning 
and goal intertwinement (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004). They increase the flow of informa-
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tion in the network, which contributes to variety, which in turn increases the number of 
potential solutions (Wagenaar, 2007; Van Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2014). Also the literature 
on bridging ties, individuals who span and connect different structural holes in networks, 
stress the increase of social capital available for the network to use, if brokerage activities are 
performed (Granovetter, 1985; Burt, 2004). “A theme in this work is that behavior, opinion, 
and information, broadly conceived, are more homogeneous within than between groups. 
People focus on activities inside their own group, which creates holes in the information 
flow between groups, or more simply, structural holes” (Burt, 2004: 353). In line with previ-
ous research on network management, our first hypothesis is:
(1) A higher level of connective management activities will lead to better governance network 
performance.
Not only with regard to network performance, connecting strategies are also relevant in the 
contemporary debate about the accountability and legitimacy of governance networks. Ac-
cording to Sørensen and Torfing (2009), network managers could play a key role in unleash-
ing the democratic potentials of governance networks. What is this democratic potential of 
governance networks and how does this work?
governance neTworks anD The issue of DemocraTic legiTimacy
If we look at the characteristics of governance networks mentioned in the previous sec-
tions, then it becomes clear that they often have a highly pragmatic and context-bound 
essence because they emerge as a result of interdependency between relatively autonomous 
actors around complex issues (cf., Bogason & Musso, 2006). Governance networks could 
be general-purpose, but often they are issue specific (Dryzek, 2007). The networks that 
we include in our empirical research have this issue-specific character, since they emerge 
around concrete complex water problems, dealing with specific water and land use issues. 
Moreover, these issues transcend existing jurisdictional borders of governments. This deliv-
ers challenges for analyzing the democratic legitimacy of these networks, at least in terms 
of traditional models of democracy. Dryzek (2007) describes this in as follows (p. 262): 
“democratic theory has historically proceeded under the assumption that the proper – and 
perhaps exclusive – locus of political authority is the sovereign state claiming exclusive 
political authority over a defined territory and population.” Within the system of represen-
tative democracy, political authority is related to the so-called primacy of the politics, which 
“presupposes that the council of elected representatives confers legitimacy on the decisions 
it takes. Yet when policy problems do not respect the territorial scales, this system breaks 
down,” as Hajer (2009, p. 30) aptly puts it. In short, the institutional structure of representa-
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tive democracy does not match with the boundary crossing nature of wicked issues, which 
are an important raison d’être for governance networks. Governance networks are polycen-
tric and the relevant demos for decision making in governance networks consists of those 
affected by the complex issue(s) at stake (Dryzek, 2007). In this sense, there is no one single 
all-purpose demos, but rather multiple demoi that could exist at different levels, below, 
above, and across the state. Hence, as Warren (2009, p. 7) notes: “the legitimacy generated 
by electoral democracy does not carry over to issue-segmented constituencies.” Although 
they could be set up or initiated by representatives of the state, they are often neither the 
result of intentional design by political principals nor constituted in a legal sense through 
statute or administrative regulations. This makes it difficult for elected political actors to 
steer governance processes, and traditional institutions of checks and balances on power 
and accountability become less effective in such a context (van Kersbergen & van Waarden, 
2004). In governance networks, accountability is often diffuse and spread among different 
actors and governmental layers (Hajer, 2009). In the words of Dryzek (2010, p. 123):
In governance, there are few moments such as a vote in a legislature or election where 
power holders display themselves and can be called to public account for their actions. 
Policy making is often a low-visibility affair, and it may be hard to determine where 
power actually lies. Clearly, electoral democracy is in trouble when networked gover-
nance dominates. Networks do not hold elections; they do not have an electorate, an 
opposition, or any obvious alternative set of power holders.
Taking the complexity of certain issues as the starting point, governance networks are a 
response to the limits of hierarchical–instrumental policymaking, which is part and parcel 
of the representative democratic system (Wagenaar, 2007). Unsurprisingly, analyzing the 
democratic performance of governance networks via the conceptual understanding built 
in liberal democratic theory, which is the normative basis for representative government 
in Western countries, generally leads to negative audits (Bogason & Musso, 2006, p. 10).1 
Again, in the words of Dryzek (2010: 124): “liberal notions of constitutionalism and liberty, 
and electoral notions of authorization and accountability, […] fare badly when applied to 
governance networks.” However, governance networks are not a threat for democracy per 
se. According to several authors they have democratic potential (e.g., Dryzek, 2007; Klijn & 
Skelcher, 2007; Sørenson & Torfing, 2009).
It is exactly their flexibility and un-predetermined structure that make governance net-
works potentially valuable for dealing with complex issues and generating democratic le-
gitimacy according to other standards. We have to stress the adverb potentially here, because 
it follows from the outset (due to their context-specific character) that governance networks 
differ tremendously in their relative level of democratic legitimacy or performance, no mat-
ter what model is taken as the normative basis. According to Klijn and Skelcher (2007, p. 
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588), governance networks offer “…new ways of connecting (…) policy-making to citizens 
and stakeholders, overcoming the constraints and limitations of representative democracy 
and party politics.” An important question then is to what extent governance networks are 
inclusive, transparent, and provide opportunities for debate and dialogue. This shifts the 
focus towards the democratic quality of the governance process. As elaborated below, delib-
erative models of democracy are helpful in this respect, and relatively well suited to evaluate 
the democratic legitimacy of governance networks. Organizing a deliberate, inclusive, and 
transparent governance process increases the legitimacy of the throughput (i.e. interests, 
ideas, plans) in the governance network. This, in turn, could increase the performance 
of governance networks. The argumentation is that a properly structured interaction and 
deliberation process among stakeholders can help to generate more effective and innovative 
solutions to complex issues (e.g., Fung & Wright, 2003; Bogason & Musso, 2006; Wagenaar, 
2007). For this to happen, network management or metagovernance is argued to be of high 
importance. This line of thought is elaborated in the next sections.
DeliberaTive Democracy, ThroughpuT legiTimacy, anD governance 
neTworks
Deliberative democracy is not usually thought of as an alternative to representative democ-
racy, but rather as an expansion of it (Chamber, 2003). Deliberative democracy focuses on 
the communicative processes of opinion and will-formation that precede voting. Hence, 
deliberative democracy is grounded in an assumption that preferences of individuals are 
not fixed, but can change in debate and political dialogue (Held, 2006). This distinguishes 
deliberative models of democracy fundamentally from aggregative models of democracy, 
which generally take preferences as given, defined prior to political action (Dryzek, 2007). 
Manin describes this assumption as follows (1987, p. 351):
We need not to argue that individuals, when they begin to deliberate political matters, 
know nothing of what they want. They know what they want in part: they have certain 
preferences and some information, but these are unsure, incomplete, often confused 
and opposed to one another. The process of deliberation, the confrontation of various 
points of view, helps to clarify information and to sharpen their own preferences. They 
may even modify their initial objectives, should that prove necessary.
Such an assumption is well suited to issues dealt with in governance networks, which are 
often coined as “wicked” (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). These issues are multifaceted, involve 
conflicting preferences and values of involved stakeholders, and are often not well under-
stood at the beginning of the process (e.g., de Rynck & Voets, 2006). They demand delibera-
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tion and dialogue to become structured and mutually understood. Furthermore, although 
governance networks are seldom designed with deliberation in mind, they are potential 
sites for deliberation. As Dryzek notes: “So compared to a hierarchy, communication, and 
the distribution of communicative capacity, can be relatively egalitarian. The implication is 
that governance networks may have some potential for promoting dialogue compared to 
their more hierarchical alternatives…, because to exert influence, an actor has to persuade 
others in the network” (Dryzek, 2010, p. 125).
Building on this deliberative democracy point of view, one can use the concept of 
throughput legitimacy to assess the democratic legitimacy of governance processes. The 
notion of throughput legitimacy focuses on the democratic quality of the decision-making 
process. It is about how input (ideas, plans, expression of interests) is processed throughout 
the policy-making process. It is the process of deliberation itself and the conditions of the 
process that are important for generating this kind of democratic legitimacy. As Manin 
notes (1987, pp. 351–52): “the source of legitimacy is not the predetermined will of individu-
als, but rather the process of its formation, that is, deliberation itself.” This deliberation and 
argumentation process generates more or less support for certain measures. Furthermore, 
for this deliberation process to be successful, the communication process between actors in 
governance networks has to be open and transparent, or at least conform to a number of 
rules and practices that are all connected to the process of discussion, information, plurality 
of values, and so forth. Besides transparency, the inclusiveness of the process is an important 
consideration. According to Dryzek (2007), a deliberative model views a decision as legiti-
mate to the degree all affected by it have the right, opportunity, or capacity to participate in 
deliberation about the decision in question (see also for example Cohen, 1989; Manin, 1987). 
And Dryzek (2007, p. 268) continues: “While there can be problems in operationalizing this 
ideal…, as a criterion it can be applied as a matter of degree.” To empirically examine the 
democratic legitimacy of governance networks around complex water projects, we focus on 
throughput legitimacy, taking the deliberative model of democracy as our starting point. 
Due deliberation, the transparency of the decision-making process, and the degree of inclu-
sion of affected stakeholders are important indicators in this respect.
connecTive managemenT, ThroughpuT legiTimacy, anD neTwork 
performance
Connective Management and Throughput Legitimacy
As argued in the previous sections, governance networks have democratic potential because 
citizens, civil society organizations, and businesses have more room for direct engagement. 
In order to make this potential manifest, it is important that these stakeholders become in-
cluded and connected to the processes of governance networks (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009; 
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Edelenbos et al., 2013b). According to the literature, network managers could play a key role 
in structuring dialogic interaction between network actors (e.g. Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; 
Sørensen & Torfing, 2009). A connecting-oriented network manager brings people together 
and is focused on enabling interactions and relationship building in order to develop and 
explore content and attempt to come to an agreement on sharing resources and joint con-
tent. Network managers create opportunities for citizens, civil society organizations, and 
businesses to deliver input in governance processes. As different stakeholders deliver input, 
a connective network manager aims to bring these stakeholders together in a constructive 
manner. He or she has a feel for the diversity of interests, for what is relevant for the different 
involved stakeholders, and provides opportunities for these stakeholders to engage. Con-
nective management in this sense is important for creating the conditions in which a legiti-
mate governance process can evolve (Sørenson & Torfing, 2009; Mathur & Skelcher, 2007). 
Throughput legitimacy is about further specifying the quality of the interaction process, 
focusing on the quality of the argumentation process, the opportunities for deliberation, the 
transparency of the decision-making process, and the transparency of information. Other 
aspects, such as bargaining and negotiation, can also be part of the interaction process but 
these are not included in our conceptualization of throughput legitimacy.2 Moreover, the 
manager takes responsibility for connecting this debate and communication in informal 
governance networks throughput to formal decision-making structures and processes. 
Stakeholders in governance networks want their input and throughput to be taken seriously 
and adopted in decision making. The level of throughput legitimacy depends therefore on 
the connective activities of the network manager. This argumentation leads to the formula-
tion of the second hypothesis that we test in this research:
(2) A higher level of connective management activities will lead to a higher level of throughput 
legitimacy
Throughput Legitimacy and Network Performance
The quality of the interaction process between stakeholders is not only interesting in terms 
of (throughput) legitimacy. Governance scholars, both with and without a special interest 
in deliberative democracy theories, also make the argument that, especially when it comes 
to complex issues, a qualitatively “good” interaction processes will lead to better network 
performance (see for example Mandell, 2001; Fung & Wright, 2003; Hajer & Wagenaar, 
2003; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006; Wagenaar, 2007). Deliberation increases exchange of in-
formation, perceptions, and preferences, by which a learning process can take place. As 
Risse and Kleine (2007, pp. 73–4) argue: “…decision-making processes that systematically 
allow for arguing, reason-giving and mutual learning rather than hard-nosed bargaining 
will have a substantially improved chance of leading to better outcomes. The main reason is 
that arguing and reason-giving provide a mechanism to probe and challenge the normative 
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validity of actors’ interests as well as to check the empirical facts on which policy choices are 
based.” As a wide variety of authors point out, in interaction and debate, different sources, 
perspectives, interests, and values are explored and exploited to develop innovative, accept-
able, and sustainable results (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Mandell, 2001). Moreover, from 
previous empirical (case study) research we know that the development of an interesting 
content that attracts wide sets of actors is very important (see Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006; 
Marcussen & Torfing, 2007; McGuire & Agranoff, 2011). Due deliberation, if it is organized 
properly may contribute to this development of solutions by providing good argumentation 
and dialogical processes that tap the available information and knowledge from involved 
actors. This leads to the final two hypotheses that we want to test in this research:
(3) A higher level of throughput legitimacy will lead to better governance network perfor-
mance.
Assuming that connective management positively influence network performance and 
throughput legitimacy, and that throughput legitimacy also contributes to network perfor-
mance, we expect a partially mediating role of throughput legitimacy:
(4) Throughput legitimacy partially mediates the relationship between connective manage-
ment and network performance.
In the model depicted in Figure 1, the various hypotheses are combined in the conceptual 
framework to be tested. The following section addresses data collection and the measure-
ment of our core variables.
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meThoDs
Sample and Data Collection
For our analyses we conducted a survey among participants in governance networks 
around Dutch complex water projects. What makes these projects complex is that a va-
riety of private/societal actors are involved, as are different governance levels and policy 
domains, and that these projects touch upon a variety of spatial functions (e.g., housing, 
infrastructure, agriculture, nature development, and water retention), interests, and val-
ues (e.g., Edelenbos et al., 2013a). However, an exhaustive list of people participating in 
complex water projects does not exist. Nevertheless, we were able to obtain 874 e-mail 
addresses of people from our target group by utilizing the Living with Water mailing list. 
This is a national knowledge research program aimed at developing and sharing knowledge 
about the management of complex water projects in various areas in The Netherlands. 
People on this list are participants in complex water projects, i.e. project managers and 
stakeholders, from a variety of organizations which are involved in these projects (munici-
palities, water boards, building contractors, and project management organizations). We 
want to stress that our population consists of individual participants involved in different 
governance networks around complex water projects. Each of the respondents received an 
e-mail with a login code where he/she could enter the survey and complete it. We asked 
the respondents at the start of the questionnaire to name the project with which they 
were mostly involved and to use this project to answer all the questions. A total of 272 
questionnaires (31.1 percent) were returned. For the final analysis, we used a database with 
200 respondents because we deleted 72 cases composed of those who answered only 15 
questions (55 respondents) or quitted the survey after half the items (17 respondents). The 
200 respondents were involved in 166 different water projects geographically dispersed 
over The Netherlands. Because several of the respondents are involved in the same water 
project and thus the same governance network, we randomly selected one respondent for 
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each project in order to ensure the independence of the data. This resulted in a sample of 
166, with one respondent for each water project.
Respondents’ Organizational Background and Position
Table 1 displays the respondents’ organizational background and role in the projects. We 
made a distinction between managers (36 percent), actively participating stakeholders (39 
percent), and less actively participating stakeholders, who have a monitoring role (25 per-
cent) (we call this category followers). Most of the respondents are from a governmental 
organization (54%), i.e. national government, regional/local government, water board. Of 
this group of respondents, the water board is the largest, which is not surprising given their 
important role in Dutch water management.3 The other big group consists of consultants (33 
percent), who are generally (externally hired) project managers or actively involved project 
advisors. Furthermore, there is a group of respondents representing societal or economic 
interest associations (e.g., farmers, environmental groups, and resident organizations). 
The remaining category consists of individual involved citizens (residents) and business 
firms (private developers, building companies). The managers mainly have a governmental 
background (water board, regional/local government), or are from a management consul-
tancy, hired by a (combination of) governmental organization(s) to manage the project. 
Furthermore, the category followers consist for an important part of representatives from 
national government. This is not surprising, as national government often has a monitoring 
role in these projects (e.g. providing and monitoring national policy guidelines). To check 
whether the respondent’s organizational background or the respondent’s position in the 
project mattered for the evaluation of the network performance or the level of throughput 
legitimacy, we included these (dummy) variables as controls (see section ‘control variables’).
Table 1 respondents’ Organizational Background and role in Project
organizational 
background
manager of the 
project (n=60; 
36.1%)
actively 
participating (as 
stakeholder or 
advisor) (n=64; 
38.6%)
less actively 
involved 
(monitoring, 
follower) (n=42; 
25.3%)
Total (n=166)
National government 4 6.7% 11 17.2% 10 23.8% 25 15.1%
Regional/local government 10 16.7% 10 15.6% 6 14.3% 26 15.7%
Water board 18 30% 12 18.8% 9 21.4% 39 23.5%
Societal/Economic interest 
organization
5 8.3% 2 3.1% 5 11.9% 12 7.2%
Management consultancy 21 35.0% 26 40.6% 9 21.4% 55 33.7%
Other 2 3.3% 3 4.7% 3 7.1% 8 4.8%
Total 60 100% 64 100% 42 100% 166 100%
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Measurement of Variables
In this section, we discuss the different scales used to measure our core variables: throughput 
legitimacy, connective management, and governance network performance. Subsequently, 
we discuss the measurement model, presenting each construct’s reliability and validity. Table 
2 presents the specific items on the scales, their factor loadings, and construct reliability. The 
descriptive statistics and the correlation matrices can be found in Table 3.
throughput legitimacy
To measure throughput legitimacy, we focused on three aspects derived from the literature: 
the way stakeholders are involved (we call this voice), the way decision making is transpar-
ent for stakeholders (transparency), and the way argumentation processes are organized 
(due deliberation) (Bekkers, Dijkstra, Edwards, & Fengers, 2007; Dryzek, 2010; Risse & 
Kleine, 2007). We used six items (see Table 2) to measure these indicators (two items for 
each dimension) and combined them into a scale to measure throughput legitimacy.
Network performance
There has been much discussion in the governance literature on how to measure perfor-
mance of processes in governance networks. We want to stress that there is no particular 
best approach (e.g., Provan & Milward, 2001). Especially within governance networks 
around the formulation, decision-making and implementation of projects, such as water 
management projects, actors have different goals, and it is thus difficult to pick a single 
goal by which to measure outcomes for these processes. Furthermore, measuring network 
performance is problematic because decision-making processes in governance networks 
are lengthy, and actors’ goals can change over time. Goal displacement is the negative term 
for this phenomenon, and learning is the positive term (see Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). To 
deal with these issues in measuring network performance, we use the previously tested scale 
of Klijn et al. (2010). They used perceived network performance as a proxy for measuring 
network performance (see also, for example, Hasnain-Wynia et al., 2003). This scale consists 
of multiple criteria: the problem solving capacity of the project results (Provan & Milward, 
2001), the innovative character of the project results (Sandström & Carlsson, 2008), the 
established connection between different spatial functions, and the impact of involvement 
of the stakeholders on the project results (‘recognizable contribution’) (Koppenjan & Klijn, 
2004).
Connective Management
To measure the connective activities of the network manager, we build on Klijn et al.’s (2010) 
scale regarding connective network strategies. It consists of items that measure different 
connective activities, such as the degree to which the network manager aims to connect 
different parties with different interests, the degree to which he makes the diversity of per-
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ceptions manifest as much as possible, and the extent to which he or she provides enough 
opportunities for the representatives of the different involved parties to give feedback to 
their grassroots.
Measurement Analyses
Construct validity: analysis of reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity
We conducted confirmatory factor analyses to assess convergent and discriminant validity.4 
The overall fit of the measurement model was tested by two different fit indices. The Com-
parative Fit Index (CFI) has a value of 0.91, which is acceptable (Byrne, 2010). Furthermore, 
the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) has a value of 0.065, which can be 
considered as an adequate fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Byrne, 2010).
All factor loadings are larger than 0.50, a very conservative cut-off level (Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham, and Black, 1995), and an important indicator demonstrating convergent validity. 
Construct reliability assessment is based on item-to-total correlations, Cronbach’s alpha, 
and composite reliability. All items have corrected item-to-total correlations greater than 
.40, which represents a general threshold (Field, 2005). All values are considered reliable; 
they exceed the generally accepted threshold of 0.7 for Cronbach’s alpha, and the threshold 
of 0.6 for composite reliability (Fornell & Larcker, 1981), except the value of composite reli-
ability for connective management (0.54).
To establish discriminant validity, we compared the average variance extracted (AVE) 
with the squared interconstruct correlation estimates (SIC) (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The 
AVE of all three constructs are larger than the SICs; this means that the indicators have more 
in common with the construct they are associated with than they do with other constructs.
testing for General Method Bias
An important issue with respect to measurement is that our data are all self-reported and 
based on a single application of a questionnaire. This can result in inflated relationships 
between variables due to common method variance, that is, variance that is due to the 
measurement method rather than the constructs themselves (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). 
We therefore conducted a Harman one-factor test to evaluate the extent to which common 
method variance was a concern. A factor analysis was conducted on all 15 items used to 
measure the perceptual variables covered by the hypotheses. No single factor accounted for 
the majority of the explained variance (i.e., 34.3%). Although the above analysis does not 
totally rule out the possibility of same-source, self-report biases, it does suggest that general 
method variance is probably not an adequate explanation for the findings obtained in this 
study (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).
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Control Variables
We selected several control variables for taking into account differences in the complexity 
of the specific water projects, the networks, and the respondents. On the project level, we 
included task complexity as a control variable. The literature suggests that increased task 
complexity increases the difficulty of realizing effective and efficient network performance 
(e.g., Moynihan, et al., 2010). To measure this variable, we enquired about the role of 8 
different spatial functions in the project, measured on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 
no role to a very strong role. These 8 different spatial functions are: nature development, 
business area, recreation/leisure, roads, railway, shops/retail, water management, and hous-
ing (see also Klijn et al., 2010). Cases in which more spatial functions are involved in the 
project or are touched upon by the project could said to be more complex. In 51 percent of 
the cases, 3 or more spatial functions play a relatively large role in the project, and in 26 
percent of the cases, 4 or more spatial functions. To include this variable in our analysis, we 
made a scale, ranging from 1 to 5, by adding up the scores for the 8 functions and dividing 
them by 8. Furthermore, we included the size of the network as a control variable. Although 
the literature on governance networks is not clear about the relationship between size of 
the network and network performance (Turrini et al. 2010), we may expect that in larger 
networks around complex issues, it is more difficult to realize good network performance, 
due to a more broad diversity of interests which are at stake and more differences in prob-
lem perceptions (cf. Hasnain-Wynia et al. 2003; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). The size of the 
network was measured by a 5 scale category: (1) less than 4 actors, (2) 5-9 actors, (3) 10-14 
actors, (4) 15-19 actors, and (5) 20 or more actors. The mean score was 3.03 (10-14 actors), 
with a standard deviation of 1.4.
On the respondent level, we included several control variables: the respondent’s position 
in the project (manager, actively participating stakeholder, or follower/monitoring), orga-
nizational background (interest group, national/regional government, water board, etc.), 
and project experience. The respondent’s position and organizational background might 
make a difference in judging the items on throughput legitimacy or network performance 
(e.g. Head, 2008). Furthermore, we included the number of years the respondent has been 
involved in the project (in this particular role). This is a general check on whether the re-
spondent has participated for a sufficiently substantive amount of time to actually be able to 
make experience-based judgments. The mean score on this variable is 3.5 years, which is a 
considerable amount of time. However, the standard deviation (2.8 years) is quite high, and 
this strengthens the case to include this variable as a control variable.
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Table 2 Measurement Items and Construct reliability
Items and Constructsa Factor 
loading
Corrected 
item-
to-total 
correlations
Alpha/ 
Composite 
reliability
Source
Throughput legitimacy
1) There are many different stakeholders involved in the 
project [voice]
.51 47 .80/.62 New scale
2) The process is very accessible to stakeholders [voice] .76 .67
3) The provision of information about this projects is well 
organized [transparency]
.72 .63
4) The decision-making process concerning this project 
is characterized by high transparency (insight into 
concrete decisions) [transparency]
.60 .49
5) The process around this project included many 
opportunities for debate and discussion [due 
deliberation]
.62 .55
6) The argumentation about this project was careful and 
good in terms of content [due deliberation]
.57 .51 AVE
0.40
SIC
0.34; 0.31
governance network performance
1) Do you think that innovative ideas have been 
developed during the project?
.51 .44 .78/.62 Adapted 
from Klijn et 
al. (2010)
2) Do you think that different environmental functions 
have been connected sufficiently?
.68 .59
3) Do you think that in general the involved actors 
have delivered a recognizable contribution to the 
development of the results?
.66 .58
4) Do you think that the solutions that have been 
developed really deal with the problems at hand?
66 .54
5) Do you think that the developed solutions are durable 
solutions for the future?
.75 .63 AVE
0.43
SIC
0.34; 0.26
connective management
1) The manager aims to connect different spatial 
functions in the development of the project
.53 .44 .71/.54 Adapted 
from Klijn et 
al. (2010)
2) The manager creates enough opportunities for the 
representatives of the different involved parties to 
give feedback to their grassroots
.70 .51
3) The manager aims to connect different parties with 
different interests as much as possible
.77 .62
4) The manager tries to make the diversity of 
perceptions manifest as much as possible and to 
include them in the decision-making process
.52 .43 AVE
0.41
SIC
0.31; 0.26
a. all the items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from (1) Strongly disagree to (5) Strongly agree.
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finDings
Correlations
To analyze the relations between the variables, we first performed a correlation analysis. 
The results presented in Table 3 show that the main variables have a strong positive cor-
relation to one another; this is in line with our hypotheses. In general, the control variables 
do not show significant correlations with the core variables. Only the size of the network 
positively correlates with connective management and throughput legitimacy. A larger 
network requires more connective management activities and vice versa (more connective 
management leads to a larger network). Furthermore, there is a small negative correlation 
between the dummy of project followers and connective management. In general, the fol-
lowers judged the connective activities of the project managers a bit more negatively than 
the group of managers and the group of actively participating stakeholders.
Impact of Connective Management on Throughput Legitimacy and Governance Network Performance
In Figure 2, the results of the structural equation modeling analysis are displayed.5 The 
standardized estimates and the subsequent impact on throughput legitimacy and gover-
nance network performance are shown. The first three hypotheses are confirmed in this 
structural model. The standardized direct effect of connective management on network 
performance is 0.28 (p < 0.05), which is not that strong. In contrast, the effect of connective 
management on the level of throughput legitimacy in governance networks is strong. We 
found a standardized regression coefficient of .56 (p < 0.01). With regard to the relationship 
between throughput legitimacy and network performance, we found a standardized regres-
sion weight of .42 (p < 0.01), which also indicates a quite strong relationship.
 
 
 
 
       R2 = .31 
   
 
 
                                               .56          .42  R2 = .39 
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Connective 
Management 
Network 
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Figure 2. Connective Management, throughput Legitimacy, and Network Performancea
a. Goodness-of-fit statistic: Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .91; χ2/df = 1.69. Badness-of-fit statistic: rood Mean Square error (rMSea): 0.065.
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These results provide a first indication that throughput legitimacy has a partially mediating 
role in the relationship between connective management and network performance. The 
standardized indirect effect of connective management on governance network performance 
is 0.24 (0.56 * 0.42), which results in a standardized total effect of 0.51 (0.277 + 0.235). To 
estimate the significance of this mediation effect, we performed the bias-corrected bootstrap 
method described by Shrout and Bolger (2002). We requested 2,000 bootstrap samples. The 
indirect effect of connective management on network performance is significant at the one 
percent level. Therefore, we can also confirm hypothesis four.
The final step in the analysis was the examination of the control variables. Control vari-
ables considered and dropped from the final model due to non-significant results were task 
complexity, respondent’s position, organizational background, and years of involvement. 
Only the size of the network was positively related to connective management (β = .26, p < 
0.01), but negatively related to network performance (β = -.27, p < 0.01). Larger networks 
require more connective management activities. Furthermore, it seems to be more difficult 
to realize good network performance in such networks. This is line with other research 
(Hasnain-Wynia et al., 2003). The relationship between the core variables remained signifi-
cant and the same size (approximately).
conclusion anD Discussion
In this article, our aim was to provide more empirical insights into the democratic legitimacy 
and the performance of governance networks, and the role of network managers therein. 
Before we present our conclusions, we first want to mention some important research 
choices and limitations of our study. Because traditional democratic principles are based 
on liberal democratic theory and their application to governance networks suffers from 
theoretical issues (cf., Sørensen, 2002), we have chosen to use the deliberative model. We 
focused on the democratic quality of the governance process, using the concept of through-
put legitimacy to assess democratic legitimacy. This has limited our research, omitting other 
important indicators for democratic legitimacy, such as political accountability. We think, 
however, that when it comes to empirically investigating a fuzzy and contested concept 
like democratic legitimacy, such choices are, to a certain extent, inevitable. Furthermore, 
there are some empirical limitations. This study has focused on specific kinds of gover-
nance networks; all the networks studied were in the field of water management. These 
results cannot automatically be assumed to hold also for other types of projects or policy 
domains, such as (social) service delivery networks. Next, the study was conducted in The 
Netherlands, and the projects are all Dutch. The results may differ in other countries with 
different decision-making cultures (e.g., Skelcher et al., 2011). However, the transition in 
the Dutch water sector from a technocratic top-down governmental approach towards a 
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more open, network oriented governance approach, reflects similar trends in other Western 
countries (e.g. Wolsink, 2006) and within other sectors (e.g. Sørenson & Torfing, 2007). 
Furthermore, we based our analysis on the perceptions of a single participant within the 
different networks. Although such an approach is certainly not unusual (e.g. Moynihan & 
Pandey 2005; Klijn et al., 2010) and enabled us to include a large number of networks in our 
analysis, we have to be careful in making generalizations. However, we believe that, within 
the constraints of this research, we can draw meaningful conclusions.
Our first conclusion is that network management positively affects network performance. 
This confirms previous empirical studies on governance networks (Meier & O’Toole, 2001, 
2007; Klijn et al., 2010). Our study indicates that in particular the connective abilities of 
network managers are important in realizing good network performance. The network 
manager connects actors with different organizational backgrounds, thus enhancing the 
integrated nature of network outcomes.
Our second conclusion is that governance networks have indeed democratic potential, 
as several authors argue, but in order to make this potential manifest, network managers 
can play a key role. Democratic legitimacy, conceptualized and elaborated in this article as 
throughput legitimacy, can be enhanced by the connective activities of network manag-
ers. This confirms theoretical assumptions made in the literature on governance networks 
(e.g., Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Sørenson & Torfing, 2009). In line with other scholars, we 
acknowledge that interaction processes between actors in governance networks have a 
complex nature and could therefore not be controlled by the manager (e.g., Wagenaar, 2007; 
Teisman, van Buuren, & Gerrits, 2009). However, a network manager could facilitate this 
interaction process and could influence the conditions. As the results indicate, network 
managers who have an eye for the diversity of perceptions and interests involved in gover-
nance networks, and who aim to create a constructive interaction between these stakehold-
ers, positively affect the throughput legitimacy of governance networks.
Our third main conclusion is that (throughput) legitimacy is important to realize network 
performance. This study provides the insight that throughput legitimacy has a strong posi-
tive effect on network performance. Network managers can create the conditions, but are 
dependent on the way stakeholders interact with one another (cf. Van Meerkerk & Edelen-
bos, 2014). Throughput legitimacy has a strong mediating effect in the relationship between 
network management and network performance. A high level of throughput legitimacy 
reflects a relatively high level of communication, deliberation, and debate among actors 
in the network in order to achieve results. Actors get the opportunity to communicate and 
explain their frames and interests. This learning process in turn has a positive effect on 
network performance.
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noTes
1. See for example Dryzek (2007) and Sørensen (2002) for elaborations of the misfit be-
tween traditional democratic principles, such as popular control and political equality, 
and the general characteristics of governance networks.
2. See Papadopoulos (2002) for an interesting elaboration of two contradictory approaches 
to actors’ behavior in governance networks: strategic bargaining versus deliberation. 
Strategic bargaining approaches tend to underrate the role of discourse, whereas works 
on deliberation tend to underrate the “agonistic” dimension of politics (p. 11). He points 
out that in governance arrangements both forms of action are present.
3. Water Boards form a fourth layer of government in the Netherlands (next to national 
government, provinces, and municipalities). The Boards are water authorities with tasks 
exclusively in the water domain and their boundaries are determined by hydraulic fac-
tors, such as dike rings and pumping and storage areas.
4. Convergent validity is about the extent to which indicators of a specific construct share 
a high proportion of variance in common. Discriminant validity is about the extent to 
which a construct is truly distinct from other constructs.
5. We used AMOS Version 18.0.
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Part III
The importance of non-
governmental boundary spanners 
in governance networks
Where the previous chapters were focused on boundary-spanning strategies from a gov-
ernmental perspective – or more specifically: the boundary-spanning activities of public 
managers operating in governance networks – the following chapters go deeper into the 
boundary-spanning activities of non-governmental actors, especially community leaders. 
These boundary-spanning activities are less elaborated in the governance network literature. 
In the following two chapters governance networks in which citizens take a leading role are 
examined. The role of boundary-spanning activities in the establishment and development 
of vital relationships with other actors in the network, particular governmental institutions, 
will be examined. In the last chapter of part III the effects of both governmental as non-
governmental boundary spanners on network performance will be tested.

ChaPter 4
Boundary spanning 
between a citizen initiative 
and local government
This chapter has been published as:
Edelenbos, J., & van Meerkerk, I.F. (2011). Institutional evolution within 
local democracy: Local self-governance meets local government. 
In: Torfing, J., & Triantafillou, P. (Eds.), Interactive policy-making, 
metagovernance and democracy (pp. 169-186). Essex: ECPR Press.
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absTracT
In this chapter, we elaborate on the institutional implications of governance networks 
driven by self-organization of citizens within local democracy. Self-organization of citizens 
seem to be valuable for producing urban development, since such initiatives bring about 
development that starts from within the urban area itself, enhancing the chance that this 
development fits local needs and circumstances and enhances the commitment of the lo-
cal stakeholders involved. However, an important difficulty for such initiatives to establish 
concerns the linkage with governmental institutions. This linkage might lead to new rela-
tionships between governmental institutions and civil society, but could also easily lead to 
evaporation of citizens’ initiatives. In this chapter we go deeper into the evolution of this 
interaction process and look for important factors which are important for self-governance 
to establish in connection with local governmental institutions. Making an effective con-
nection and realizing anchorage is dependent on different factors, of which boundary 
spanning, trust and informal networks are considered to be of major importance. These 
factors provide institutional interaction, which could be described as a co-evolving process 
wherein existing institutions slightly change or evolve by interacting agents, operating at the 
boundaries of these institutions.
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inTroDucTion
In the Netherlands, citizens have the formal opportunity to put issues – under certain 
conditions – on the political agenda. This has been possible since May 2006 at the national 
level and at the local level since March 2002. In addition, people increasingly engage in 
an informal way, on their own initiative, to draw from their expertise, experience and 
knowledge to formulate ideas for policy that they may offer to government. Such ‘citizens’ 
initiatives’ can be seen, in addition to interactive policy making, as a form of citizens’ par-
ticipation (Edelenbos et al., 2008). Citizen participation is often initiated by government; it 
is a bottom-up development started by citizens themselves (Edelenbos et al., 2008).
In this chapter, we elaborate on the institutional implications of the ‘citizens’ initiatives’ 
within local democracy. These initiatives could be described as forms of self-governance, 
leading to the emergence of ‘proto-institutions’ (Lawrence et al., 2002). These proto-institu-
tions interact with established institutions of representative democracy. This interaction is a 
co-evolving process in which both types of institutions react to each other in certain ways. 
In this contribution, we describe this institutional evolution and try to find determining 
factors in this process. We want to provide explanatory factors of processes of institutional 
co-evolution. We argue that these factors are of major importance with regard to processes 
of citizen participation and co-operating mechanisms between proto-institutions developed 
by citizens’ initiatives and established institutions of representative democracy.
We will treat one in-depth case study: the citizens’ initiative in the municipality of 
Vlaardingen. At this moment there is an initiative for the (re)development of Broekpolder, 
an area southwest of Vlaardingen. For the case study, we used two main research methods: 
document analysis and semi-structured interviews. The Broekpolder case was selected for 
scientific research is because it is unique in the Netherlands – here we see that a formal right 
to put something on the government agenda through citizens’ initiative developed to a form 
of self-organisation. In general, citizens’ participation is initiated and organised by govern-
ment, but in this case it was organised by the local community. In the research, all relevant 
written documents, such as memos, reports and political documents, were subjected to 
accurate study. In addition, eleven key players were interviewed, some several times, and 
these were made up of civil servants, council members, aldermen and citizens. The inter-
views were semi-structured and main themes were used to structure the interview – process 
development, institutions, co-operation, and change. We reconstructed the process and his-
tory of the case, and then asked questions about the coordination and co-operation between 
the federation (citizens) and government (council, civil servants, administrators).
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TheoreTical perspecTive
A Sociological Perspective on Institutions
The institutional approach in the functioning of public administration has received much 
attention in recent years (March & Olsen, 1989; Goodin, 1996). The institutional theory has 
a versatile ‘body of knowledge’ (Peters, 2005). This theory involves roughly three streams: 
economic, political and sociological (Edelenbos, 2005), which do not exclude each other. 
This chapter introduces the concept of ‘institution’ in accordance with the sociological 
perspective.
The sociological perspective focuses on rule systems and roles of (organised) individuals 
who shape interaction patterns between actors in a certain policy area (policy arena or 
policy situation) (Giddens, 1984; Eggertson, 1990). We then speak of ‘rules of the policy 
game’ and ‘roles in the policy game’ (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982; Goodin, 1996). Goodin defines 
(1996: 52) institutions as ‘organised patterns of socially constructed norms and roles’.
Interactive Policy Making as Self-Organisation
Local citizens’ initiatives and interactive policy making can be seen as processes of self-
organisation where (organised) citizens and social interest groups spontaneously come to 
a common action (Edelenbos et al., 2008). Informal citizens’ initiatives often arise from 
dissatisfaction with the actions of governments and function as a response to proposed 
government policy. Citizens and social groups often see that resistance is useless and then 
switch to a more proactive way of resistance by developing plans on their own initiative. 
Self-organisation is the internal capacity of elements within systems to adjust and develop 
(e.g. Cilliers, 1998; Heylighen, 2002). The concept focuses on how processes come about, 
develop and change. Processes evolve out of events, actions and interactions and build 
an institutional structure (Benson, 1977; Teisman et al., 2009). Through interaction and 
bonding among citizens and public officials, information exchange, learning and mutual 
experience develop, which may promote new patterns of relationships (Meek, 2008: 420; 
Morçöl, 2008). Processes of self-organisation in turn might lead to new relationships be-
tween governmental institutions and civil society. A form of participatory democracy enters 
a representative democracy, which could lead to a reorientation of existing democratic 
institutions (Edelenbos, 2005).
The Interaction Process between Institutions and Proto-Institutions as a Source of Institutional Evolution
Although many definitions and descriptions underline the sustainable, regulatory and 
stable character of institutions (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982; Giddens, 1984), here we also want to 
emphasise the volatility and transience of institutions (Lawrence et al., 2002). The institu-
tions that are now stable and sustainable all had an origin in which they were capricious in 
nature and were experienced as a new institution. Institutions do not only regulate the act, 
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but are also found in that act and brought to further development (Eggertson, 1990). In this 
chapter, we approach institutions as being processes of social interaction that could become 
the object of transformation when different, interrelated but sometimes incompatible social 
arrangements meet (Benson, 1977; Seo & Creed, 2002).
As a result of the application of citizens’ initiative, new institutional arrangements could 
be constructed that interact with the existing institutions of representative democracy. This 
interaction can produce tensions or ‘incompatible institutional processes’ (Seo & Creed, 
2002). It leads to pressure on both institutional arrangements. The ‘proto-institutions’ (Law-
rence et al., 2002) in participatory democracy can be understood as temporary, and these 
short-term institutions can provide a ‘de-institutionalisation’ of existing institutions that 
have a stable and long-term character (Edelenbos, 2005). Old and new institutions influence 
each other, and from this co-evolutionary process, both can mutually adapt themselves into 
a search for new operation logic. ‘Ongoing social construction produces a complex array 
of contradictions, continually generating tensions and conflicts within and across social 
systems, which may, under some circumstances, shape consciousness and action to change 
the present order’ (Seo & Creed, 2002: 225).
Finding a balance between the old institutions of representative democracy and the 
proto-institutions of participatory democracy asks for adaptability of both institutions. The 
interaction between the different institutions is therefore of major importance. However, in 
practice, this interaction process is difficult to bring about and in many cases does not lead 
to institutional evolution. ‘Interactive governance is often organised as an informal process 
with different rules and roles than the existing institutional representative system, which 
runs parallel or prior to the formal institutions of negotiation and decision making’ (Edelen-
bos, 2005: 128). This could easily result in the evaporation of emerging proto-institutions in 
participatory democracy and the reestablishment of existing patterns of behaviour within 
the institutions of representative democracy.
In the literature on adaptive capacity of systems different factors are mentioned which are 
important with regard to processes of adaptation, innovation and uncertainty. These factors 
are grounded in interaction processes between different institutions or systems and could 
therefore stimulate institutional co-evolution.
Factors of Adaptability Grounded in Interaction Processes
In the literature on adaptive governance and processes of institutional change, several fac-
tors are mentioned that may affect the evolution of institutions (Edelenbos, 2005; Folke et 
al., 2005; Granovetter, 1973; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Maguire et al., 2004; Seo & Creed, 
2002; Teisman et al., 2009; Williams, 2002). Three important and interrelated factors are: 
informal networks, trust and boundary spanning.
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Informal networks
Interactions between actors within informal networks outside the realm of formal institu-
tions could enhance the chance of the emergence of innovative policies and arrangements 
(Bekkers et al., 2010). This factor is about networks with an informal character that connect 
agents operating within traditional institutions of representative democracy and agents 
operating outside these institutions. The informal character of the networks provides room 
for involved actors to think and behave outside their established roles and rules accord-
ing to their formal position within established institutions. People are not directly pinned 
down to or held accountable for certain statements. Informal networks give room for 
experimentation and could lead to change. However, not all informal networks facilitate 
institutional evolution. Important in this matter is the structural ‘embeddedness’ of the 
networks (Granovetter, 1973). ‘Structural embeddedness is critical to our understanding of 
how social mechanisms coordinate and safeguard exchanges in networks, for it diffuses 
values and norms that enhance coordination among autonomous units …’ (Jones et al. 1997: 
924). For institutional evolution to happen, it is important that different parts of the social 
system representing the institutional processes of representative democracy are connected 
to one another.
trust
Besides the structure of the networks, the quality of social relationships (Granovetter, 1973) 
is a determining factor for change. Trust is seen as an important facilitating mechanism for 
cooperation between different parts of social systems (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007; Nooteboom, 
2002; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). This could ultimately lead to changes within existing, es-
tablished patterns of behaviour. Because trust helps people to tolerate uncertainty and make 
decisions where there is uncertainty (Luhmann, 1979; Bachmann, 2001), it is especially 
important in horizontal and emerging partnerships (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007; Koppenjan & 
Klijn, 2004). In the interaction between the emerging institutions of participatory democ-
racy and the institutions of representative democracy, there is uncertainty regarding the 
rules and roles of individuals. Representatives of both institutions must have trust in the 
partners’ intentions and competences for accepting their views and their influence.
Boundary spanning
As stated above, the existence of informal networks and processes in which new forms 
of governance are developed is not enough for the institutional evolution of the involved 
governmental entities to occur. Institutional change could happen when new practices are 
linked with existing routines (Maguire et al., 2004). Meaningful connections have to be 
made with the existing institutions of representative democracy (Edelenbos, 2005). Indi-
viduals who are able to connect emerging rules and roles within these informal networks 
with established rules and roles within the institutions of representative democracy could 
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therefore be described as key persons. These so-called ‘boundary spanners’ understand ‘…
both sides of the boundary, enabling them to search out relevant information on one side 
and disseminate it on the other’ (Tushman & Scanlan, 1981: 291–2). Boundary spanners have 
a feeling for different institutional arrangements (cf. Williams, 2002) and could therefore 
make connections between these institutional arrangements, which could lead to institu-
tional co-evolution.
Framework for Approaching and Analysing the Case
We describe and analyse the developments in institutions in the encounter between rep-
resentative democracy (municipal institutions) and participatory democracy (citizens’ 
initiative). We speak of institutional evolution when new ways of working emerge. With 
regard to this case, this means that existing municipal institutions show resilience: they are 
able to connect (new) participatory forms of democracy with their institutional practices, 
developed within representative democracy. New forms of citizen participation are incor-
porated, leading to new patterns of behaviour. For actors in those institutions, it means 
that they are able and willing to change their roles and rules of behaviour. We speak of 
‘institutional rigidity’ when municipal institutions resist new ways of working. This is the 
case when actors are not able or willing to change their roles and rules of behaviour: changes 
or new developments are delayed, resisted or absorbed in existing institutional procedures.
Our research examined the interaction processes between the emerging proto-institution 
(citizens’ initiative) and the (three) institutions of representative democracy within the 
municipality of Vlaardingen (see the three arrows in figure 1). In these three interaction 
processes, we looked at how the institutions of both citizens’ initiative and the local govern-
ment developed in time (from 2005 to 2010). We depict institutions as the roles people 
play in practice, as argued above. We therefore looked closely at how representatives of the 
citizens’ initiative, the city council, the Civil Service, and the board acted, analysing their 
daily activities in performing their jobs.
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case sTuDy: inTroDucTion
The Origin of the Citizens’ Initiative in Broekpolder
 The Broekpolder is an old recreational area of approximately 300 hectares in the north-
western part of the city of Vlaardingen. In early 2000, the city and the province of Zuid-
Holland had plans to build houses in the area. The Broekpolder was designated as a search 
location for ‘rural living’ by the regional government. This caused a large protest in the local 
community, which resulted in 10,000 signatures against the arrival of country houses in the 
Broekpolder. The regional government decided not to take any initiatives until 2010.
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Meanwhile, a group of thirty citizens of Vlaardingen had gathered with the aim of main-
taining the open and green character of the area. At the end of 2002, this group organised a 
number of meetings where citizens were invited to consider the future of the Broekpolder. It 
looked for co-operation with the council, Mayor and Aldermen (administrative body), and 
civil servants (see figure 2).
The agreement between the municipality and Federation
This citizens’ initiative was formalised on 5th October 2006 in the Foundation Federation 
Broekpolder. The Foundation has two goals:
(1) In the broadest sense, to develop and maintain the Broekpolder area through sport, 
recreation, culture, cultural history, nature and education.
(2) To take care of the common interests of the users of the Broekpolder on a voluntary 
basis.
The municipality (the administration) and the Federation jointly developed a policy note 
that later became a social contract in which the citizens’ initiative and its relationship with 
the municipality were elaborated. Special attention was paid to the degree and the extent 
of citizen participation and initiative of the Federation. With respect to participation pos-
sibilities, a distinction was made between area maintenance and regional development of 
the Broekpolder. With regard to the maintenance activities, the Federation was allowed 
to give qualified advice on the contract extension of the Board, which is the basis of the 
performance of daily maintenance in the Broekpolder. The municipal administration can 
only differ from the advice if there is a strong argument against it. However, the Federation 
should refrain from a direct interference with the normal daily maintenance.
With regard to the regional development, two categories are distinguished: small enhance-
ments and large development projects. With regard to small enhancements, the Federation 
gives binding advice to the Mayor and Aldermen. With regard to the large development 
plans and projects, the Federation takes the initiative in generating ideas and subsequently 
develops in cooperation with the municipality those projects. However, there is the pre-
condition that the Federation provides societal support for their ideas and plans – it should 
make enough effort to bring all the interested parties and stakeholders together that reflects 
the population of Vlaardingen. The Federation receives a budget for their organisation and 
the maintenance and development of the area. This budget is approved by the council. The 
Federation is bound by this budget, by the overall structure plan for the region and by legal 
requirements.
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Practice of the Federation
The Federation has the ambition, while practicing its initiating role, to serve as a platform 
where all citizens are able to get in contact with each other. A number of chambers are 
created in which several themes, such as recreation, sport and environment, are elaborated. 
The Federation sees its added value in acting as a loosely coupled organic network, where 
participants form linkages and alliances with others to obtain their goals.
The Federation also proposes to arrange the communication with the city council through 
the creation of a political portal (Municipality of Vlaardingen, 2007: 6):
If some ideas are beginning to show maturity in the Federation or if council members 
like to raise something, then an orientation meeting between Federation and (parts 
of) the city council can take place. These meetings are informal in the sense that the 
municipalities’ members are free to bring their ideas.
With regard to its representativeness and creating support for ideas and plans, the Federation 
is focused on creating linkages to municipality (council, administration and Civil Service) 
and the broader society in Vlaardingen. It has several informal links to key players in the 
Civil Service, the Mayor and Aldermen. The vision document for the area is developed with 
the consent of the council and administration. The Federation will also involve the broader 
public in the development of the vision document and the specific projects it embraces. 
The Federation continuously tries to reach and involve the citizens of Vlaardingen through 
advertisements, presentations and (public) meetings and events. In this way, the Federation 
responds to the demand of the city council to represent the population of Vlaardingen as 
much as possible.
analysis: insTiTuTional implicaTions in Three relaTionships
Relationship 1: Board of Mayor and Aldermen – the Federation
From the beginning, the relationship between the Federation and the Board of Mayor and 
Aldermen has been positive and productive. People with management experience partici-
pated in the Board. The chairman of the Federation was a former council member and knew 
her way in the municipal organisation. At the time of the citizens’ proposal, one of the 
aldermen (Mr Versluijs of the Labor Party), had a (personal) connection with the group of 
citizens. He had been actively involved in the design of the citizens’ initiative. This seems to 
be a crucial aspect. Through this connection, support for the citizens’ initiative was embed-
ded in the Board of Mayor and Aldermen. The involved alderman played an important role 
in convincing the Board and the city council to support the citizens’ initiative.
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The Board parties – Labour, Christian Democrats and Green Party – attached relatively 
great value to the citizens’ initiative. Citizen participation was included in the Coalition 
Agreement (2006–2010) as an explicit theme and political ambition. The citizens’ initiative 
fitted in well here.
Nevertheless, the Board had to get used to the new (co-operative) structure. This was es-
pecially expressed in the preparation of the strategic vision for the Broekpolder region. After 
a motion of the council, in article 2 of the Covenant, it was determined that, first, a financial 
framework should be developed, offering clarity about the conditions that related to the 
ideas proposed by the Federation. This vision should be jointly prepared by the Federation 
and the municipal board. However, the Board had given this task to the Civil Service, but 
without taking the new role of the Federation into account. Hereby, a regular internal work 
approach was activated contradictory to the covenant that proposed co-operation between 
municipality and Federation. Through well-timed and appropriate responses by an involved 
and committed civil servant and the involved alderman, a vision in collaboration with the 
Federation was finally drawn up.
Relationship 2: Municipal Council – Federation
The institutionalised role of the council (setting the terms and controlling the Board on 
these terms) was (to some extent) challenged by the citizens’ initiative. There was uncer-
tainty about the future role of the council. To what extent would the council still be involved 
in the decision-making process concerning the Broekpolder? Implementing such projects 
was politically sensitive in the Broekpolder area, where competing political interests were at 
stake. The councils’ discussion about the citizens’ initiative proposal on 19th January 2006 
(Gemeente Vlaardingen, 2006a) shows that the council had reservations. For example, 
some council members feared making a decision from which they could not later withdraw. 
The council was afraid of losing its grip on the citizens’ initiative that matters may be seen as 
a fait accompli. Some councillors wanted clear rules provided in advance, while the council 
as a whole was reluctant to create an extra organisational layer that could not be democrati-
cally controlled.
There are also some criticisms about the representativeness of the Federation. The strong 
involvement of some prominent Labor members (PvdA) in the in the initiative caused the 
scepticism with some political parties. This led the Federation to involve more people with 
other (political) backgrounds (such as the VVD, liberal party).
The politicised situation in the city council frustrated the development of a council portal, 
ardently desired by the Federation. The political portal would accelerate the decision-
making process by ensuring a timely alignment with politics on specific project proposals. 
However, the political parties had insufficient confidence in each other to create this portal. 
Who can we trust to represent the council in this portal? Do we like it to prematurely com-
mit ourselves to specific project proposals? The council wanted to retain the freedom and 
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opportunity to have the final say at the end of the policy process, as they always had. It 
was, therefore, decided to operate in accordance with the traditional political procedures to 
deal with project proposals; that the council would be involved through the whole Council 
Commission and would be informed by the Municipal Board on this issue.
Despite a reluctant and critical attitude, the citizens’ initiative proposal was approved 
by the council with a large majority. What we observed in this case was that the political 
system was on the average positive about the initiative, but did not change its own patterns 
of behaviour. The council absorbed the initiative into its existing institutionalised practices. 
For example, the political portal is subjected and the treatment of new developments re-
garding the Broekpolder area (and therefore the citizens’ initiative) takes place according to 
the usual procedures in the Council Commission on urban development (this Commission 
meets two times each year.)
Later in the process, around the beginning of 2010, one political party (Christian Demo-
crats) was very negative about the way the plans were developed out of sight of the council. 
This party was not happy with the way the council had no democratic role anymore in the 
process.
Relationship 3: Civil Service – Federation
The arrival of the Federation as a new partner to the Civil Service caused some consterna-
tion. Previous negative experiences with a citizens’ initiative did not help. Because of a lack 
of professional expertise among citizens, civil servants feared that the involvement of the 
Federation would only delay implementing any projects. According to some respondents, 
the proposed co-operation implicitly felt as if the functioning of the Civil Service was ques-
tioned. Until the decisive council meeting (in 2006), the attitude among officials was mainly 
passive and negative. Previous investments in the relationship would count for little if the 
plans of the Federation for the city council were to be rejected.
With the formal acceptance of the covenant between the city council and the Federa-
tion, civil servants had to take their new partner more seriously. Article 10 of the Covenant 
provides for assistance and support to be given to the Federation – something that had not 
occurred before. Civil servants are obligated to provide this through information or advice, 
in the same way they are obliged to assist the Mayor and Aldermen. Article 10 is made 
with regard to a lack of resources available for the Federation, such as time, procedural 
experience and finance. However, both Federation and Civil Service experienced difficulties 
with putting this into practice. For civil servants, the system became diffuse and unclear. 
Civil servants now have to deal with two principal players: the Board and the Federation. 
Who do they have to serve, especially when there are conflicts of interests between the 
two principals? The obligation to assist the Federation was something of a problem. A lot 
of effort would now have to be expended, which would take up valuable time and money 
from the Civil Service. Its view was that assistance could mainly be used when plans and 
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ideas became a project. Now, the official assistance could be overstretched and affect is too 
diverse: members of the Federation know where to find the officials. The arrangement leads 
to an appeal to the administrative capacity, which may not always be available at the desired 
moment.
The Federation, on the other hand, complained about a lack of administrative support. 
Some of this can be explained by the informal way in which the Federation acts and ap-
proaches civil servants. In the ‘normal’ case, whereby administrators can ask for support 
and advice, the interaction between administrator and civil servant was clearly regulated 
and institutionalised. Both parties knew, for example, how to arrange such an interaction 
and the extent of the support. However, this was not the case with regard to support for the 
Federation. Officials were not sure to what extent they could support the Federation and 
they did not see this service as ‘part of their normal job’.
Civil servants responded by making the new situation as manageable and clear as possible, 
through regulations (as much as possible) and the development of a project organisation, 
in which tasks and responsibilities are clearly divided and defined. The proposed project 
organisation structure consisted of a programme manager, a steering committee and project 
groups. Directors of both the municipal and the Federation would participate in the steer-
ing committee. At first there was an explicit distinction between different project groups, 
both from the town and the Federation in order to create workable situation in the eyes of 
the civil servants. The Federation was approached as a separate organisation with its own 
structure.
However, at the end of 2009 things were moving in the Civil Service. A programme 
manager was appointed from within the city council. This person was given the explicit task 
of assisting the Federation and creating connections to the city organisation. Also, project 
groups were formed in which both civil servants and members from the Federation (from 
the various chambers) were involved. Within these project groups members from the Fed-
eration and civil servants work together in making feasible plans that fit within the vision of 
the Federation. The programme manager plays a very different role in comparison with his 
or her colleagues, who are responsible for other areas: he or she coordinates, connects and 
facilitates instead of directing and steering.
evoluTion of esTablisheD insTiTuTions
What does the analysis to date indicate with regard to institutional evolution? We distinguish 
three periods of institutional evolution. The different periods of institutional evolution are 
summarised in Table 1.
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In Period 1 of the institutional evolution, there is a tendency for the city council to keep the 
proto-institution at a distance. There are sceptics within the civil service, as well as among 
councillors. Councillors are critical about the representativeness and there is uncertainty 
with regard to the future role of the council with regard to this project. The attitude of 
civil servants could generally be characterised as reluctant. Civil servants were passive and 
sceptical towards the citizens’ initiative. The proponents of the citizens’ initiative (an alder-
man, an active civil servant and the chairman of the Federation) are exploring the way 
in which they could make a fruitful co-operating mechanism. They seek political support 
and broaden the participation within the Federation with members from different political 
parties.
We observe a change in Period 2 when the covenant is accepted by the council. Not sur-
prisingly, it was this judicial arrangement that was creating an awareness, ‘acceptance’ and 
acknowledgement of the Federation’s work and ideas within the Civil Service. Civil servants 
tried to make the new situation as manageable and as clear as possible. They were doing this 
in their established way of working: formulating rules and dividing clear responsibilities 
and tasks. However this is sometimes difficult when confronted with the informal way the 
Federation works. The council also tries to absorb the initiative into its existing institution-
alised practices. It does not accept the formation of an informal political portal and sticks 
to the usual procedural arrangements with regard to area development. Also, the Board of 
Aldermen reacted in its practiced way with regard to the development of the vision by ac-
tivating a regular internal work approach. So, although the covenant was an administrative 
novelty, it did not cause change within the different institutions. The established institutions 
of representative democracy and the proto-institution still worked separately, in parallel, 
according to their own established ways of working.
Table 1 Periods of institutional evolution within the Broekpolder case study
period of institutional 
evolution
characteristics involved institutions focus on
Period 1 – dissociation 
(2002-2006)
Exploration, keeping other’s 
institutions at a distance, 
awaiting, aversion
Civil Service, Federation, 
Council, Board of Alderman
Controlling, 
experimentation, seeking 
for political support
Period 2 – parallelisation 
(2007–2008)
Institutions are running and 
working in parallel, there is 
not enough coordination
Civil Service, Federation, 
Council, Board of Alderman
Searching for certainties, 
established institutions 
seek to absorb the initiative 
in existing institutionalised 
practices
Period 3 – 
synchronisation (2009 
- 2011)
Institutions are to a large 
extent interwoven, leading 
to new ways of working 
together
Civil Service, Federation, 
Board of Alderman
Searching for effective 
co-operation mechanisms, 
embedding within 
different institutions
Boundary spanning between a citizen initiative and local government 115
This changed in the Period 3 (see table 1), which is still running. The Civil Service and the 
Federation are more interwoven with the emergence of project groups made up of members 
from both organisations. In this period, the rules and the roles (Goodin, 1996) within the 
Civil Service changed significantly in comparison with other development projects. We 
could speak of institutional change within the Civil Service. The responsible Alderman 
for area development supports the relationship between the programme manager and the 
Federation. The co-operation between the two organisations is in this way embedded within 
the Board. However, this clearly is not the case with regard to the council. The consequence 
of the clear separation of Federation activities and council activities is that projects and 
plans are developed out of sight of the council.
insTiTuTional evoluTion anD insTiTuTional embeDDing – 
explanaTory facTors
The explanation for the evolution of existing institutions in this case was closely connected 
to the way in which the new ‘proto-institution’ was linked with the existing institutions. 
What was the role of the three factors mentioned in our theoretical framework?
The functioning of the informal network between members of the Board of Aldermen, the 
Civil Service and the Federation played a crucial role in the whole process. In the first phase 
(around 2004), the group of citizens made connections with the Board of Aldermen in an 
informal way to show their intentions and competences, to test the reaction, and to develop 
knowledge regarding important procedures and sensitivities within the political arena. After 
the acceptance of the proposal by the council (end of Period 1, see table 1) a direct connec-
tion between the group of citizens and the civil service emerged. The involved civil servant 
in this matter noticed that contacts with the group of citizens ‘were frequent and mainly 
informal’. He became part of the informal network and the structural ‘embeddedness’ with 
the established institutions of representative democracy increased. In co-operation with the 
group of citizens, he wrote a policy document aimed at orgainising the relationship between 
the Federation and the city council.
The Federation tried to expand the informal network with members of the council by 
proposing a council portal. The council rejected this proposal and this hindered a connec-
tion with the informal network. Regarding the latest developments in the council and the 
coming elections (March 2010), this might be problematic for the future development of the 
initiative. Because of the weak connection with the city council, one of the major parties – 
the Christian Democrats – complained about a lack of democratic control.
The boundary spanners between the different institutions played an important role in 
organising the linkage between the proto-institution and the existing institutions. In the 
civil service, the Federation and the Board of Aldermen there was such a boundary spanner. 
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At the end of the first phase (2006), there was a committed civil servant who took care of the 
connection between the administration and the Civil Service. He took on the role of a ‘guide 
of the initiative through the civil service’ and he was able to translate the ideas, proposals 
and informal patterns of behaviour from the Federation into internal procedures, which 
fitted more with existing patterns of behaviour within the Civil Service. He also organised 
internal workshops for civil servants aimed at the issue of ‘how to deal with two different 
principals’ (the Board and the Federation). When this particular ‘boundary spanner’ ceased 
involvement after 2006, the link between the Civil Service and the Federation deteriorated 
and the aims of the Federation and the Civil Service began to diverge. This is also expressed 
in Period 2 of institutional evolution (see table 1) which is characterised by ‘parallelisation’. 
At the end of 2009 this connecting role is picked up again by the newly appointed program 
manager. He adapted his role as program manager in accordance with the partnership. He 
described his role as “coordinating”, “facilitating” and “connecting” instead of directing 
and steering, which is the regular role of a program manager within the civil service. He 
facilitated the interaction process between civil servants (‘experts’) and members of the 
Federation which was aimed at developing policy proposals for the area. Together with the 
chairman of the Federation, he organised the formation of the joint project groups, which 
increased the interaction between both organisations (Period 3, see table 1).
The Federation also had such a boundary spanner in the person of the chairman. With 
her working experience as a councillor, she was well aware of some important formal pro-
cedures and institutions in the municipal organisation. She realised that it was necessary 
to make connections to existing institutional practices of the city council in order to put 
the citizens’ initiative into practice. In order to obtain the necessary support of councillors 
and civil servants, the Federation should adopt to some extent the municipal institutional 
habits, procedures and routines. Together with the boundary spanner in the civil service, 
she wrote the covenant. This harmonisation with the working methods of the Civil Service 
provided the necessary clarity among civil servants and councillors. Her approach to the 
formal procedure of public consultation regarding the strategic vision was also helpful. 
Before starting this procedure, she ensured that the governmental entities agreed upon 
the Federation’s approach. The Federation took the formal procedure as point of departure 
for the public consultation, but changed the process of this consultation according to its 
own working principles. Instead of seeing this formal procedure as a ‘necessary evil’, the 
Federation took advantage of the situation to get communicate with the local population 
and obtain new ideas and projects.
The third boundary spanner involved was an alderman. He played a crucial role in con-
vincing the council that this experiment with citizens’ participation should be given the 
opportunity to go forward on a trial and error basis. As a policy advocate, he convinced 
other parties of the added value of this initiative. With regard to the civil service, he focused 
on ‘avoiding the emergence of detailed rules’ concerning the initiative and the relationship 
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between the Federation and Civil Service: ‘This is a typical reaction of civil servants, but is 
at the expense of the needed flexibility. For it is about a process and that needs room for 
development.’
The different boundary spanners connected the logics of the three different entities and 
played a crucial role in organising and embedding new patterns of behaviour into existing 
institutional structures. Together they harmonised the differences between the administra-
tive structures and processes of the Civil Service and the informal self-organising ways of 
the Federation. There was not such a boundary spanner active within the city council.
What can be said about the role of trust? The increasing interactions between the city 
council and the Federation enabled the creation of familiarity, joint understanding and 
trust. Representatives from the citizens’ initiative, Civil Service and the Board got to know 
each other’s intentions and competences and this developed a growing trust. This was im-
portant for reducing the scepticism surrounding citizens’ participation among civil servants 
(within the first phase of the interaction process). The committed civil servant ‘was touched 
by the enormous drive and spirit of the involved citizens’. This indicates intentional trust. 
As an experienced civil servant in this matter, the boundary spanner noticed that many 
civil servants did not have a high degree of trust in citizens concerning their participation 
in projects. The growing co-operation between the Civil Service and the Federation led 
to a growing trust in the capabilities and application of the volunteers working within the 
Federation. This was important for the willingness of civil servants to co-operate and to 
modify their dominant role in formulating policy proposals with regard to the area.
Within the council, a lack of trust is an important factor hindering the realisation of an 
effective link between the Federation and council. In the beginning, there was a lack of 
trust because of the strong involvement of Labor Party sympathisers. After broadening the 
network of citizens and the withdrawal of some Labor councilors, the intentional trust of 
the councillors in the Federation increased sufficiently to accept the proposal. However, 
council members were still eager to keep control over their formal roles, tasks and activities. 
They were very sceptical with regard to the Federation’s abilities to produce sound demo-
cratic proposals. This indicates a lack of competence trust. There is, however, also a lack of 
(intentional) trust between council members, which hindered the formation of the political 
portal. According to the different respondents, some council members are afraid that other 
council members will try to use this portal for their own political aspirations.
conclusion anD Discussion
Our research indicates the difficulty to put participatory forms of democracy into practice 
within established institutions of representative democracy. Proto-institutions of participa-
tory democracy have to be connected with these established institutions in order to prevent 
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evaporation. Making an effective connection and realising embedding is dependent on dif-
ferent factors, of which trust, informal networks and connective capacity through boundary 
spanning is of major importance. These factors provide institutional interaction, which 
could be described as a co-evolving process wherein existing institutions slightly change or 
evolve by interacting agents, operating at the boundaries of these institutions. The boundary 
spanners connected the logistics of the three different entities and played a crucial role in 
organising how to embed new patterns of behaviour into existing institutional structures. 
They merged new ways of organisation with existing institutional procedures. This is a dif-
ficult task and requires individuals who are committed and have the necessary experience.
However, the absence of a boundary spanner within the council and a lack of trust be-
tween council members hindered the realisation of the political portal or another form of 
institutional linkage with the council. The complaint regarding a lack of democratic control 
in the council is an expected reaction from the viewpoint of the representative institutional 
settings and relationships where there is little opportunity for participatory democracy. It 
shows the tension when new forms of participatory democracy meet highly institutionalised 
forms of representative democracy.
In the case study, we found different periods in the process of institutional evolution. The 
importance of institutional design with regard to changes in the processes is addressed in the 
literature (e.g. Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). The result of this research emphasises the difficult 
processes of institutional evolution. The co-evolving process of institutional interaction is 
hard to grasp and could hardly be controlled, designed and directed. Different, interacting 
factors, comes into play: boundary-spanning persons, informal networks and trust come 
together in a co-evolving process. It is a process characterised by learning, trial and error 
and is highly dependent on the interacting actors and specific contextual and cultural condi-
tions of the case. If one of the factors (trust, boundary-spanning actors, informal networks) 
disappears, the evolution process could be brought to a halt.
We found that besides management and meta-governance (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009), 
trust building was especially important (in Period 3, see table 1) for opening up the estab-
lished institutions, exploring and developing new interaction processes and behavioural 
patterns, and synchronising different institutional patterns. Trust provided an acceptance 
of the citizens’ initiative and the input from involved citizens in formulating and develop-
ing policy plans. Different aspects and effects of trust have been stressed in the literature 
(Lane & Bachman, 2001; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). In this study, we observed intentional 
and competence trust. From this growing trust, the actors were willing to take risks and 
therefore possibilities for change emerged. In the literature, the relationship between insti-
tutions and trust is mostly studied from the perspective of the stability of institutions and 
institutional design, which may enhance trust (Farrel & Knight, 2003; Koppenjan & Klijn, 
2004). This study supplies a supplementary view that the presence of trust is an important 
factor for institutional evolution. It creates the confidence for ‘stepping out of the box’ and 
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exploring new processes and institutions. This reverse relationship has not been studied 
widely. Further research should provide more insights in this relationship and the next step 
is to focus on adaptability (factors) and evolutionary aspects of governance networks.
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absTracT
Urban regeneration processes in which local stakeholders take the lead are interesting for 
realizing tailor made and sustainable urban regeneration, but are also faced with serious 
difficulties. We use the concept of self-organization from complexity theory to examine the 
relationship between local stakeholders’ initiatives and vital urban regeneration processes. 
We conducted a two case comparative research, Caterham Barracks and Broad Street BID 
Birmingham (UK), in which local stakeholders take the lead. We analyze the evolution of 
these regeneration processes by using two different manifestations of self-organization: 
autopoietic and dissipative self-organization. We found that a balanced interplay between 
autopoietic and dissipative self-organization of local stakeholders is important for vital 
urban regeneration processes to establish. We elaborate four explanatory conditions for this 
interplay. These conditions provide at the one hand stability and identity development, but 
also the needed connections with established actors and institutions around urban regen-
eration and flexibility to adjust to evolving demands during the process of regeneration. 
However, consolidation of such initiatives does mean a challenge for existing structures 
for government, market and society that will need to adapt and change their roles to new 
governance realities. In this way self-organizing processes become meaningful in the regen-
eration of urban areas.
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1. inTroDucTion
Urban regeneration processes are processes that refer to vision and action building aimed to 
resolve urban issues and to bring about sustainable improvement in the economic, physical, 
social, and/or environmental conditions of an urban area that has been subject to change 
(Roberts, 2000: 17). As an emerging new form of governance, these practices are often the 
result of partnerships between actors in formal government, market, and civil society (Heal-
ey, 2006). Urban regeneration processes are embedded in dynamic network environments, 
in which different governmental agencies, commercial actors, non-for-profit organizations 
and residents reshape urban areas and are dependent of each other (Wagenaar, 2007; Taylor, 
2007). In this matter, we see that the need and importance of public engagement in the field 
of urban regeneration is stressed nowadays, although the extent, the results and the way in 
which this could or should be organized is certainly not straightforward (e.g. Campbell & 
Marshall, 2000; Innes & Booher, 2004; Bond & Thompson-Fawcett, 2007). In this article 
we approach participation as a multi-way set of interactions among governmental parties, 
citizens or businesses and other actors who together produce outcomes (Innes & Booher, 
2004). We focus on community-led initiatives in the context of urban regeneration. Local or 
community based initiatives from citizens or businesses seem to be valuable for producing 
urban regeneration, since such initiatives bring about development that starts from within 
the urban area itself, enhancing the chance that the regeneration fits local needs and circum-
stances and enhancing the commitment of the involved local stakeholders and therefore the 
implementation of visions and plans (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002; Wagenaar, 2007).
However, the difficulty of putting local initiatives from non-state actors into practice is 
also well-noted in the literature, for example because of the lack of resources and power of 
these actors (e.g. Chaskin & Garg, 1997) or the difficulty of making effective connections 
with governmental institutions to guarantee implementation (e.g. Edelenbos, 2005; Healey, 
2006). Therefore, the establishment of vital actor relations in order to collaboratively create 
and maintain urban areas of high qualities is stressed in the literature (e.g. Healey, 1998; 
Innes & Booher, 2004). For example, the establishment of vital relationships between 
community-led initiatives and organizations of representative democracy, which are impor-
tant for dealing with recurring issues in urban regeneration (Campbell & Marshall, 2000; 
Edelenbos & Van Meerkerk, 2011).
In this article we therefore depart from the proposition that the success of local regenera-
tion initiatives depends on the extent in which these initiatives are evolving within vital 
collaborative multi-actor relationships. In this respect, insight is missing in how these 
initiatives lead to vital collaborations among actors trying to realize urban regeneration 
(see also Taylor, 2000; Innes & Booher, 2004). We want to enhance the understanding of 
the emergence of community-led initiatives in sustainable improvements in the economic, 
physical, social, and/or environmental conditions of urban areas. We use the concept of self-
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organization from complexity theory to theoretically approach and elaborate the emergence 
and evolution of community-led initiatives. We see self-organization as a useful concept in 
the context of urban regeneration, because it explicitly focuses on the dynamics within urban 
systems and the evolution of interactions between different stakeholders, which could lead 
to new system behaviour and ultimately to the transformation of urban areas (cf. Wagenaar, 
2007; Teisman et al., 2009; De Roo, 2010). The following research question is leading for our 
research and article: “how do local initiatives, approached as self-organization, evolve and 
which conditions facilitate them to develop into vital actor relations for urban regenera-
tion?” We conducted a two case comparative research of two urban regeneration projects in 
the UK: Caterham Barracks and Broad Street BID Birmingham. These cases are examples 
of urban regeneration processes in which local actors (users, residents) took initiative and 
responsibility. In the following section we provide our theoretical and analytical frame-
work, in which we elaborate two different forms of self-organization, i.e. autopoietic and 
dissipative self-organization. Subsequently, we will analyze our two cases, resulting in a case 
comparative analysis. Finally, in section 7 we draw conclusions.
2. TheoreTical framework: framing self-organizaTion
We argued in the introduction that we approach local urban regeneration as processes of 
self-organization. In this section we theoretically elaborate the concept of self-organization. 
Self-organization is generally associated with complex system thinking as developed in 
physics, and broadly described as the emergence of new structures (‘order’) out of ‘chaos’ 
(Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). Notions of complexity have not just remained within physics, 
but have also influenced social sciences and more specifically, planning and governance 
studies (e.g. Wagenaar, 2007; Teisman et al, 2009; De Roo, 2010). Complexity thinking could 
be useful for studying processes of change in complex network environments, such as urban 
regeneration, because it explicitly focuses on the dynamics of systems. It approaches systems 
as being in a continuous flux, in processes of becoming instead of being, emphasizing the 
continuous interaction between different elements forming a system. Self-organization is 
defined here as the emergence and maintenance of structures out of local interaction, an 
emergence that is not imposed or determined by one single actor, but is rather the result of a 
multitude of complex and non-linear interactions between various elements (Cilliers, 1998; 
Heylighen, 2002; Jantsch, 1980).
Autopoietic and dissipative self-organization
The literature on complex systems and self-organization distinguishes autopoietic and 
dissipative system behaviour Autopoietic self-organization is about self-maintenance and 
reproduction of systems (Jantsch, 1980). This concept is developed in biology, but has also 
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inspired social scientists and even led to Luhmann’s famous theory of autopoietic or self-
referential systems (e.g. Luhmann, 1995). Autopoietic self-organization is aimed at stabiliz-
ing and sometimes intensifying boundary judgments in social settings, attain an existing 
structure and maintain it in self-referentiality (cf. Luhmann, 1995).
Complex systems also show dissipative self-organization. Prigogine (Prigogine & Stengers, 
1984) specifically focuses on this type of system behaviour in his research. He argues that 
dissipative behaviour is boundary breaking, leading to evolution of systems. As opposed 
to irreversible physical processes which play a ‘destructive role’ (which develop towards 
a situation of equilibrium and thus inertia), Prigogine observed and analyzed irreversible 
processes which play a ‘constructive role’: the so-called dissipative structures (Bor, 1990). 
Dissipative behaviour refers to the (increasing) connection of various subsystems leading to 
a highly dynamic process heading towards far-from-equilibrium situations (Jantsch, 1980; 
Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Heylighen, 2002; Morçöl, 2005). In these far-from-equilibrium 
situations, systems are much more sensitive to external influences and their behavioral pat-
terns are non-linear; small changes in the components of a system may lead to large-scale 
changes (Morçöl, 2005: 11).
Complex systems (physical as well as social) that show both types of self-organization can 
be in situations of so-called ‘bounded instability’ (Merry, 1999; Stacey, 1995). In a situation 
of bounded instability “…the organisation can find the mix of confirmation and novelty 
that allows it to be a learning system that is able continually to self-organize and thus renew 
itself ” (Merry, 1999: 275). In situations of equilibrium, systems are too static to be really 
adaptive to new, unanticipated situations. Such a system can grow isolated and thus become 
irrelevant to its environment. On the other hand, when a system is totally unstable, it is not 
capable to respond in a coherent way to new challenges and could easily become rudderless. 
Situations of bounded instability are thus characterized by both autopoietic and dissipative 
system behaviour.
Vital actor relations
In literature on collaboration and networks the importance of vital actor relationships is 
indicated. Healey (2006) argues that institutional or relational capacity is important to 
develop and realize cooperation and collaboration. Also the literature on networks stresses 
the importance of actor relationships. Meier and O’Toole (2001) for example found that net-
working activities have positive impact on the effectiveness of these actor relations. Other 
scholars mention that vital actor relations are characterized by trustworthiness which is 
developed and maintained by repeated interaction among actors in the network (Edelenbos 
& Klijn, 2006). Network management activities are important to bring actors together and 
develop trustworthy and vital actor relationships and networks (Klijn et al., 2010).
Vital networks are those networks in which actors have positive interdependent rela-
tionships and in which actors frequently meet and exchange visions, meaning, interests, 
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information and knowledge (c.f. Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002; Healey, 2006). Vital actor rela-
tions develop joint fact finding and mutual understanding of problem situations (Healey, 
1995). Actor relations are not dominated by conflicts or deadlocks, but are characterized by 
ongoing interaction leading to joint strategies to solve problems. For the establishment and 
maintenance of vital actor relationships an active role of so called ‘boundary spanners’ is 
indicated as an important condition (Alter & Hage, 1993; Friend et al, 1974; Williams, 2002). 
These are people who are skilled communicators, able to ‘talk the right language’ of the 
different forums or networks in which they are active, and have excellent networking skills 
giving them the ability to gain entry to a variety of settings and to seek out and ‘connect up’ 
others who may have common interests or goals (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002: 100).
In sum, many scholars mention the importance of vital actor relationships in complex 
planning and governance processes, because they lead to collaboration and trust between 
interdependent actors and subsequently to more legitimate and effective policy outputs. 
We are therefore interested in how processes of self-organization are related to vital actor 
relations, or more specifically: how autopoietic and dissipative behaviours contribute to 
the establishment of vital actor relations in the context of urban regeneration. In the next 
paragraph we operationalize this relationship.
Self-organization in urban regeneration: the analytical framework
Building on the previous sections, we translate self-organization to urban regeneration 
processes as the emergence of governance structures in which local stakeholders (residents, 
businesses, non-for-profit organizations, etc.) have a pivotal role. It is framed as an interplay 
of autopoietic and dissipative self-organization when these local stakeholders take initiative 
to come to collective and collaborative action. We focus on the relation between the interplay 
of autopoietic and dissipative self-organization on the one hand and vital processes of urban 
regeneration on the other hand. We want to find explanatory conditions in this relationship 
(see figure 1). We are especially interested in how these kinds of self-organised behaviour 
lead to vital actor relations in which different actors work together in a collaborative way, 
and what elements are crucial in this process.
Below we define and operationalize our three core variables in our research. We define 
dissipative self-organization as the openness of social systems and the exploration for 
(increasing) interconnection of different subsystems leading to highly dynamic and vital 
processes (c.f. Jantsch, 1980; Teisman et al, 2009). This type of self-organization is character-
ized by external orientation, wide boundary judgments and production of new structures 
and processes (Flood, 1999; Teisman et al, 2009) in which variety and redundancy of ideas 
(plans, content) and actors is aimed for. These new structures and processes often goes 
at the expense (in terms of attention, time, energy, resources) of existing structures and 
processes leading to tensions between ‘the new’ and ‘the existing’. We define autopoietic self-
organization as the inwards orientation of social systems that is about self-maintenance, 
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identity forming and stabilization, and reproduction (c.f. Jantsch, 1980; Luhmann, 1995). 
Autopoietic self-organized systems are characterized by internal orientation, narrow 
boundary judgments and stability (reproduction, maintaining) in structures (Flood, 1999; 
Teisman et al, 2009) in which variety and redundancy of ideas (plans, content) and actors 
are countered.
We define vital actor relations as the way in which different actors develop relational 
capacity, jointly and collaboratively develop problem definitions and solutions in the urban 
area (c.f. Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002; Edelenbos, 2005; Healey, 2006; Klijn et al, 2010). The 
processes are characterized by ongoing interaction in which mutual communication and 
understanding are present and high-level conflicts (i.e. sharp differences of opinion and 
interests) are absent.
Table 1 summarizes the indicators for autopoietic and dissipative self-organization. We 
want to stress here that the distinction between autopoietic and dissipative self-organization 
is purely analytical. In practice we see that the two are simultaneously present and recipro-
cal to each other. In case description and analysis we also see this intermingling of the two.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
(interplay of) autopoietic and 
dissipative self-organization 
vital processes of urban 
regeneration 
explanatory conditions 
Figure 1 Conceptual framework
Table 1 Operationalization of the three core variables
main variables indicators
Dissipative self-organization - external orientation through a) open boundaries, and b) looking for exposure
- wide orientation through a) exploring new content, and b) involving and 
connecting a large number of actors in new actor constellations 
Autopoietic self-organization - internal orientation through a) closed boundaries, and b) strengthen internal 
identity
- narrow orientation through a) explicating and consolidating content, and b) 
stabilizing existing actor constellations or even reducing the number of involved 
actors
Vital urban regeneration - co-production through a) joint problem-definition and b) joint solution finding
- ongoing interaction through a) the presence of mutual communication an 
understanding, and b) the absence of high-level conflict
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Case studies
We selected two cases in which a certain level of self-organisation was present, thus in our 
view providing examples of self-organization in urban regeneration. The case Caterham 
Barracks Community Trust is an example of community-based initiative that led to a 
self-organizing community trust. The case Broad Street Birmingham is an example of the 
establishment of a Business Improvement District in which property owners and business 
actors develop pro-active behaviour and self-organizing capacity for redeveloping the urban 
area.
We conducted theory-informed case studies in a focused way, to empirically analyze a 
particular theoretically relevant issue, self-organization in urban regeneration, and generate 
new theoretical knowledge from the empirical analysis. The research design of two case 
studies does not enable us to develop generalized empirical knowledge but it does provide a 
detailed understanding of contextual and situational conditions that influence the evolution 
of self-organization and the interplay with vital collaborative regeneration processes. From 
the cases we draw theoretical insights, which need to be empirically validated in other con-
texts before we know whether they can be generalized. This is in accordance with conven-
tional case study methodology (e.g. Stake, 1998; Yin, 1984). We conducted an instrumental 
case study rather than an intrinsic case study (Stake, 1998). In an instrumental case study 
the researcher uses a case to gain more understanding about a particular phenomenon of 
interest. An intrinsic case study is carried out because of an interest in the case itself, and 
what happens in the case. We used the cases to develop new insights (emerging from the 
cases) in finding facilitating conditions for self-organizing processes in urban regeneration. 
The explanatory conditions that we find in the cases are derived from the interviews.
Data were collected through a combination of interviews, observations and document 
analyses. All relevant written documents were subjected to accurate study, such as memos, 
reports, newsletters, proposals, websites, political documents, statutory instruments etc. In 
addition, key players in both cases were interviewed: the involved individuals in the initia-
tives (local residents in Caterham and the BID management in Birmingham) and other 
involved actors in the regeneration process, such as civil servants of the local authority, 
council members, developers and other involved governmental agencies. The interviews 
were semi-structured. Firstly, the process and history of the cases were reconstructed. 
Secondly, questions were asked about the indicators mentioned in table 1: how did the 
self-organization develop and how did they demarcate the content and the process of the 
regeneration: how did they involve other actors, how did they decide on the themes and 
projects of the regeneration and how did they structure the interactions and communica-
tions with the other involved actors and the local community? In the next two sections the 
analysis of the cases is presented. In our analysis we focus on the behaviour of individual 
actors within the interaction regarding the regeneration processes.
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3. inTroDucTion of The case sTuDies
Both regeneration processes started off in the nineties and are examples of local stake-
holders taking responsibility for the vitality of their urban environments. An important 
difference concerns the initiators of the self-organization: the Broad Street Birmingham 
case was initiated by private businesses, while the Caterham Barracks case was initiated 
by local residents. Below, the two cases are further introduced. Table 2 compares the cases 
regarding their main characteristics. To structure our analysis, we use the rounds model of 
Teisman (2000) on policy and decision-making processes. This model fits our complexity 
perspective on urban regeneration, because it is focused on the variety of actors involved in 
decision-making processes and the dynamics resulting from their interactions. Each round 
is ended with a crucial decision or event (e.g. the involvement of a new actor), defined by the 
researchers in retrospect, but based on the reconstruction of the process by the respondents. 
The crucial decision or event is the beginning of a next round, and generally serves as a focal 
point of reference for the actors involved. Both regeneration processes could be divided in 
four rounds (see table 2).
Table 2: main characteristics of the two cases
broad street birmingham caterham barracks
key actors Broad Street businesses
Property owners and developers
City Centre Partnership
West Midland Police
Broad Street BID 
Local Group
Private developer
District Council
Caterham Barracks Community Trust
issue The BID is established to counter the 
controversy between “drunks and bankers” 
and to make Broad Street “cleaner, brighter 
and safer”. 
Closing of the Barracks has impact on the local 
economy and the character of the area. The 
redevelopment of the site is a chance to create 
new vitality for the area. 
Timeframe Round one: 1991 – 2003
Growing controversies
Round two: 2003 – 2004,
Establishing the BID
Round three: 2004 – 2009,
Operating the BID
Round four: 2009 – 2010,
Expanding the BID
Round one: 1995 – 1997,
Redefining the Barracks
Round two: 1998,
Plans for redevelopment
Round three: 1999 – 2000,
Establishing governance arrangements 
between main actors
Round four: 2001 – 2010,
The Community Trust in action
legislation Business Improvement District
(Statutory Instrument 2004: 2443)
Section 106 Agreement between private 
developer, local authority and Community Trust 
size Approximately 100 acres and over 300 
businesses
57 acres divided in three parcels, Approximately 
400 new houses.
budget Approximately £ 400,000 p.a. since 2004. Initial investment of £ 2,000,000 by private 
developer for community benefits
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Caterham Barracks
Caterham Barracks is an urban regeneration project, developed and managed in a coopera-
tive process between local community, a private developer and the District Council. The site 
is located in the North-western edge of Caterham-on-the-Hill (see figure 2). Caterham is a 
town in the Tandridge District of Surrey and located south of London. The self-organizing 
character of the case is represented by the emergence of the Caterham Barracks Community 
Trust, in which local residents took responsibility for developing and managing community 
facilities and played a key role in the regeneration process. Caterham Barracks refers to 
a Depot used by the army until 1990 when it was declared redundant by the Ministry of 
Defence.
In 1995 the barracks were closed. This affected the local economy and the character of 
the area, since the population of the Barracks had for a long period of time contributed to 
the social life and economic well-being of the local area (Tandridge District Council, 1998: 
2). When the Barracks were closed, interactions between local residents and the District 
Council commenced, aimed at preserving the area (Interview CBCT, 2009). In this way the 
demolition of the historical buildings and the construction of high- and middleclass hous-
ing was prevented; the scenario most interesting to private developers. From that moment 
on the redevelopment of the area became a process in which local residents in cooperation 
with a private developer played a key role.
Figure 2 Overview geographical area Caterham Barracks (Source: Google earth)
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Broad Street Birmingham
Broad Street BID Birmingham is a Business Improvement District, initiated by local busi-
nesses, property owners and the Birmingham City Council. The main goal of the organiza-
tion of this BID was to bring down the nuisance of the night-time economy on the business 
environment within the Broad Street area (see figure 3).
The self-organizing character of the case is represented by the emergence of the BID, in 
which local business took responsibility for developing and managing their environment. 
The concerns about the business environment on and around Broad Street Birmingham 
started off in the early nineties. The establishment of a convention centre in this part of 
the city centre boosted the local economy around Broad Street, both for offices as for the 
emerging night-time economy. The quality and reputation of the area became seriously 
challenged as the night-time economy started to cause increasing nuisance, thus devaluat-
ing the expensive real estate investments made in the area. When a person was killed during 
a night-time fight, interactions between local businesses, city council and police started 
around the issues on Broad Street. Consequently, local businesses took initiative to solve the 
controversy between “drunks and bankers”. From that moment, the BID played a key role in 
the regeneration of the area.
In the next section the case studies are described and analyzed by focusing on autopoietic 
and dissipative characteristics.
Figure 3 Overview geographical area Broad Street Birmingham (Source: Google earth)
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4. analyzing The caTerham barracks regeneraTion process
In this paragraph the urban regeneration of Caterham Barracks is analyzed by the concepts 
of dissipative and autopoietic behaviour and vigorous actor relationships. Table 3 summa-
rizes the results of the analysis. The indicators of table 1 are marked (in bold) to explicate the 
autopoietic and dissipative elements.
Table 3: dissipative and autopoietic self-organization within the case Caterham Barracks
Time frame Dissipative self-organization autopoietic self-organization
Round 1 (1995-1997): Redefining 
the Barracks
exploration of what the former 
Barracks (and the area) could mean for 
the local community
Interaction process in which different 
actors are connected
Development of some clear guidelines 
and protection of the area: explication 
of what should be maintained
stabilization of the involvement of a 
certain group of individuals: the Local 
Group
Round 2 (1998): Plans for 
redevelopment
explorative planning process in 
which a large numbers of actors are 
involved
connection between ideas and 
interests Local Group, private 
developer, local community and local 
authority
‘selection’ of ideas for community 
facilities and future management 
organized by Local Group
Round 3 (1999-2000): 
Establishing governance 
arrangements between main 
actors
exploration of effective cooperation 
structure between Local Group, 
private developer and local authority;
intensive interactions between 
Local Group, private developer and 
local authority
refinement of plans towards 
implementation
formalization of arrangements 
between main actors: dividing 
responsibilities
establishment of Community Trust
Round 4 (2001-2011, still 
running): The Community Trust 
in action
Community Trust is looking for 
exposure: it seeks for sustainable 
user groups for running community 
facilities. 
Decreasing interactions between 
main actors
internal orientation: Community 
Trust is increasingly focused on internal 
management and running business
Dissipative and autopoietic self-organization in the regeneration process
Below, the elements of dissipative and autopoietic self-organization are elaborated for each 
round of the process.
round 1 (1995-1997)
Dissipative behaviour
After the Barracks were closed, an interactive process developed, which was character-
ized by increasing interaction between local residents, local government officers and local 
councillors, about the redevelopment of the area. An important figure in connecting these 
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different actors was the later chairman of the Community Trust, living in Caterham and 
at that time a District councillor. He wanted to explore the possibilities for making the 
redevelopment of the site more productive for the local community. In this respect, a forum 
for discussion about the future of the Barracks’ site was formed: the so-called Local Group. 
This Local Group consisted of representatives from different community groups, officers 
and councillors of the District and members of the Caterham Residents’ Association and it 
reported back to the District Council (TDC, 1998; Interview TDC, 2009). To protect the area 
from building houses and demolition of the historical buildings, the Local Group wanted to 
turn the site into a Conservation Area (see below). This required local consultation and was 
an important trigger for wider community participation. Through bus tours, organized by 
the local government, local residents were taken into the area and asked if the site should be 
preserved (Interview TDC, 2009). Furthermore, local residents were invited to vote for dif-
ferent development scenarios, which were co-produced by the local authority and the Local 
Group. This consultation attracted a high response. About 1300 people voted (TDC, 1998). 
The scenario with the minimum amount of housing, an emphasis on retaining the best 
buildings and convert them for employment, and providing various community facilities 
attracted the most votes, i.e. 66%. According to the later chairman of the Community Trust 
and the private developer, this scenario was financially unrealistic or at least very difficult 
to realize and economically not sustainable, but it provided a clear statement of what local 
people wanted with the site (Interviews CBCT, 2009; private developer, 2009).
Autopoietic behaviour
Two important focal points for setting boundaries concerning the content of the regeneration 
process were the protection of the area from housing and the prevention of the demolition 
of the historical buildings. There was high consensus in the local community that a develop-
ment strategy focused on building new houses would not be beneficial for increasing the 
vitality of the urban area (TDC, 1998; Interview CBCT, 2009). Such an area, in which mainly 
newcomers would settle, would not be connected to the local community. Furthermore, the 
historical buildings would have to be knocked down, which would significantly harm the 
historical meaning of the site for local residents. The chairman of the Community Trust 
notes on this matter: “it was the institution [Caterham Barracks] that created this part of 
Caterham. In terms of the historical growth of this place, it is really important. Just to knock 
it down doesn’t really do anything sensible with it.” (Interview CBCT, 2009). Therefore, in 
consultation with the local community, the site was turned into a Conservation Area by 
which development initiatives were restricted if they would harm the historical value of the 
area.
On the basis of the selected scenario, the Council produced a development Brief for the 
bidding process in which community benefits were ensured, such as employment uses, 
community facilities, recreational and sport uses and in which it was clearly stated that new 
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residential development only would permitted if sufficient community benefit is demon-
strated (TDC, 1998: 5).
round 2 (1998)
Dissipative behaviour
Because of the specific conditions about combining different spatial and societal functions, 
different developers left the bidding process. “A lot of the larger houses builder companies 
just walked away and thought […] there is no way we want a piece of this, this is far too com-
plicated. We just want to build a few houses, that’s what we do. We don’t want to get involved in 
employment or community facilities, that’s far too complicated.” (Interview private developer, 
2009). A relatively small, but upcoming, company decided to invest in this project: “…
because it was on our doorstep, we felt we had the time to invest in try to make this work.” 
(Ibid). To make the project financially more beneficial and because of the restrictions of 
the development Brief, the developer took a broader perspective than simply focusing on 
housing and wanted to connect housing with integral spatial development and the delivery 
of community facilities. It started an interactive planning process with local residents to 
explore the possibilities for this perspective. In this respect, a community planning week 
was organized which attracted contributions from over 1000 people. For the consultants 
who facilitated this collaborative planning process, it was the first time a private developer 
approached them. “But what was interesting in Caterham; it was the first time for us with a 
private sector client saying ‘that’s sounds like a good idea’, to actually engage people in this 
project.” (Interview organizers collaborative planning process, 2009). During the planning 
weekend the private developer was focused on connecting housing and the development 
of new kinds of community facilities to make the scenario financially more attractive. “The 
offer here was; well look guys, this [the scenario in the development brief] is not a deliverable 
plan at all. […] What you need is more housing and the housing can then deliver the com-
munity facilities. And all of a sudden people say: we can have the community facilities and they 
get hooked on what they can have and probably less concerned about the housing, which was 
what happened.” (Interview private developer, 2009). At the end of this planning weekend, 
it was agreed that both more facilities and more houses could be developed than initially 
noted in the development Brief (Interviews CBCT; private developer, 2009).
Autopoietic behaviour
An important autopoietic characteristic in this round is the quest of the private developer 
for commitment in terms of involvement towards the Local Group. This Local Group was 
until then a broad group of people from various community organizational backgrounds. 
The private developer was willing to cooperate with this group, but wanted commitment and 
convergence to financially deliverable plans (Interview private developer, 2009). The result 
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was a stable and smaller group of local residents who were very willing to get involved. In 
cooperation with the private developer, the Local Group set up several working groups to 
further elaborate the ideas concerning the community facilities and its future management. 
These working groups were organized around specific themes, such as land use, youth, 
environment, arts and recreation, and employment and enterprise and created boundar-
ies regarding the scope of the projects (Website CBCT, 2002; Interview CBCT, 2009). In 
cooperation with the private developer, financially undeliverable plans were eliminated 
(Website CBCT, 2002; Interview private developer, 2009). Furthermore, only local residents 
were involved, because the idea was to give them responsibility for the management of com-
munity facilities (Interview CBCT, 2009).
round 3 (1999-2000)
Dissipative behaviour
After the Planning weekend and the further development of the site, there was increasing 
interaction between the private developer, the local authority and the ‘new’ Local Group. 
In this process strategies were formed about the question how to make the regeneration 
initiatives and projects sustainable and community driven. An effective cooperation struc-
ture was explored about the future ownership of specific community buildings, land and 
community facilities (Interviews private developer; TDC; CBCT, 2009). Using the legal 
framework of the Town and Country Planning Act, a so-called S106 agreement5 between 
the developer, the local government and the Local Group was formed. The Local Group 
turned into the Caterham Barracks Community Trust. The developer contributed in excess 
of £2 million pounds in buildings and money to this project. The assets and the land for 
community facilities were transferred to the Community Trust.6
Autopoietic behaviour
In this round the identity of The Local Group evolved into a more formal entity: the Cater-
ham Barracks Community Trust. The objectives of the Trust were to facilitate the develop-
ment of the community facilities and activities, aimed to maximise the benefit for the local 
community (Interview CBCT, 2009). The interactions between the private developer, the 
local authority and the Local Group were formalized and stabilized by the development 
5  S106 stands for ‘Section 106 agreement’, which is generally used by planning authorities to secure benefits for 
the community from planning approvals that cannot be secured in other ways (NLGN, 2002: 12). Developers 
often have to lodge bonds with the planning authority to the value of the amount they have to invest back into 
the community. The bond is only returned when the authority is satisfied that the developer has complied with 
the agreement.
6  The CBCT owns the cricket green, the pavilion, the Officers Mess, the NAAFI, the Old Gymnasiums and the 
football fields.
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of an accountability structure: from that moment forward, representatives from the local 
authority and the developer sit on the Trust’s Board and oversee the management of the 
community facilities (TCPA, 2007: 37).
round 4 (2001-2011 and still running)
Dissipative behaviour
After its establishment, the Trust started looking for exposure. Different self-organizing 
user groups, having evolved from the working groups, were sponsored and facilitated in 
their management. The Trust used its funds to establish a range of economic, social, edu-
cational, cultural and sports facilities, such as an indoor skate park, a centre for arts and 
recreation, a cricket field, a children’s play area, a nature reserve/community farm, a centre 
for enterprises and a football club. The Trust functioned as a platform or ‘springboard’ for 
these user groups to run certain community facilities and it holds an open attitude towards 
potential user groups. User groups are allowed to run a community facility on their own 
and ultimately to own the particular asset, if they are able to financially sustain themselves 
and to provide community benefits (Interview CBCT, 2009). In the end, all the community 
facilities should be self-sustainable.
Autopoietic behaviour
After the establishment of the Trust and the handing over of the community assets, the 
interaction between the private developer and the local authority and the Trust decreased. 
The Trust increasingly concentrates on its own task and defends its own interest against that 
of the private developer. There are some disagreements about the time schedules accord-
ing to which the Trust gets the full financial responsibility over the community assets. At 
the same time the communication with the local community is less frequent compared to 
previous rounds of the process. In this round the internal orientation of the Trust increases.
Relating self-organization to vital actor relations in the regeneration process
The regeneration process started with increasing interactions between local residents, lo-
cal councillors and civil servants to make sense of the closing of an institution which had 
been an important part of the identity of Caterham. According to the different respondents, 
the boundary spanning work of the later chairman of the Community Trust was highly 
important here. These dissipative characteristics evolved into vital actor relations in which 
joint problem-definition and joint solution finding were produced: the preservation of the 
site and the need to connect future developments of the site with the local community. The 
adaptive behaviour of the private developer in the second round is stressed by the respon-
dents. The developer broadened his scope on housing and explicitly decided to develop 
the site in co-production with the local community. In this way the vital actor relations 
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were maintained and further evolved. Autopoietic behaviour is observed in the stabilization 
and reduction of the number of involved actors: local residents who were committed and 
willing to stay involved got a seat in one of the working groups of the Local Group. In the 
next round the cooperation between de Local Group, the private developer and the District 
Council led to a governance arrangement concerning the future management of the site. 
The District Council showed adaptive behaviour in this round by giving the Community 
Trust a leading role. Subsequently, the Trust evolved into a more formal entity with its own 
way of working. According to the chairman, the Trust model is a very useful model for 
community-led regeneration. It provides both the flexibility and legal capacity to evolve 
in accordance with the needs of the community (Interview CBCT, 2009). It was able to 
facilitate the different user groups in their efforts, contributing to the urban regeneration. 
At the same time, however, the interactions with the other actors are decreasing. In this 
respect, the Trust increasingly enacts autopoietic behaviour. As a result, actor relations seem 
to becoming less vital.
5. analyzing The broaD sTreeT birmingham regeneraTion process
In this paragraph the urban regeneration of Broad Street Birmingham is analyzed by the 
concepts of dissipative and autopoietic behaviour and vigorous actor relationships. Table 4 
summarizes the results of the analysis. The indicators of table 1 are marked to explicate the 
autopoietic and dissipative elements.
5.1 Dissipative and autopoietic self-organization in the regeneration process
Below, the elements of dissipative and autopoietic self-organization are elaborated for each 
round of the process.
round one (1991 – 2003): Growing controversies
Autopoietic behaviour
In this round, the period before the catastrophic fight took place, individual businesses 
acted within their regular business activities. On the level of the Broad Street area, a special-
ized business area emerged with two main functions: business and service activities on one 
hand and a thriving night-time economy on the other, each of them successful in their own 
account (Interview BID manager 2010).
Dissipative behaviour
In the Broad Street area, internal cohesion was weakened as conflicts arose between spe-
cialised functions of offices and the night-time economy. The dissipative element of the 2003 
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fight was that from that moment on, an interaction process between actors started in which 
the various possibilities for dealing with the “bankers and drunks” controversies on Broad 
Street were explored.
Table 4: dissipative and autopoietic system behaviour within the case Broad Street Birmingham
Timeframe Dissipative self-organization autopoietic self-organization
Round 1 (1991 – 
2003):
Growing 
controversies
Internal cohesion is weakened.
Growing controversy between “drunks and 
bankers” 
More and more specialization in business 
activities: Convention Quarter. External 
identity is strengthened.
Businesses do not look beyond their regular 
business boundaries.
Round 2 (2003 – 
2004):
Establishing the 
BID
After the fight, open, explorative and informal 
explorations for solutions for Broad Street.
connection made to BID legislation, translation 
to local circumstances.
Attempts to involve more businesses and get 
them to vote ‘yes’ for the BID.
exposure through newsletters, website. 
Shared responsibility and interest among 
the different users and stakeholders of 
Broad Street is emphasized.
Defining the BID: content, boundaries and 
involved actors are set.
BID is formalized when most businesses 
vote in favour of the BID.
Round 3 (2004 – 
2009):
Operating the 
BID
exposure to the BID through newsletter and 
website, in order to attract new investments and 
to establish a positive reputation for the area.
interaction within a stabilized and 
defined group of actors.
responsibilities are divided.
Executing projects, strengthening internal 
organisation and incorporating new ideas 
into the BID organisation. 
Round 4 (2009 – 
2010):
Expanding the 
network
New content for the BID2 is explored, new actors 
get involved.
In the BID2 proposal, the same 
organizational structure is carried on.
round two (2003 – 2004): establishing the BID
Dissipative behaviour
After the catastrophic fight, deliberations started between the businesses of Broad Street, the 
West Midland police and the Birmingham City Centre Partnership (a public organisation 
established in 2001 to maintain and improve relationships between the city council and 
the Birmingham business community). These deliberations first took place in an informal 
partnership, emphasizing the shared responsibility and interest among the different us-
ers and stakeholders of Broad Street. In 2004, three summits were organised in order to 
address the local problems of “bankers and drunks”. In between the summits, businesses 
involved in the deliberations went around the area to talk to the other businesses. The City 
Centre Partnership was connected to the national Association of Town Centre Manage-
ment (ATCM) which was at that time promoting the new concept of Business Improvement 
Districts (BID) throughout the UK. During the Broad Street summits, the BID concept was 
brought up and met with great enthusiasm, because it would enable businesses themselves 
to take a leading role (Interview BID manager, 2010). The City Centre Partnership invested 
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the people, money and time to develop a BID, thereby meeting local parameters and fol-
lowing the procedures of the BID legislation.7 Because of the BID, interactions between 
the local businesses increased. The motives to choose for this specific institutional form 
were mostly opportunistic and pragmatic: “Broad Street shows how timely things can be. The 
BID legislation came in, as a sort of vehicle to take things forward.” (Interview City Centre 
Partnership, 2010).
Autopoietic behaviour
The autopoietic element of the 2003 fight was that through these events the mutual depen-
dence of the two main functions on Broad Street became visible. According to the later 
employed BID manager everybody, including businesses, police and hotels, was suffering 
from the events at that time (Interview BID manager, 2010). When the BID legislation was 
introduced during this round, this legislation played an important structuring role in the 
further deliberations among the involved actors. Soon as the BID legislation was adopted 
and adapted to the local parameters, the legislation caused autopoietic behaviour in the 
sense of providing a specific identity and structure for local businesses. Businesses were 
being convinced of the deliverables the BID could provide for the amount of money the 
levy would be. The boundaries, both in content, geography and the membership were set 
up, the binding identity of the businesses involved became explicated and the organisational 
structure and the BID levy were agreed upon. The original controversy between “bankers 
and drunks” was still structuring this process, as is represented by three levels of levy: the 
premises closest to Broad Street have to pay the highest amount of levy, and the themes the 
BID would work on: safety, cleaning, greening and image building (Interview BID manager, 
2010, Broad Street BID proposal 2005). The establishment round ended with the acceptance 
of the BID proposal in 2005. 65% of the non-domestic ratepayers of the BID area turned 
up for the vote, and 92% of them voted in favour of the BID (BID update No.4 May 2005)8.
round three (2004 – 2009): Operating the BID
Autopoietic behaviour
The organizational structure set out in the BID proposal was followed, with an annual 
assembly for the levy payers and reports about the deliveries of the BID. The businesses 
7  The BID legislation is a statutory instrument in order to promote partnership working between local authorities 
and local businesses. The regulations contain some general rules and requirements concerning a BID proposal. 
A BID can be initiated by non-domestic ratepayers in a certain geographical area, parties with an interest in land 
(landowners or landlords), bodies with a purpose to develop BID proposals, or the relevant billing authority 
(district, county of city council) (Deputy Prime Minister 2004, Statutory Instrument 2004: 2443)
8  For a ballot to be legitimate, the turn over has to be at least 30%, of which half should be voting in favour of 
the BID, representing a minimum 50% of all rateable value in the BID area (Statutory Instrument 2004: 2443).
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participated in working groups, or raised issues of concern to the BID manager, who was 
instated to handle both the internal as the external matters of the BID on behalf of the BID 
board. The BID manager started to lead a day and a night team. The day team concerned 
communication, strategic delivery and promotion of the area. The night team consisted of 
wardens patrolling the BID area at night, and occasionally managing events. The BID man-
ager was also the main contact point between local businesses and other parties involved in 
the Broad Street controversies (local authority, police etc.) (Interview BID manager, 2010). 
The interactions in this round aim at executing projects along the themes presented in the 
BID proposal, which relate to the “bankers and drunks”-problem: marketing to counter 
the negative reputation of the neighborhood, safety to address the anti-social behaviour 
and cleanliness to prevent littered streets after the weekends. Streets were refurbished and 
greened, events were organised, empty buildings were covered with promotional banners, 
safety was improved. Occasionally, new ideas were adopted and executed as well, but only if 
they fitted the clearly demarcated lines of the BID proposal.
Dissipative behaviour
The BID gave exposure of its actions in order to establish a positive reputation for the 
neighbourhood again, through a website, marketing campaign and close contact with press 
agencies. The BID worked on giving the businesses of Broad Street a voice on the plans and 
policies for the Broad Street area by other actors (Interview BID manager).
round four (2009 – 2010, and still running): expanding the BID
Autopoietic characteristics
In the preparation of the re-ballot, major attention was given to re-assure the earlier benefits 
of the BID and its network. In the proposal BID2, prepared to put forward in re-ballot, the 
key achievements and the new areas of work were mentioned. “The BID has consistently 
delivered on its promises to improve the environment for business.” (BID2 proposal, 2009) 
The BID2 proposal still put forward the initial controversy of “bankers and drunks” as the 
major concern of the BID, and warned for a return to that situation if the BID is not to be 
continued (BID2 proposal, 2009, Interview BID manager, 2010). The existing organization 
was reassured and maintained.
Dissipative behaviour
Apart from continuing with the current work, two new themes were introduced. These were 
‘developing’ (targeting vacant buildings, regeneration in partnership with West Midlands 
Advantage) and ‘connecting’ (aim at lobbying for a rapid transport solution system and 
better connections). An effort was made to make the BID more heard in planning, eco-
nomic development, and transportation strategies made by other (public and private) actors 
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outside the BID. The BID had earlier proven to be instrumental in establishing the Westside 
project in 2008 (a regeneration partnership of stakeholders in Birmingham-west), and the 
advantages of this partnership were emphasised in the BID2 proposal as well. These new ac-
tivities were taken forward because the BID learned in previous rounds what it could deliver 
and because other stakeholders than the BID are not that active in addressing the challenges 
of Broad Street in relation to regeneration and connectivity (BID2 proposal, 2009; Interview 
BID manager, 2010). Although the process for re-ballot is structured along the prescribed 
BID legislation, the Broad Street BID again translated local, specific and new issues into the 
framework of the BID. Remarkable is that the BID tried to reach further than the initial 
controversy, and thus expanded its network, not only in organizational or geographical 
terms, but also strategically trying to expand its legitimacy, while keeping close to the local 
conditions at the same time.
5.2 Relating self-organization to vital actor relations in the regeneration process
On Broad Street Birmingham especially in the second round there were ongoing interac-
tions between the various local stakeholders. The 2003 fight, ending round one, was the 
event that made the businesses and other actors on Broad Street aware of a joint problem, 
which was further defined in the second round. Boundary spanning work was done in order 
to look beyond the regular business activities, and co--production took place to find joint 
solutions. These were formalized by using the BID legislation as facilitating legal framework. 
As a consequence, the local businesses became leading and decisive in the process and the 
deliberations on Broad Street were furthered among a fixed group of actors represented in 
the BID Board during the third round. Again, the legal framework of the BID was facili-
tating this, and according to the BID legislation, both businesses, the BID board and the 
City Centre Partnership had to adapt to new roles. In the fourth round, the BID needed to 
renew its legitimacy by a re-ballot prescribed by the BID legislation. This demanded new 
interactions between local stakeholders to reassure and renew the BID strategy. Further-
more, connections were being made with other local stakeholders which were not part of 
the BID organisation, again boundary spanning work was done and potential new roles 
were explored. Although the deliberations on Broad Street started due to a conflict between 
different functions and users of the area, the process that emerged is characterized by vital 
actor relationships. There is a low level of conflict and high mutual understanding between 
the local stakeholders, which is symbolized by a positive re-ballot in 2010.
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6. case comparison
Vital urban regeneration processes?
In the previous two sections we subsequently discussed and analyzed the two forms of 
self-organized behaviour and its impact on the vitality of the actor relations in the urban 
regeneration processes of both cases. In this section we explore similarities and differences 
between the cases.
autopoietic and dissipative self-organization
In both cases we observed both manifestations of self-organisation, dissipative and autopoi-
etic. We argue that this continuous interplay was important for creating and maintaining 
the vital actor relations, which made the local initiatives effective. At the same time new 
structures emerged in which local stakeholders got the room and responsibility to take the 
lead in the regeneration process.
Vital actor relations
When we take a closer look into the specific contribution that either dissipative or autopoi-
etic self-organization made to the vitality of the actor-relations, specific differences between 
the cases become visible. In Caterham Barracks, the dissipative characteristics in the case 
are focused on connecting different actors and different spatial functions, in order to create 
a wide and diverse community related to the barracks. The people involved gradually be-
came a more stable group because of a number of participants that remained turning up at 
meetings. The autopoietic characteristics were focused on consolidating ideas, delineating 
focus, formulating plans and finding organisational structure, in a rather converging man-
ner towards a coherent development plan and the start of the Trust. On Broad Street, the 
dissipative characteristics in the case were rather focussed on pragmatic problem solving. 
Each time an existing problem was solved, a further challenge was found. Hence, instead 
of integrated vision building, a more ad-hoc and pragmatic way of working was followed. 
Homogeneity between the main actors, the businesses, has been important in creating 
vital actor relations. An explanation for this difference could be found in the object of the 
self-organization: at Broad Street the regeneration was about overcoming the controversy 
between conflicting functions in the area but keeping both functions, i.e. night time and 
day time economy, sustain, while in Caterham it was about the transformation of an area’s 
meaning and establishing new functions in the area after the closing of the Barracks.
As described above, the interplay between dissipative and autopoietic system behaviour 
led to vital actor relationships, and eventually, to new governance structures in which lo-
cal stakeholders took the lead in the urban regeneration process. At the same time, these 
emerging structures triggered autopoietic self-organization by themselves. This led to 
stability and progress, but is also a potential risk: the new emerging structures sometimes 
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challenge already existing structures. For example, the democratic control of by the District 
Council concerning the developments in Caterham Barracks has significantly changed now. 
Also in the Birmingham case did the pre-existing City Centre Partnership adapt to a new 
role after the BID started to show off effects. A mutual adaptation of roles took place during 
the self-organized process: new governance structures emerge and old structures adapt.
In the case of Caterham the new structure of the Trust was capable of producing self-
sustaining urban regeneration by running and facilitating community managed facilities. 
In Caterham Baracks, community engagement was focused on outcome. Each round has 
explorative actions, but seemed to be rounded up by consolidation, delineation or selection. 
After each round a product was put forward as a result, and the final result is the creation 
of a new vision for the barracks, to be realised in the new development and creation of the 
Trust to keep the community as involved as they were in earlier rounds. However, connec-
tions between the Trust and the other actors (private developer, District Council and local 
community) became less vital in the last round. This autopoietic behaviour, endangering 
vital relationships with the community, could become problematic, for example in terms of 
legitimacy, which is a common issue for neighbourhood based initiatives (e.g. Chaskin & 
Garg, 1997).
In the Birmingham case, the BID proved to be an efficient vehicle for producing self-
sustaining urban regeneration. However, the BID also excluded non-business actors such as 
local residents. On Broad Street, not so much a final goal like a plan or redevelopment was 
the leading idea, but the pragmatic solving of the ‘problems of the day’. As these problems 
were originally legitimating the BID, the problems both needed to be solved and remem-
bered at the same time. In the last round, when the BID had become rather successful, new 
and further challenges were found in order to maintain the legitimacy of the BID gover-
nance structure. The autopoietic characteristic of shutting out residents and solely focussing 
on businesses could be seen as a weakness in the light of inclusiveness and community 
involvement, but at the same time it is an element that makes the BID effective in solving 
the shared problems on Broad Street.
7. explanaTory conDiTions
The goal of this research was to gain understanding of self-organizing processes in regen-
erating urban areas and to find conditions which favour these processes to emerge and to 
evolve into vital collaborations. In this section we describe four conditions which we found 
in both cases. These conditions are case driven.
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1) events threatening the identity of the area
In both cases dissipative behaviour is triggered by (external) events which had a disrupting 
effect on the meaning of the area for local stakeholders, i.e. the identity of the urban social 
system was threatened. In Birmingham the controversies between “drunks and bankers” 
were harming the reputation of the area. The death of a person triggered local businesses 
in cooperation with local authorities to take initiative. For the local stakeholders, this event 
strongly symbolized the conflicting functions of the area. In Caterham the closing of the 
Barracks triggered local community members to take initiative in a regeneration process. 
Although the Barracks were losing their function, they still had a strong historical, eco-
nomical and social meaning for the local community. The threatening of the demolition 
of the buildings in order to build new houses triggered local stakeholders to protect the 
area and to transform it into a preservation site. Subsequently, local stakeholders prevented 
the demolition of the historical buildings of the Barracks and came up with the idea to 
reuse these buildings for community facilities. In Birmingham, the BID did not destruct the 
neighbourhood ‘function’ of the night-time economy, but developed new ways of manag-
ing this night time economy in such a way that it was not a controversy for the day-time 
economy anymore.
2) Boundary-spanning work
In both cases we observed that key individuals were able to make connections between 
the different spheres (public, private and/or civic). In the literature, these connecting 
individuals are also known under the concept of boundary spanners (e.g. Alter & Hage, 
1993; Williams, 2002). These boundary spanners not only connected actors operating in the 
different spheres, but also connected institutionalized structures to the emerging structures 
within the regeneration processes. In the case of Caterham the chairman of the Trust was 
important in creating relations between governmental institutions (the District Council and 
the District administration), the local community and the private developer. In Birming-
ham the BID Managers were important boundary spanners, especially in the second round, 
when the BID was initiated in the first place, but also in the fourth round, when it needed 
to renew its legitimacy again by the re-ballot. Then, new interactions emerged among local 
stakeholders in which the already existing BID partners sought and found communication 
and understanding with new content.
3) Mutual adaptation of roles
The emergence of new structures puts pressure on existing institutionalized structures. In 
both cases we observed a process of mutual adaptation of roles. In the Caterham case, the 
role of the local authority changed into facilitating instead of initiating or determining. In 
this way room is created for the self-organizing local stakeholders to take responsibility for 
the community facilities. Furthermore, the private developer adapted his way of working by 
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taking a broader perspective on spatial development, including other spatial functions in its 
planning, by organizing a community planning weekend for the first time and by developing 
a S106 contract with the Local Group. On Broad Street too, mutual adaptation with regard 
to the emerging structure of the BID took place. The City Centre Partnership reorganised 
itself from a liaison between City Council and the Birmingham business community into a 
facilitating agency working for the Birmingham BIDs. Other local stakeholders, such as the 
police, City Council and residents accept the leading role of local businesses in the regen-
eration process. At the same time, the participating businesses in the BID were willing to 
extend their regular business activities with taking up certain responsibilities for the area. In 
both cases we observe that the succession of the emerging structures by the self-organizing 
local stakeholders’ coincide with adaptation of institutionalized roles of other actors in the 
environment, which is also concluded in other case-studies of interactive or self-governance 
(e.g. Edelenbos, 2005; Edelenbos & Van Meerkerk, 2011).
4) Facilitating legal frameworks
In both cases enabling legal frameworks were used by the vigorous actor relations and 
facilitated the self-organization. In Caterham the S106 legislation obligated the private 
developer to invest in the local community. This framework has flexibility to be adapted 
to local circumstances. The S106 agreement was used as an innovative way to facilitate 
the Trust. Furthermore, the Trust model provided both the legal capacity as flexibility to 
facilitate community regeneration efforts. On Broad Street the BID legislation was used 
especially because it is prescriptive in procedures, but not on local conditions and themes. 
The legislation thus enabled businesses to find, and take forward the issues they regarded as 
important with their own means and responsibility.
8. conclusion
In this paper we explored and investigated the emergence of local initiatives in vital urban 
regeneration processes. We acknowledge that we only analyzed two cases in a specific 
country (UK), and therefore cannot provide generalized conclusions. However, we believe 
we found interesting insights from our two case comparative research. Using the concept of 
self-organization from complexity theory is helpful for analyzing how these local initiatives 
emerged, evolved and were able to consolidate. These self-organizing processes were not at 
forehand coined as regeneration processes but were a reaction to area identity threatening 
developments. Eventually, they evolved into, what could be approached as, urban regen-
eration. Vital actor relationships emerged in which the meaning of the areas for the local 
stakeholders evolved in such a way that it was connected with its historical roots, but also 
redefined in order to make it productive for a regeneration of the local community.
Chapter 5148
In both cases, the local initiatives led to new structures embedded in vital relationships 
between public, private and/or societal actors. The case analysis showed that there was a 
continuous interplay between autopoietic and dissipative system behaviour. Other scholars 
also stress this balance between these two manifestations of self-organization, characterized 
by the so-called ‘edge of chaos’ (e.g. Kauffman 1993; Merry, 1999) or situations of ‘bounded 
instability’ (Griffin et al., 1999). Our research empirically substantiates this theoretical as-
sumption. We argue that this continuous interplay provided space for the new governance 
structures related to the local initiatives to evolve, but in connection with existing institu-
tional structures and actors relevant with regard to the urban regeneration processes. In the 
emergence of this new dynamic equilibrium existing roles of involved actors changed. In 
both cases we observe a rather facilitating role of governmental organizations and a more 
integral focus of spatial development by private actors in connection with the local com-
munity. Furthermore, boundary spanners were highly important in connecting different 
parts of the system in a meaningful way, catalysing or initiating these processes of change. 
To maintain the vital actor relationships, continuous efforts are needed to keep interplay 
between autopoietic and dissipative behaviour.
Harnessing complex governance issues, such as urban regeneration, by the use of par-
ticipatory arrangements is, in line with academic and practitioner discourses criticizing 
modernistic principles (Bond & Thompson-Fawcett, 2007), increasingly seen as a more 
effective and legitimate approach than conventional representative arrangements linked to 
hierarchical-instrumental policy making (see Wagenaar, 2007). In this light, self-organi-
zation driven by local stakeholders’ initiatives is highly potential as it even goes one step 
further as it is community-based instead of government-led participation (see Boonstra & 
Boelens, 2011). However, consolidation of such initiatives does mean a challenge for existing 
structures for government, market and society that will need to adapt and change their roles 
to new governance realities. In this way self-organizing processes become meaningful in the 
regeneration of urban areas.
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absTracT
Previous research has extensively analyzed the role, and indicated the importance, of network 
management for the functioning and performance of public or governance networks. In this 
article, we focus on the influence of boundary spanning actors in such networks – an aspect 
less examined in the governance network literature. Boundary spanners are considered to 
be important for governance network performance. Building on the literature, we expect 
a mediating role of trust in this relationship. To empirically test these relationships, we 
conducted survey research (N=141) among project managers involved in urban governance 
networks: networks around complex urban projects that include the organizations involved 
in the governance process (the formulation of policies, decision making, and implementa-
tion) in these complex projects. We found a strong positive relationship between the pres-
ence of boundary spanners and trust and governance network performance. The results 
indicate a partially mediating role of trust in this relationship. Furthermore, we found that 
these boundary spanners originated mainly from private and societal organizations, and 
less from governmental organizations.
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inTroDucTion
Previous research has extensively analyzed the role, and indicated the importance of 
network management for the functioning and performance of governance networks (see 
for example Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997; Meier and O’Toole, 2007; Agranoff and 
McGuire, 2001; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Klijn, Steijn, & Edelenbos, 2010a). These studies 
specifically focus on the management of interaction between different actors in the network 
and their impact on network performance. We approach network management in another 
way, as we focus on a specific set of actors in that network: the boundary spanning persons 
that operate on the borders of their home organizations. We are interested in their role 
and their significance for network performance and trust building in governance networks. 
We focus on issue-specific networks, formed around complex urban issues in the field of 
spatial planning. These urban issues, like regeneration of deprived areas, are embedded 
in networks, in which different governmental agencies, commercial actors, non-for-profit 
organizations and residents reshape urban areas and are dependent of each other, as these 
issues cross different organizational and jurisdictional boundaries (Healey, 2006; Wagenaar, 
2007; Klijn et al., 2010a).
Connective capacity is considered to be important to realize supported and qualitatively 
good outcomes in networks around complex governance issues (e.g. Koppenjan & Klijn, 
2004; Healey, 2006; Edelenbos, Bressers, & Scholten, 2013). The literature on boundary 
spanners pays specific attention to individuals who work at the boundaries of their organi-
zation. Competent boundary spanners are organizational members who are able to link the 
organization they represent with its environment (Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). They are con-
sidered to be important for building trust within governance networks and to help improve 
coordination around decision making and implementation in governance networks around 
complex public issues (Steadman, 1992; Williams, 2002; Van Hulst et al., 2012). Although 
the effects of boundary spanning on individual organizational performance and inter-
organizational collaboration and trust are (to some extent) reported in the literature (e.g. 
Leifer & Delbecq 1978; Tushman & Scanlan, 1981; Seabright et al., 1992; Ahearne et al., 2005), 
there is a lack of empirical studies, especially quantitative (and mixed method) research, 
focusing on the functioning and presence of competent boundary spanners on the one hand 
and governance network performance and trust within these networks on the other. In this 
article, we want to empirically investigate these relationships. Building on the literature, we 
assume that boundary spanners have a positive influence on network performance, and that 
trust has a mediating role in this relationship. We conducted survey research on complex 
urban projects in the four largest cities in The Netherlands. These projects were developed 
in governance networks including public, private, and societal actors. We examined where 
boundary spanners in these networks were located and what the effect was of the presence 
of boundary spanners on the level of trust within these networks and network performance.
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In the next section, we elaborate the characteristics of the issues and the type of networks on 
which we are focusing. In the third section, we elaborate on the concept of boundary span-
ners and the relationships between boundary spanners, trust, and network performance, 
resulting in four research hypotheses. The fourth section, dedicated to our research meth-
ods and techniques, is followed by a discussion of our findings. The final section presents 
conclusions and a discussion of the research results.
governance neTworks anD The neeD for connecTive sTraTegies
Governance Networks: What Kind of Networks Are We Talking About?
In contemporary public administration theory it is recognized that interdependent sets 
of actors provide input to many decision- making processes (e.g. Kickert, Klijn, & Kop-
penjan, 1997; Pierre, 2000; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009). This has led to a developing body 
of research on so-called governance networks. Despite the differences in use and meaning 
among scholars, certain main characteristics and presumptions of governance networks can 
be identified:
1. They emerge and evolve around boundary-crossing public issues that cannot be solved 
by one actor alone but require collective actions of more actors (Sørensen & Torfing, 
2009). These issues cross different organizational, jurisdictional, societal, and/or func-
tional boundaries and have a multi-value character (Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997);
2. Therefore there is relatively high interdependency between actors to deal with these 
issues. The different actors around boundary-crossing public issues have to join their 
resources and knowledge to achieve qualitatively good outcomes (Agranoff & McGuire, 
2001);
3. These interdependencies require interactions between various actors with different 
interests, which show some durability over time (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004);
4. Steering within these interactions is complicated, because each actor is relatively au-
tonomous in the sense that network participants typically have limited formal account-
ability to network-level goals (Provan & Kenis, 2008), and each actor has his/her own 
perception about the policy problems and solutions (Teisman, 2000).
Based on these characteristics, we define governance networks as more or less stable pat-
terns of social relations between mutually dependent actors, which form around public 
issues, and which are formed, maintained, and changed through interactions between the 
involved actors (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). We focus on governance networks around 
complex urban projects that include the organizations involved in the governance process 
(the formulation of policies, decision making, and implementation) in these complex 
projects. We tested whether these networks had the characteristics of governance networks 
described above (see section Methods). Hence, we use a rather broad conceptualization 
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of governance networks (cf. Klijn, 2008), for example in contrast to literature focusing on 
policy implementation networks around public services, which have – usually – a more 
clear goal and are often characterized by high-density groups of actors (e.g. Provan and 
Kenis, 2008; Meier and O’Toole, 2007). The interrelationships between the different organi-
zations in the networks that we examined are more loosely coupled. They are issue-specific 
networks, since they emerge around concrete complex urban problems, dealing with spe-
cific urban development, like regeneration of certain city districts where for example city 
representatives, private project developers and residents form a temporary actor network in 
developing and implementing the project. In these networks there is a strong diversity of 
involved organizations, interests, and perceptions within these kinds of networks. The real-
ization of good network performance in such an environment calls for connective capacity 
(Edelenbos et al., 2013).
The Need for Connective Network Strategies
The concept of connective capacity of governance networks is a response to the struggle 
against fragmentation in contemporary specialized governance systems in Western democ-
racies dealing with complex societal issues (Edelenbos & Teisman, 2011; Edelenbos et al., 
2013). Fragmentation is defined as a whole field of separate and specialized organizations, 
and is the consequence of specialization, the main driving force for wealth and develop-
ment. Further, as long as specialization is a driving force for wealth, fragmentation will 
be the normal societal organizational principle (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009; Edelenbos & 
Teisman, 2011).
As noted above, complex urban issues are cross-boundary in nature. Literature on urban 
governance stress the problems of fragmentation and complexity encountered by different 
kinds of stakeholders (including governmental agencies) to effectively deal with these cross-
boundary issues (Wagenaar, 2007; Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). As governance processes 
dealing with these issues evolve at the boundaries of different public, private, and societal 
organization, the connective activities of a variety of individuals are likely to matter for 
the performance of the network. While this is recognized in the literature, much of the 
attention goes to the role of (representatives of) central actors (e.g. lead organizations, net-
work managers, politicians) (e.g. Meier & O’Toole, 2007; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009; Klijn 
et al., 2010; Cristofoli et al., 2012). Empirical research with a broader focus, i.e. formal and 
informal boundary spanners originating not only from official responsible organizations, 
but also from societal organizations, NGOs and community organizations, is scarce (cf. Van 
Hulst et al., 2012). Therefore, and in addition to many literature on network management, 
we focus on a broader set of boundary spanners with various organizational backgrounds, 
to empirically examine their influence on network performance.
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Boundary Spanners as Connective Agents
The concept of boundary spanners is developed in organizational literature. Just like actors 
dealing with complex governance issues, organizations are also confronted with forces of 
fragmentation due to specialization (Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). Organizations have differ-
ent types of boundaries (e.g. horizontal, vertical, and external), which “…separate special-
ized subunits from each other and from external areas” (Ibid, p. 290). Successful boundary 
spanners are strongly linked internally and externally, so that they can both gather and 
transfer information from outside their sub-units. The combination of internal linkages (in 
their own unit or organization) and external linkages (with other units or other organiza-
tions) makes up their perceived competence and determines their boundary status (Tush-
man & Scanlan, 1981; Levina & Vaast, 2005). We want to stress that we focus on ‘boundary 
spanners-in-practice’, as Levina and Vaast (2005) call them. There is a lot of ambiguity 
in the literature on boundary spanning due to differences in operationalization. Confus-
ing (formal) representational communication roles and informational communication 
roles (Tushman & Scanlan, 1981) and/or officially nominated boundary spanners (agents 
who are expected to engage in boundary spanning, such as top managers) and boundary 
spanners-in-practice (Levina & Vaast, 2005) is probably an important explanation for this 
ambiguity. Informational roles are involved in a two-step information flow (acquiring 
external information and transmitting/translating this internally and vice versa), whereas 
representational roles are rather involved in a one-step information flow and perform a 
more routine transacting or representational role. In this study we mean by boundary span-
ners, individuals who are involved in this two-step information flow: individuals practicing 
high boundary spanning activities.
In short, boundary spanners manage the interface between organizations and their 
environment. Boundary spanning is essentially characterized by negotiating the interac-
tions between organization and environment in order to realize a better fit, which often 
also means that practices of involved organizations/systems are transformed (Steadman, 
1992; Levina & Vaast, 2005; Edelenbos & Van Meerkerk, 2011; Van Hulst et al., 2012). To 
effectively accomplish a better fit, boundary spanners are engaged in three main (and inter-
related) activities: connecting or linking different people and processes at both sides of the 
boundary, selecting relevant information on both sides of the boundary, and translating this 
information to the other side of the boundary (Leifer & Delbecq, 1978; Tushman & Scan-
lan, 1981; Jemison, 1984). Realizing connections between actors in governance networks 
is about building and maintaining sustainable relationships (Williams, 2002). A common 
denominator in the early organizational boundary spanning literature is the emphasis on 
information exchange (see Jemison 1984). For selecting relevant information on one side of 
the boundary and translating this information to the other side of the boundary, bound-
ary spanners need to have a feeling for the social construction of other actors (Williams, 
2002). According to Tushman and Scanlan (1981: 291–2), boundaries “can be spanned ef-
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fectively only by individuals who understand the coding schemes and are attuned to the 
contextual information on both sides of the boundary, enabling them to search out relevant 
information on one side and disseminate it on the other.” In this respect, Williams (2002) 
distinguishes a variety of personal characteristics of competent boundary spanners in gov-
ernance networks, like empathy, being a good listener and translator to other communities. 
Boundary spanners understand other actors’ needs (Ferguson et al., 2005) and are so-called 
active listeners (Williams, 2002; Van Hulst et al., 2012): open to be influenced by the views 
of other people. This enables them to search for shared meanings (Levina & Vaast, 2005). 
In this way, sustainable relationships with actors from different organizational backgrounds 
are developed and maintained. These and other personality traits are also widely stressed 
and discussed in (social) psychology literature and related to building effective cooperation 
and project performance (e.g. Thal & Bedingfield, 2010; Davis, 2011).
However, at this point we have to be clear that we don’t study personal traits of boundary 
spanners from a (social) psychological point of view. Instead we depart from a behavioristic 
viewpoint and specifically look at how boundary spanners act in a governance network and 
which actions they perform in (trying to) connecting different stakeholders in the network. 
In the section “operationalization and measurement” we come back to this, by operational-
izing boundary spanning as a set of actions that boundary spanners perform in the practice 
of urban governance.
Many studies show that the presence of competent boundary spanners leads to a better fit 
between organization and environment, although the results are not that straightforward. A 
better fit is often deduced from better organizational performance or higher levels of trust 
within inter-organizational cooperation. For example, positive organizational outcomes of 
boundary spanning individuals are found in terms of innovation (Tushman, 1977), financial 
performance (Dollinger, 1984), strategic decision-making (e.g. Jemison, 1984), access to 
knowledge (e.g. Cross & Cummings, 2004), and organizational identification of customers 
(e.g. Ahearne et al., 2005). Furthermore, boundary spanners could increase trust between 
individuals of different organizations involved in inter-organizational cooperation, but this 
in turn could have negative consequences in terms of organizational adaptability due to 
over embeddedness (Seabright et al., 1992; Brass et al., 2004). While negative outcomes of 
boundary spanning activities are less found in the literature, they are also less examined 
according to Ramarajan et al. (2011). In their study on negative consequences of bound-
ary spanning contact in uncertain multi-organizational contexts, they found that frequent 
contact of boundary spanners with other organization’s personnel was related to more 
inter-organizational problems, and also related to more negative attitudes toward their own 
job and organization. Hence, the results are somewhat mixed, at least due to differences in 
operationalization, level of analysis, and organizational context (Tushman & Scanlan, 1981; 
Perrone et al., 2003; Brass et al., 2004; Ramarajan et al., 2011).
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Boundary Spanners and Governance Network Performance
Dealing effectively with complex urban governance issues requires a high flow of infor-
mation between involved actors (Wagenaar, 2007). Especially, because in such a context 
goals are not straightforward and often diverse (Teisman, 2000; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). 
Furthermore, it requires mutual alignment of a diversity of stakeholders. This means that 
realizing vital connections between actors could increase the performance of these mutually 
dependent actors, as it stressed in the literature on urban regeneration and neighborhood 
governance (e.g. Purdue, 2001; Musso et al., 2006; Van Meerkerk, Boonstra, & Edelenbos 
2013). Also the literature on bridging ties, individuals who span and connect different 
structural holes in networks, stress the increase of social capital available for the network to 
use, if brokerage activities are performed (Granovetter, 1985; Burt, 2004). “A theme in this 
work is that behavior, opinion, and information, broadly conceived, are more homogeneous 
within than between groups. People focus on activities inside their own group, which cre-
ates holes in the information flow between groups, or more simply, structural holes” (Burt, 
2004: 353). In their study of neighborhood governance reforms in Los Angeles, Musso et al. 
(2006) note that bridging ties increases the reachability of information between individuals 
and could create more and shorter paths between groups. However, they also note that 
it is “a combination of strong and weak ties, [which] have direct effects on information 
diffusion, access to resources capacity for collective action, and political mobilization” (p. 
92). This is line with the literature on boundary spanning, stressing the importance of strong 
internal and external linkage.1
With their role in increasing the flow of information, and translating information across 
organizational boundaries, connecting individuals and processes across organizational 
boundaries, we expect that the presence of boundary spanners contributes to the perfor-
mance of governance networks. By network performance we refer to the substantive results 
of the actor network, such as the innovative character of the project plan, problem-solving 
capacity, and cost- efficiency (see also Klijn et al., 2010a), regarding specific urban projects. 
The specific operationalization and measurement is discussed in the next section. We for-
mulate the following hypothesis to test the relationship between the presence of boundary 
spanners in the network and governance network performance:
H1) The presence of more boundary spanners has a positive effect on governance network 
performance
Boundary Spanners and Trust
In the relationship between boundary spanners and network performance it is important to 
consider their influence on trust building. An important driver for the emergence and sus-
tainment of collaborative efforts in networks is trust (Huxham & Vangen 2005; Edelenbos & 
Klijn, 2007; Ansell & Gash, 2008). Going through the literature and providing a definition 
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useful for empirical research of governance networks, Edelenbos and Klijn (2007) describe 
trust as referring to “a more or less stable perception of actors about the intentions of other 
actors, that is, that they refrain from opportunistic behavior” (p. 30).
In some literature boundary spanning activities are positively related to trust building 
(Williams, 2002; Ferguson et al., 2005; Perrone et al., 2003). Frequent and recurring inter-
action with actors with different organizational backgrounds gives the opportunity to get 
familiar with one another’s values and perspectives and to show respect to these in building 
common ground and framework (Steadman, 1992). As competent boundary spanners are 
relationship builders and develop a feeling for the interests and social constructions of other 
actors in the governance network, we assume that they positively influence the level of trust 
in the governance network.
H2) The presence of more boundary spanners leads to a higher level of trust in the governance 
network
Boundary Spanners, Trust, and Governance Network Performance
From previous research we know that trust has a positive influence on governance network 
performance (Klijn, Edelenbos, & Steijn, 2010b; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Provan & Kenis, 
2008). Building on the literature, Klijn et al. (2010b, 196–8) mention four arguments why 
trust is important within governance networks for achieving supported and qualitatively 
good outcomes:
1. Trust reduces the risk inherent in cooperative relations, because it creates greater pre-
dictability about each other’s behavior.
2. Trust increases the probability that actors will invest their resources, such as money and 
knowledge, in cooperation.
3. Trust stimulates learning by increasing the exchange of information and knowledge. 
Knowledge is partly tacit and only available, for instance, in the form of human capital. 
This type of knowledge can be acquired only by exchange and intensive cooperation.
4. Trust has the ability to stimulate innovation. Innovations emerge by confronting differ-
ent ideas and expertise. Trust can facilitate innovation by reducing uncertainty about 
opportunistic behavior and by making vertical integration and coordination – which 
could hinder innovation – less necessary.
We acknowledge that in literature the relationship can be vice versa, i.e. that good perfor-
mance and continued cooperation lead to increased trust (e.g. Lewicki & Bunker, 1996), as 
‘good results’ like consensus on decisions and satisfaction with concrete implementation of 
decisions strengthen trustworthiness among stakeholders (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). How-
ever, for this study we explicitly focus on how trust leads to higher network performance. 
To test this causal relationship we formulate the following hypothesis:
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H3) A higher level of trust between actors involved in the governance network leads to better 
network performance
Assuming that boundary spanners positively influence network performance and trust, and 
that trust also contributes to network performance, we expect a partially mediating role of 
trust:
H4) Trust partially mediates the relationship between the presence of boundary spanners 
within the governance network and governance network performance
In the model below (figure 1), the various hypotheses are combined in the conceptual 
framework we will test. We have to note that we did not include context variables in our 
model, such as the political opportunity structure or the network position of actors. Previ-
ous research shows that such context factors are important for both the extent in which 
(and what kind of) connective activities are undertaken and the effectiveness of boundary 
spanning activities (Stevenson & Greenberg, 2000). However, our main goal is to examine 
where boundary spanners are located and whether boundary spanners effect the level of 
trust within governance networks and network performance. Hence, we have left this con-
textual dimension out of our research.
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Figure 1 Conceptual Model
The following section addresses data collection and the measurement of our core variables. 
Then, we describe the extent to which boundary spanners were present in the urban gover-
nance networks researched and test our model.
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meThoDs
Sample and Data Collection
We collected data from a web-based survey held in 2011 (April–July) among leading project 
managers in the four largest cities of the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, 
and Utrecht2) and managers within two private firms (P2 and DHV) that operate as project 
managers in these four cities. The organizations involved actively participated in the survey 
in two ways. Firstly, they organized the e-mailing to the project managers and encouraged 
them to participate in the survey. Secondly, we held three preparation sessions with eight 
project managers from the four participating cities to validate our survey approach and 
questionnaire. In these sessions, we discussed the relevance of the items and whether they 
understood all the survey questions. In this way, we were able to improve our questionnaire: 
we added some items and we changed the formulation of questions. In the next section, we 
present and discuss the items that we used to measure our core variables. These items are 
largely derived from the scientific literature, using existing scales.
Each respondent is a manager involved in specific urban projects in one of the four cities. 
We consider the set of actors involved in each (urban) project as a governance network: a 
governance network consists of actors (local government, project developers, building com-
panies, residents, societal stakeholder groups, etc.) that have interdependent relationship 
with one another in developing and implementing an urban project. Each project manager 
was asked as a respondent to fill in the questionnaire with a specific urban project in mind 
in which they are/were most intensively involved, and which they had to keep in mind when 
responding to all questions. We explicitly selected the project managers because they know 
what is going on in the surveyed projects and are also equipped to answer specific questions 
concerning boundary spanning, project management, relations with principal, and so forth. 
To safeguard the independence of our data, we arranged with participating organizations 
that they send e-mails to each leading project manager of a specific urban project. In this 
way, we made sure we had one manager for each project. We sent one follow-up by e-mail. 
In addition, we called respondents to remind them about the survey.3
Table 1 describes the population of the project managers from the four largest municipali-
ties of the Netherlands and from two private firms. The table also shows the response rate, 
which is 41 percent (N=141).
Table 1 Population and response of the Survey
Population Response (absolute) Response (percentage)
Municipalities (4) 288 117 40.6%
Private organizations (2)  57  24 42.1%
Total 345 141 40.9%
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Unit of analysis
In this research we study the relationship between (the presence of) boundary spanners 
in the governance network and network performance, with trust (among people in the 
network) as an partly mediating variable in this supposed relationship. Our unit of analysis 
is on the level of the governance network. We study the presence of boundary spanners in 
the network, which don’t necessarily be the official project manager but also can turn out 
to be other persons (resident, private project developer, etc.). We therefore asked the lead-
ing project manager of each network to what extent they witnessed boundary spanners in 
the network. As will be further elaborated in the section “measurement of variables”, these 
persons where referred to as performing explicit activities to connect different actors and 
processes in the network with their home organization. The variables performance and trust 
are also analyzed on the network level. Performance is measured by asking the respondent 
for example to score the durability and the innovative character of the project results in 
relation to the urban issue at stake (see section “measurement of variables”). The level of 
trust was measured by explicitly asking the respondent to indicate and score the level of 
trust among (main) actors in the governance network. We have to note here that our data 
is cross-sectional and were collected at a single point in time. More research is therefore 
required to sustain the causal relationships.
Governance Networks around Complex Urban Projects
The urban projects could be described as complex projects developed within governance 
networks. The networks around the projects on which the managers reported, mostly 
included more than ten organizations (66%). In the results section, when we discuss the 
locus of boundary spanners, more specific information is presented about the types of orga-
nizations included in the networks. Most of the networks included societal interest groups 
(94.3%), private developers (78.6%), architectural firms (79.4%), and different governmental 
organizations.
We also checked whether the urban projects were really boundary-crossing public issues. 
We measured this by focusing on task complexity: how many and what kinds of develop-
ment and/or spatial activities are included in the project (Klijn et al., 2010a)? Consequent 
to the preparation sessions with the eight project managers, we asked about six different 
kinds of spatial activities/tasks: infrastructure (rail and public highways), water manage-
ment, housing, social facilities (schools, sports facilities), development and/or regeneration 
of business areas, and development of city parks (cf. Klijn et al., 2010a). Measured on a 
five-point Likert scale, on average more than three of these tasks (M = 3.76) play a medium 
to large part in the projects, which confirms the boundary-crossing nature of the projects.
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Measurement of Variables
In this section we discuss the different scales we used to measure our core variables trust, 
the presence of boundary spanners, and governance network performance. Subsequently 
we discuss the validity and reliability of these scales. Table 2 presents the specific items of 
the scales, their factor loadings, and the construct reliabilities. The descriptive statistics and 
the correlation matrices can be found in table 4.
Boundary Spanning actors
We could not find an existing scale for measuring the presence of boundary spanners in 
governance networks. To develop a reliable scale we build on scales in the business litera-
ture (e.g. Jemison, 1984; Ferguson et al., 2005) and on the literature about the activities of 
boundary spanners (see section Boundary Spanners as Connective Agents). We distinguish 
five different boundary spanning activities as an indication of the presence of boundary 
spanners in the governance networks:
1. Good information exchange between the network and the home organization (e.g. 
Tushman & Scanlan, 1981);
2. Building and maintenance of sustainable relationships between organizations in the 
network (Williams, 2002; Klijn et al., 2010a);
3. Making effective connections between developments in the network and work processes 
in the home organization (cf. Jemison, 1984; Steadman, 1992);
4. A feeling for what is important for other organizations in the network (Williams, 2002; 
Ferguson et al., 2005);
5. Timely mobilization of their home organization when this is considered necessary/use-
ful regarding developments in the network (cf. Klijn et al., 2010a; Ferguson et al., 2005).
In the survey, we asked the respondents whether they thought there were many persons 
active in the network who show these kinds of activities. Furthermore, we asked where these 
persons were located (i.e. their organizational background). The results will be discussed in 
the next section. Together, the items to measure the presence of boundary spanners form 
a scale with a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.84, by which we could consider the scale as reliable. 
The mean score on the presence of boundary spanning persons is 3.37 (SD = 0.67) on a five-
point Likert scale, indicating a moderate presence of boundary spanners in the governance 
networks.
trust between actors in the Governance Network
To measure trust within the network, we build strongly on the existing scale of Klijn et al. 
(2010b), consisting of different dimensions derived from the business literature, including 
the notions of agreement trust, benefit of the doubt, reliability, and goodwill trust. Because 
the project managers in the sessions to improve our questionnaire argued that for them an 
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Table 2 Measurement Items and Constructs’ reliability
Items and Constructsa Factor 
loading
Corrected 
Item-to-Total 
Correlations
Alpha/ 
Composite 
Reliability
Source
presence of boundary spanners in the governance 
network
.84/.76 New scale
1) In this project there are many persons active 
who are able to build and maintain sustainable 
relationships with different organizations in the 
network
.69 .59
2) In this project there are many persons active who 
have a feeling of what is important and what 
matters for other organizations in the network
.80 .71
AVE
0.53
SIC
0.42; 0.27
3) In this project there are many persons active 
who take care of a good information exchange 
between the network and their home 
organization
.79 .73
4) In this project there are many persons active 
who make effective connections between 
developments in the network and internal work 
processes of their home organizations
.71 .66
5) In this project there are many persons active who 
are able to mobilize their home organization in a 
timely manner in relation to developments in the 
network
.61 .54
Trust between actors in the governance network .80/.66 Adapted Klijn et 
al. (2010a)
1) The parties in this project generally live up to the 
agreements made with one another
.54 .49
2) The parties in this project give one another the 
benefit of the doubt
.67 .60
3) The parties in this project keep in mind the 
intentions of the other parties
.82 .69
4) Parties in this project can assume that the 
intentions of the other parties are good in 
principle
.63 .57
5) Parties in this project feel a good personal 
connection with one another
.68 AVE
0.46
SIC
0.42; 0.25
governance network performance .76/.63 Adapted Klijn et 
al. (2010b)
1) Do you think that innovative ideas have been 
developed during the project?
.59 .50
2) Do you think that different environmental 
functions have been connected sufficiently?
.69 .57
3) Do you think that the solutions that have been 
developed really deal with the problems at hand?
.75 .60
4) Do you think that the developed solutions are 
durable solutions for the future?
.67 .52
5) Do you think that – in general – the benefits 
exceed the costs of the cooperation process?
.60 .48 AVE
0.44
SIC
0.25; 0.27
a. all the items were measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from (1) Strongly disagree to (5) Strongly agree.
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important additional element of trust is ‘feeling a good connection with the other actors’, we 
improved the scale by adding this aspect of trust.
Performance of Governance Networks
There has been much discussion in the governance literature on how to measure perfor-
mance of governance networks. We want to stress that there is no particular best approach 
(e.g. Provan & Milward, 2001). In urban governance networks multiple stakeholders are 
involved which pursue different goals. Therefore, picking a specific goal of one of the nodes 
to measure network performance is not considered adequate (cf. Provan & Milward, 2001). 
Furthermore, measuring network performance is problematic because decision-making 
processes in governance networks are lengthy, and actors’ goals can change over time. Goal 
displacement is the negative term for this phenomenon, and learning is the positive term 
(see Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). We follow the approach of Klijn et al. (2010a) to deal with 
this problem. They used perceived network performance as a proxy for measuring network 
performance. Furthermore, they used more than one criterion to measure this. We used 
their scale, which takes into account that goals change and that actors have different views 
about the outcomes.
Measurement Analyses
analysis of reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity
We conducted confirmatory factor analyses to assess convergent and discriminant validity. 
The overall fit of the measurement model was tested by the fit indices CFI and RMSEA. The 
CFI index has a value of 0.973 and the parameter RMSEA has a value of 0.040 (PCLOSE 
larger than 0.050, i.e. 0.731), which indicate a good fit of the measurement model with the 
data (Byrne, 2010).
All factor loadings are larger than 0.50, a very conservative cut-off level (Hair et al., 1995), 
which is a first important indicator demonstrating convergent validity. Furthermore, the 
composite reliability indexes of the three scales all exceed the .60 threshold (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981).
To further assesses the reliability of the measures we computed corrected item-to- total 
correlations and Cronbach’s alphas. All items had corrected item-to-total correlations that 
were greater than .40, which represents a general threshold (Field, 2005). All Cronbach’s 
alphas exceeded the widely accepted cutoff value of .70.
To establish discriminant validity, we compared the average variance extracted (AVE) 
with the squared inter-construct correlation estimates (SIC). The AVE of all three constructs 
are larger than the corresponding squared inter-construct correlations, which means that 
the indicators have more in common with the construct they are associated with than they 
do with other constructs.
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testing for General Method Bias
An important issue with respect to measurement is that our data are all self-reported and 
based on a single application of a questionnaire. This can result in inflated relationships 
between variables due to common method variance, that is, variance that is due to the 
measurement method rather than the constructs themselves (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). 
We therefore conducted a Harman one-factor test to evaluate the extent to which common 
method variance was a concern. A factor analysis was conducted on all 15 items used to 
measure the perceptual variables covered by the hypotheses (background variables such 
as phase of the project were left out). No single factor accounted for the majority of the 
explained variance (i.e. 36.2%). Although the above analysis does not totally rule out the 
possibility of same-source, self-report biases, it does suggest that general method variance 
is probably not an adequate explanation for the findings obtained in this study (Podsakoff 
& Organ, 1986).
Control Variables
We selected four control variables to test whether the measured effects on our dependent 
variables, trust and network performance, are not caused by certain specific characteristics 
of the project or the reporting managers. With regard to the projects, we included two 
control variables in our analyses, based on the literature. The literature suggests that in-
creased task complexity increases the difficulty of realizing effective and efficient network 
performance (see Klijn et al., 2010a). Therefore, we included task complexity as a control 
variable (more information on this variable is reported at the beginning of this section). 
Secondly, we examined the phase of the project. This variable is about the realized activities 
within the project, such as the development of the final project plan and the realization of 
the first physical constructions. With regard to urban projects, performance in terms of 
effective and durable solutions for spatial issues become more visible if projects are in a 
later project phase. The level of trust could also be influenced by the phase of the project, for 
example because the diversity and intensity of interactions between organizations change in 
the development of urban projects (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). In 81 percent of the sample 
projects, a master plan has been developed and has been established by the city council, and 
in 40 percent the first physical constructions have been built. With regard to the reporting 
managers, we included the number of years the respondent has been involved in the project 
as the manager. This is a general check on whether the respondent has participated for a 
sufficiently substantive amount of time to actually be able to make experience-based judg-
ments. The mean score on this variable is 3.0 years, which is a considerable amount of time. 
However, the standard deviation (2.1 years) is quite high, and this strengthens the case to 
include this variable as a control. Furthermore, we included the general experience (mea-
sured in years) of the project manager with complex urban projects as a control variable. 
Our main argument here is that, through increased time spent working in the field, network 
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managers will get more experience in terms of analyzing and understanding network re-
lationships, and more skills in bringing people together to promote sense-making among 
actors in the governance network as well as to realize collaborative relationships (Juenke, 
2005). Although most project managers involved in this survey are relatively experienced 
in the management of urban projects (more than 13 years on average and a modus of seven 
years), there are strong differences (standard deviation of 7.2 years).
resulTs
Description of Locus of Boundary Spanners
Table 3 and figure 2 present the descriptive statistics of the locus and the extent to which 
boundary spanners were present in the different organizations in the governance networks 
on which our respondents reported. Firstly, it is interesting to note that societal interest 
groups (94.3%), private developers (78.6%) and architectural firms (79.4%) are very often 
part of the governance networks around complex urban issues (see table 4). In most of 
the cases, different governmental layers are also part of the governance network: national 
government (61.3%), the province (59.9%), and sub local government (58.6%). This confirms 
that networks around complex urban governance projects often have a multi-level character 
(cf. Kern & Bulkeley, 2009).
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of the Presence of Boundary Spanners in Different Organizations in the Governance Network (N=141)
Organization / interest group Mean* Standard 
deviation
Proportion of the governance networks 
(percentage)
National government 2.75 1.09 61.3
Province (regional government) 2.67 0.96 59.9
Other local government(s) 2.75 1.02 47.5
Sub local government 3.66 1.12 58.6
Housing association(s) 3.48 0.95 60.7
Private developer(s) 3.75 1.02 78.6
Architectural firm(s) 3.45 0.89 79.4
Societal interest groups (e.g. environmental, 
inhabitants)
3.46 0.93 94.3
Economic interest groups 3.10 0.94 63.8
*Measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from (1) Strongly absent to (5) Strongly present.
We asked the managers to indicate the extent to which boundary spanners were present 
in the different organizations in the governance network.4 Interestingly, there is a strong 
difference between the perceived presence of boundary spanners in governmental organiza-
tions compared to private and societal organizations in the governance network. Boundary 
spanners originate mainly from private companies and societal organizations. According to 
the managers, boundary spanners are less present in the governmental organizations with 
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which they have contact (i.e. national government, regional government, and other local 
governments). An explanation could be that governmental representatives in the gover-
nance network are less flexible because they work in a more hierarchical and bureaucratic 
organizational context than representatives of societal and private actors (e.g. Edelenbos 
& Van Meerkerk 2011). Furthermore, the fragmentation of the governmental institutional 
set-up could provide an explanation. Dutch governmental organizations are highly sector 
or domain oriented. According to several authors (e.g. Klijn & Teisman, 2003; McGuire & 
Agranoff, 2011), such strict domain or turf demarcations act as barriers to cooperation in 
governance networks. However, further research is needed to examine this difference in the 
perceived presence of boundary spanners.
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Figure 2 the Presence of Boundary Spanners in Different Organizations in the Governance Network
Correlations
Table 4 shows the correlations among all the variables included in the analysis. The table 
shows that the perceived presence of boundary persons in the governance network is 
strongly positively correlated with trust (r = 0.55) and network performance (r = 0.44); 
this is in line with our formulated hypotheses. Furthermore, trust is also positively cor-
related with network performance (r = 0.40); this is line with previous research (see Klijn 
et al., 2010b). There are also some correlations between the control variables and the core 
variables. The highest correlation in this respect exists between trust and the phase of the 
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project (r = 0.22). Projects that are in a later stage show a higher level of trust in the gover-
nance network. This is not that surprising. As is also described above, projects that are in a 
later phase have an increased chance of repeated interaction between organizations, which 
is an important factor for building trust (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007).
The correlations described above give us a first indication of the impact of boundary 
spanners on trust within the governance network and network performance. They support 
our conceptual model. In the next section we will use structural equation modeling to test 
all the relationships in our conceptual model.
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations between Variables in analysis
Mean St. D. BS Trust NP TC PP YE YI
Boundary spanners (1-5) 3.37 .67 1
Trust (1-5) 3.34 .64 .551** 1
Network performance (1-5) 3.73 .58 .440** .402** 1
Task complexity (1-6) 3.16 .83 .194* .211* .114 1
Project phase (1-6) 3.21 1.34 .211* .223** .164 .131 1
Years of experience 13.01 7.23 -.003 .096 .026 .052 .035 1
Years of involvement 2.99 2.12 .129 .091 .077 .131 .280** .191* 1
** p <0.01; * p<0.05
N is in between 133–141 (pairwise deletion of missing values)
Impact of Boundary Spanners on Trust and Governance Network Performance
In figure 3 the results of the structural equation modeling analysis are displayed.5 The 
standardized estimates and the subsequent impact on trust and governance network 
performance are shown. The first three hypotheses are confirmed in this structural model. 
The standardized direct effect of boundary spanners on network performance is 0.34 (p < 
0.05). Moreover, the effect of boundary spanners on the level of trust in the governance 
network is strong. We found a standardized regression coefficient of .65 (p < 0.01), which 
corresponds with an explained variance of 42% of the level of trust. The standardized direct 
effect of boundary spanners on governance network performance is 0.34 (p < 0.05). With 
regard to the relationship between trust and network performance, we found a standardized 
regression weight of .28 (p < 0.05). This is line with previous research, although the effect 
of trust on network performance is less strong than we found in previous research (Klijn et 
al., 2010b). This can be explained by the fact that boundary spanning turns out to be a very 
strong factor next to trust and accounts for a large part the positive relation with network 
performance in this model.
These results provide a first indication of a partially mediating role of trust in the rela-
tionship between boundary spanners and network performance. The standardized indirect 
effect of boundary spanners on governance network performance is 0.18 (0.65 * 0.28), which 
results in a standardized total effect of 0.52 (0.18 + 0.34). To estimate the significance of this 
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mediation effect, we performed the bias-corrected bootstrap method described by Shrout 
and Bolger (2002). We requested 2000 bootstrap samples. The indirect effect of boundary 
spanners on network performance is just above the significance level of 0.05 (p = 0.053). 
Therefore, we cannot confirm hypothesis four, but the results do indicate a partially mediat-
ing role of trust. The relatively small effect of trust on governance network performance 
compared with previous research could be of importance here.
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Figure 3 Boundary Spanners, trust, and Network Performancea
a. Goodness-of-fit statistics: Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .97; χ2/df = 1.22. Badness-of-fit statistics: rood Mean Square error (rMSea): 0.04; 
closeness of fit rMSea (PCLOSe): .73
Model Fit
We used several statistics to evaluate the model’s goodness of fit. Firstly, the χ2/degrees of 
freedom ratio is 1.22 and the CFI is 0.97. Secondly, the indices for the badness of fit were 
conducted by the RMSEA, which is less than 0.05 (i.e. 0.04), and the PCLOSE, which is 
larger than 0.05 (i.e. 0.73). These indices indicate that the model has a good fit (Anderson 
and Gerbing, 1988; Byrne, 2010).
Control variables
The final step in the analysis was the examination of the control variables. Control variables 
considered and dropped from the final model due to non-significant results were the con-
trols on the respondent (Years of involvement, Years of experience). The controls on the 
project (task complexity and project phase) did not show a significant relationship with the 
dependent variables (trust and network performance) either, but showed positive (small) 
relationships with the presence of boundary spanners. Task complexity requires more 
boundary spanning activities (β = .18, p < 0.05) as do projects which are in a later phase 
(β = .22, p < 0.05).
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conclusions anD Discussion
In this article, we have focused on the role of boundary spanners in complex urban net-
works in the four largest cities in the Netherlands. There is an emerging body of literature 
on the importance of individuals in inter-organizational settings (e.g. Williams, 2002). In 
the collaborative governance and network management literature, distinctive skills and 
strategies of network managers are defined and examined in this respect. This research 
complements this literature in two ways. Firstly, it directs attention to the role of different 
connective agents in governance networks rather than focusing on the network manager 
alone. Secondly, empirical studies, especially large N research, on the effects of boundary 
spanners on network performance and trust building are scarce.
Our research has some limitations. Firstly, this study has focused on specific kinds of 
governance networks; all the networks studied were in the field of urban development and 
restructuring. These results cannot automatically be assumed to hold also for other types 
of public projects or policy domains, such as (social) service delivery networks (Meier & 
O’Toole 2007). Secondly, the study was conducted in The Netherlands, and the projects are 
all Dutch. The results may differ in other countries with different decision-making cultures 
(e.g. Skelcher et al., 2011). In The Netherlands there exists a consensual political and admin-
istrative culture, in which deliberation and consultation among stakeholders is relatively 
common practice. Connective capabilities may therefore have a more direct effect on the 
level of trust and performance (cf. Torfing & Triantafillou, 2011: 267). Furthermore, we 
based our analysis on the perceptions of the leading public manager within the networks. 
Although such an approach is certainly not unusual (e.g. Moynihan & Pandey, 2005; Klijn et 
al., 2010a) and enabled us to include a large number of networks in our analysis, we have to 
be careful in making generalizations. For example, the personality of the manager could be a 
factor influencing the manager’s perception of boundary spanning activities of other actors 
in the network. Managers may differ in the way they value/perceive interdependencies be-
tween actors, the variety of boundary spanning activities, and their own role in this matter. 
However, we believe that, within the constraints of this research, we can draw meaningful 
conclusions.
A first conclusion is that boundary spanners are important people in complex (urban) 
governance networks. Because of the complex, multi-actor, and compounded character of 
these networks, the role of people who intentionally aim at crossing organizational borders 
and connecting people and organizations is highly important. This research stresses the 
importance of the connective capabilities of different individuals interacting in governance 
networks. We have shown in our research that their connecting activities are important in 
realizing network performance and trust building. This is often assumed in the literature 
(c.f. Williams, 2002) but only seldom substantiated by empirical research. The results show 
that people operating on the borders of organizational structures in the governance network 
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are important for connecting different actors and their viewpoints and interests. In this way, 
trustworthy relationships can be developed and network performance can be improved.
A second conclusion is that, in our research, boundary spanners originated mainly from 
private and societal organizations, and less from governmental organizations (at all levels: 
national, regional, and – especially – local). It seems more difficult for governmental agents 
to operate at the borders of their home organization. The internal fragmentation of their 
bureaucratic organization or agency turf may both be explanatory factors, hampering their 
connective capacity towards other organizations in the governance network (c.f. McGuire 
& Agranoff, 2011). This provides us with the insight that representatives from private and 
societal organizations are important in spanning the boundaries among private, societal, 
and public organizations in the governance network, and bringing these organizations 
more closely together in realizing network performance. It shows that (officially appointed) 
network managers are also dependent on the way other individuals in the network manage 
the interfaces with other organizations. In this respect, the network management research 
could be extended to further examine this relationship between network management and 
the connective behavior of other actors, and its effect on network performance.
However, more research – especially comparative qualitative research – should be un-
dertaken to explain this difference in boundary spanning capacity of private versus public 
actors. This stresses the need to consider the organizational context in which boundary 
spanners operate, which is in line with organizational literature on boundary spanning 
which shows that, for example, a higher level of autonomy of the boundary spanner is related 
to a higher level of trust of external agents in the boundary spanner (Perrone et al., 2003). 
In addition, macro-structural context variables, such as the political opportunity structure 
and network position of actors, should also be included in further research, as such context 
factors influence the effectiveness of boundary spanning activities and the willingness of 
agents to perform such activities (Stevenson & Greenberg, 2000).
The value and relevance of the results of this study for the practice of policy making is 
in our view that organizations need to acknowledge the importance and value of boundary 
spanning persons and activities in improving organizational and network performance. In 
contemporary complex society, the role of specific connecting individuals increases in im-
portance (cf. Edelenbos et al., 2013; Van Hulst et al., 2012; Van Meerkerk et al., 2013). Many 
policy making processes evolve in a network context, which stress the importance of people 
who develop connections among different parts in the network in finding common ground, 
mutual understanding and coordinated action. While many governments have a tendency 
to invest in new structures (reorganization) or organizational form to deal with complex 
governance issues (cf. Kort & Klijn, 2011), our study provides the insight that this one-
dimensional approach is not enough, and need at least to be accompanied by investment in 
the connective and relational capabilities of people dealing with complex, cross-sectoral and 
multi-actor policy issues.
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noTes
1. Although the literature on boundary spanning and the more sociological research on 
bridging ties and structural holes show strong similarities, there is relatively little mutual 
awareness or interaction (Fleming & Waguespack, 2007). While an extensive compari-
son is beyond the scope of this article, we could note that the sociological research is 
relatively more focused on the consequences of the network structure, for example, for 
the position of the broker (putting the broker in a position of power) (see Fuchs, 2010), 
where the boundary spanning literature is more focused on the nature of agency, i.e. 
the effects of boundary spanning activities for (inter)organizational performance. We 
follow this later perspective, examining the effects of boundary spanners on network 
performance.
2. These four cities are relatively the largest cities in The Netherlands. Amsterdam has 
783,000 inhabitants, Rotterdam 611,000, The Hague 497,000 and Utrecht 313,000. The 
fifth city, Eindhoven has 214,000 inhabitants, which is substantially lower.
3. The municipalities of The Hague and Rotterdam did not provide us with the telephone 
numbers of the project managers. In Rotterdam, we visited the managers’ departments 
to promote the survey.
4. The different types of organizations were derived from the literature (e.g. Koppenjan 
& Klijn, 2004; Klijn et al., 2010a) and the sessions with the eight project managers to 
validate our survey questionnaire (see section Methods).
5. We used AMOS Version 18.0.
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7.1 inTroDucTion
The question addressed in this thesis is: In what way and with which effects do boundary-
spanning activities impact upon the democratic legitimacy and performance of governance 
networks in the field of urban development and water governance? The genesis of this thesis 
is grounded in the contemporary governance challenge of developing integrative and legiti-
mate responses to tackle complex public issues in the fields of water governance and urban 
development. As elaborated in chapter 1, such public issues go beyond the boundaries of 
single organizations, but also beyond the boundaries of governments as a whole. Complex 
public issues are not well-bounded cases, and therefore it is highly challenging to develop 
effective and legitimate political responses.
Although complexity in public issues is not a new thing, the increased fragmentation of 
both the state apparatus and society has increased the difficulty of arriving at legitimate and 
effective policy- and decision making. The institutional set-up of functionally differenti-
ated and specialized expert systems tends to complicate coordination and hamstring efforts 
to deal with complex public issues in an integrated manner, thereby impacting on their 
legitimacy and performance (Edelenbos & Teisman, 2011; Wagenaar, 2007). Furthermore, 
because of the growing interdependency between policy areas, policy levels, and policy 
actors, effective and legitimate policy- and decision making concerning complex public 
issues require resources and capacities different than those used in traditional forms of 
representative and hierarchical government. Moreover, the context of the public sector 
has changed considerable in the last decades. Citizens and societal organizations demand 
more direct participation when their interests are at stake and are increasingly capable of 
challenging governmental action. Education levels, socio-economic resources, access to 
political information, and other ‘resources of citizenship’ have increased substantially over 
the past several decades (Dalton, 2004, 2008). Citizens nowadays have, generally speaking, 
more time, money, and access to information and networks to influence public policy, but 
they seem more reluctant to engage in traditional institutions of representative democracy, 
as an average decrease in political membership and voting shows. This contributes to the 
challenge of realizing legitimate policy- and decision making in relation to complex societal 
issues.
As a reaction to the abovementioned challenges of dealing with boundary-crossing issues 
and rising demands for empowered participation, network forms of governance have been 
on the rise in the last decades (e.g. Kickert et al., 1997; Rhodes, 1996; Sørensen & Torfing, 
2009). Governance networks refer to more or less stable patterns of social relations be-
tween mutually dependent actors (government, business, and civil society actors) that form 
around public issues, and which are formed, maintained, and changed through interactions 
between the involved actors (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). In this thesis, I have focused on two 
types of governance networks around water management projects and urban development 
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projects: networks in which governmental actors have a more leading and initiating role and 
networks that are the result of self-organizing citizens.
As argued in chapter 1, the performance and democratic legitimacy of governance 
networks depend largely on the management and the quality of interaction between the 
different stakeholders on the one hand, and the interaction between network processes and 
governmental institutions on the other. In what way and with which effects boundary span-
ners impact upon the democratic throughput legitimacy and performance of governance 
networks has been the subject of this thesis.
In the following, the main conclusions are presented. Subsequently, the implications of 
these conclusions are discussed, followed by practical recommendations. This thesis closes 
with a reflection on the results and an agenda for future research on this topic.
7.2 conclusions
Conclusion 1: Boundary-spanning activities of public managers play a key role in, and have a strong effect on, 
realizing democratic throughput legitimacy of governance networks
In chapter 3, the relationship between connective management, democratic throughput 
legitimacy, and performance of governance networks was tested by survey research. Gov-
ernance networks have democratic potential, as several authors argue, because they can 
engage a variety of affected stakeholders more directly in policy- and decision making. In 
order to make this potential manifest, the boundary-spanning activities of public managers 
play a key role. Connective management is a specific boundary-spanning activity, focused 
on interrelating actors (government, societal interest groups, businesses), layers (national, 
regional, local level), and domains (water management, infrastructure, housing, nature de-
velopment). I found a strong positive effect of a connective-oriented management style on 
the level of throughput legitimacy (a standardized regression weight of .56 at the 1% level).
The concept of throughput legitimacy is about evaluating the quality of the interaction 
process. In this respect, I used the following indicators: the inclusiveness of the process, 
the accessibility of the process, the opportunities for deliberation, the quality of the argu-
mentation process, the transparency of the decision-making process, and the transparency 
of information. Public managers can play a key role in facilitating a constructive dialogue 
between actors in a governance network. Boundary-spanning public managers focus on 
connecting different actors and different domains (cf. Feldman and Khademian, 2008). 
They create opportunities for citizens, civil society organizations, and businesses to deliver 
input in governance processes and connect these with the administrative and political do-
main. They have a feel for the diversity of interests, for what is relevant for the different 
involved stakeholders, and can provide opportunities for these stakeholders to engage. In 
this way, connections between actors can emerge in ways that include different perspectives 
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and different ways of understanding and addressing the problem. Moreover, such managers 
take responsibility for connecting this debate and communication in informal governance 
networks’ throughput to formal decision-making structures and processes.
This conclusion is in line with theoretical assumptions in the literature as well as with 
various case studies concerning the role of public managers practicing boundary-spanning 
activities in the creation of a deliberative governance process (e.g. Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; 
Sørenson & Torfing, 2009). A connective network manager facilitates the interaction process 
between stakeholders across different governmental and non-governmental boundaries. 
As the results indicate, public managers who perform boundary-spanning activities have 
an eye for the diversity of perceptions and interests involved in governance networks, and 
those who aim to create a constructive interaction between these stakeholders positively 
affect the throughput legitimacy of governance networks.
Connective management also directly influences network performance
Furthermore, this study confirms previous empirical studies that network management 
positively affects network performance (Meier & O’Toole, 2007; Klijn et al., 2010). More 
specifically, it is line with Klijn et al.’s (2010) finding that the connective, boundary-spanning 
activities of public managers are highly important in realizing network performance. By cut-
ting across conventional boundaries of organization, sector and policy boundary-spanning 
public managers can enhance the problem-solving capacity and the integrated nature of 
policy- and decision making in governance networks. I found a standardized direct effect 
of connective management on network performance of 0.28 (at the 5% significance level).
However, this standardized effect is less strong than that found by Klijn et al. (2010). 
They found a standardized effect of 0.43 (at the 1% significance level) in the relationship 
between connective management strategies and network performance. Besides small differ-
ences in the field of research (environmental projects versus complex water projects), the 
mediating role of throughput legitimacy plays an important role in this matter. If we include 
this mediating effect of throughput legitimacy, the (standardized) total effect of connec-
tive management on network performance becomes 0.51, which is a little bit stronger than 
that previously found by Klijn et al. (2010). This mediating role of throughput legitimacy is 
further elaborated in the following conclusion.
Conclusion 2: A high level of throughput legitimacy has a strong positive impact on network performance and 
mediates the relationship between boundary-spanning management and network performance
The second conclusion of this thesis is that throughput legitimacy positively affects the 
performance of governance networks dealing with complex societal issues. I found a strong 
positive effect of throughput legitimacy on network performance (a standardized regres-
sion weight of .42 at the 1% significance level) within decision-making processes around 
Dutch regional water governance projects (see chapter 3). A high level of throughput 
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legitimacy reflects a high level of inclusion of affected stakeholders, transparency of the 
policy- and decision-making process, and a high level of communication and constructive 
dialogue among stakeholders in the network. There is interaction across the boundaries of 
governmental organizations, societal interest groups, and local community organizations 
with a high democratic quality (cf. Wagenaar, 2007). As deliberation increases the exchange 
of information, perceptions, and preferences, a learning process can take place by which 
network performance can be enhanced. In box 7.1, an illustrative case of a previous study 
Box 7.1: Case illustration of connective management, throughput legitimacy, and effectiveness
Case illustration from the survey: the Noordwaard case (based on Edelenbos et al., 2013a)
The Noordwaard is a polder of nearly 2,500 hectares alongside the river New Merwede in The Netherlands. 
It has a mainly agricultural and residential function and consists of 75 farm and non-farm households. The 
Noordpolder area is located between the river New Merwede and the natural reserve area, Biesbosch. By 
making the Noordpolder available for water retention during high river discharges, a water level fall could 
be realized of about 60 centimeters in the Merwede and 30 centimeters near Gorinchem, a city threatened 
when the river floods.
Two managers from the National Department of Infrastructure and Environment were appointed to 
organize and implement the project. They implemented a very open and stakeholder-oriented process. 
The managers implemented a very connective management style, in which all kind of stakeholders (NGOs, 
citizens, farmers, and so forth) had the opportunity to become involved in the process and to provide 
information, thoughts, interests, and wishes. Through interactive design sessions, workshops, and discus-
sion meetings, different kinds of alternatives were explored. In these sessions involving civil servants, 
external experts, and stakeholders, the ‘Noordwaard option’ was born. In several interactive sessions, the 
‘run-through’ alternative emerged, which makes the inner part of the area available for temporary water 
retention when the river Merwede needs more space. The outer parts (left and right) are protected against 
flooding and available for multiple land use functions (existing residential areas, agriculture, recreation, and 
nature development). At the same time, the stakeholders managed to enforce a couple of conditions for 
developing the Noordwaard option:
-  inhabitants have the opportunity to stay;
-  inhabitants are given clarity within two years. The Noordwaard project should become a front-runner 
project;
-  people who have to move out will get reasonable compensation;
-  inhabitants and landowners (mostly farmers) are actively involved in planning.
The first point in particular was a victory for farmers and residents. In the event of people moving out, the 
national government had to provide new locations in the same area. Overall, the Noordwaard option was 
considered an effective solution for coping with flooding, but also for addressing other important function-
alities in the area. This option was the result of an extensive interactive, stakeholder-oriented process. As 
one of the managers noted: “The Noordwaard option would probably never have emerged if it wasn’t for the 
interactive process.” This case illustrates how a connective management style resulted in high throughput 
legitimacy and how this throughput legitimacy subsequently contributed to network performance. The due 
deliberation between the stakeholders resulted in an innovative and integrative solution which was also 
acceptable to the different stakeholders.
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we conducted is provided in this respect. This was one of the cases included in the survey 
study used in chapter 3.
Especially when complex societal issues are involved, a proper deliberation process will 
substantially improve the chance of achieving better outcomes. As these issues are mul-
tifaceted, involve stakeholders’ conflicting preferences and values, and are often not well 
understood at the beginning of the process, deliberation and dialogue among stakeholders 
help to structure these issues and make them mutually understood. “The main reason is 
that arguing and reason-giving provide a mechanism to probe and challenge the normative 
validity of actors’ interests as well as to check the empirical facts on which policy choices 
are based” (Risse & Kleine, 2007: 74). In interaction and debate, different sources, perspec-
tives, interests, and values are explored and exploited to develop innovative, acceptable, and 
sustainable results (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Mandell, 2001; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). 
Due deliberation, if it is organized properly, contributes to this development of solutions by 
providing good argumentation and dialogical processes that tap the available information 
and knowledge from the various actors involved.
This conclusion is in line with theoretical assumptions in the literature (e.g. Risse & 
Kleine, 2007; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) as well as with various case studies on this relation-
ship (e.g. Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006; Marcussen & Torfing, 2007; McGuire & Agranoff, 2011; 
Wagenaar, 2007), but is seldom tested with quantitative survey research. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of throughput legitimacy of governance networks in the relationship between 
boundary-spanning activities of public managers and network performance contributes to 
explaining the process that underlies this relationship.
the mediating role of throughput legitimacy in the relationship between connective management and governance 
network performance
An important finding of this study concerns the partly mediating role of democratic 
throughout legitimacy in the relationship between boundary-spanning activities of public 
managers and network performance. In this study (chapter 3), the standardized effect of 
connective management through throughput legitimacy on network performance (the in-
direct effect of connective management on governance network performance) was found to 
be 0.24 (at the 1% significance level). This makes the standardized total effect of connective 
management on network performance 0.51, which is a strong effect.
This finding nuances and clarifies the assumed and previously tested relationship between 
the boundary-spanning activities of public managers and the performance of governance 
networks (e.g. Ansell & Gash, 2008; Klijn et al., 2010; Meier & O’Toole, 2007). Public 
managers could play a key role in connecting relevant stakeholders to the policymaking 
process and building and managing a platform of inter-organizational interaction. This 
contributes to network performance. However, the results indicate that public managers 
will substantially improve their impact on network performance if they succeed in organiz-
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ing an inclusive, deliberative, and transparent policy- and decision-making process. This 
deliberative quality of the interaction process between network actors has a strong impact 
on the performance of governance networks.
Conclusion 3: Realizing throughput legitimacy and improving network performance require broad boundary 
judgments by project managers with regard to content, process, and structure
As can be concluded from the Haringvliet Sluices case (chapter 2), also substantiated by 
other research on comparable cases (Edelenbos et al., 2013b), the boundary judgments of 
project managers matter with regard to the connections in which they invest and the way 
they approach the context of their project. Through these boundary judgments, managers 
influence the inclusion and exclusion of actors (public, private, societal), domains (e.g. wa-
ter safety, environment, economic vitality, infrastructure), and frames (problems, solutions, 
interests). In this way, project managers’ boundary judgments influence the throughput le-
gitimacy and, more indirectly (see the previous conclusion), the performance of governance 
networks.
Actors make boundary judgments in order to cope with the complexities in their sur-
roundings, by demarcating what is included in, or excluded from, the project scope. Tight 
(or exclusive) boundary judgments focus on reducing or controlling complexity. They 
are based on a modernistic rationality whereby the context of the project is perceived as 
relatively stable and distinct from the project. The project is managed as a closed system in 
order to keep control and to make the project evolution predictable (cf. Boons et al., 2009). 
A manager with tight boundary judgments makes a stable and relatively closed boundary 
between the project and its context (Edelenbos et al., 2013b; Teisman, 2005). This manage-
ment style is also known as project management (e.g. De Bruijn et al., 1998; Edelenbos & 
Klijn, 2009). These boundaries protect the project from extra-systemic influences, regu-
lating the interactions between the context and the project, the flow of information, and 
what is considered to be relevant and legitimized knowledge for the project’s goals and 
development. However, such an approach does not fit with the complexity of many public 
issues nowadays. These issues cross a variety of organizational and functional boundaries, 
making them hard to catch in a tightly bounded project organization. A representative case 
is presented in box 7.2.
Broad boundary judgments allow greater room to discover more integral means of deal-
ing with complex societal issues. Making broad boundary judgments fits with a complexity-
sensitive approach towards complex public issues. Broad boundary judgments start from a 
holistic system approach in which the cross-cutting characteristics of complex public issues 
are taken as the point of departure (cf. Head & Alford, forthcoming; Teisman et al., 2009). 
Managers with broad boundary judgments focus on the interdependencies of issues, actors, 
processes, and structures. Such managers acknowledge that the boundaries between project 
and context are not objectively definable but are the result of choices, and that these bound-
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aries need deliberate legitimation. This means that the project is managed as an open system 
in which the boundaries between project and context are perceived as dynamic, fluid, and 
permeable (Edelenbos et al., 2013b). This could lead then to more inclusive governance 
processes where interests, ambitions, and actions can be combined, and consensus between 
possible diverging strategies more easily realized (cf. Boons et al., 2009).
The importance of making and enabling broad boundary judgments derives from litera-
ture stressing the importance for holistic approaches to dealing with complex societal issues, 
emerging in the last decades (see Head & Alford, forthcoming): for example, the literature 
on (complex) system thinking, which stresses the importance of understanding the complex 
web of inputs, processes, and outputs that lead to certain outcomes. Consequently, complex 
system thinkers often call for approaches that take into consideration parallel policy/pro-
duction processes and initiatives outside their organization. The literature on frame reflec-
Box 7.2: Case illustration of boundary judgments, throughput legitimacy, and network performance
Illustration from the Haringvliet Sluices case (see chapter 2)
The Haringvliet case was characterized by tight boundary judgments of the managing actors. The project 
scope (the values and policy domains involved) was defined in a relatively exclusive way, focusing on the 
values of ecology and water quality. In addition, the scope and level of stakeholder participation was rela-
tively low throughout the course of the project. According to the managing actors in the case, the low level 
of regional stakeholder participation was a consequence of the desire ‘to keep the administrative complexity 
under control.’ Furthermore, with regard to the diversity of knowledge included in the project, there was 
a clear dominance of expert knowledge from the water domain, and the project boundaries regarding 
local knowledge were relatively closed. The structural boundary judgments followed a logic of problem 
disaggregation: the project was split up into different components assigned to different organizations (RWS 
and the Province) that were given full responsibility for their specific task. These two components were 
loosely coupled, and the interaction between these two components was characterized by a low level of 
communication and coordination.
These tight boundary judgments clashed with the complexity of the issue and the dynamics in the 
project environment. The policy of enhancing estuarine dynamics and fish migration (linked to interna-
tional agreements) is informed by freshwater availability, spatial planning issues at the connected islands, 
agriculture interests, the economic vitality of the region, and ecological and environmental issues. In this 
respect, the policy measure crossed different policy sectors and governmental levels, and touched upon 
the interests of a variety of governmental and non-governmental actors. Because the values of these other 
sectors and actors were not integrated, and because these actors were not included in the governance 
process in a satisfactory way, the throughput legitimacy of the central decision in this case (the decision to 
change the management of the sluices) was highly contested. This was reflected in the resistance of a diver-
sity of stakeholders and several conflicts between governmental actors, which resulted in implementation 
problems because these actors failed to cooperate. Limiting the scope for decision making and the level of 
participation, and focusing upon formal competences and initial ambitions, are at variance with stimulating 
or allowing for the variety and flexibility needed to deal in a more effective and integrative manner with 
complex societal issues. Although tight boundary judgments can reduce feelings of uncertainty or provide a 
feeling of control for managing actors, they make the project vulnerable to growing pressures in the project 
environment because of conflict and resistance, as we can conclude from this case.
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tion also stresses the importance of reflecting on the way different actors, including policy 
advisors or public managers, approach societal issues, as these issues are not objectively 
definable (Schön & Rein, 1994). Scholars advancing this approach call for the construction 
of ‘metaframes,’ building on various conflicting frames of reference deployed by key actors.
Before proceeding, I have to make an important comment on this conclusion. The oppor-
tunity structure for managers to enact broad boundary judgments is important to consider, 
as this can be constrained by the institutional environment and processes of governmental 
organizations. For example, managers, working with a precise assignment from their politi-
cal principal or from their organizational context, have less opportunity to enact, or will 
experience more difficulty in enacting, broad boundary judgments and seeking connection 
with the project environment. Hampering context factors for making broad boundary judg-
ments were also found in the Haringvliet sluices case. In this case, international agreements 
about fish migration to a large extent conditioned the project of changing the sluice man-
agement and were an important reason why national government decided to continue with 
the implementation of the decision in 2011 (after reconsideration due to a lack of support) 
and contributed to the tight boundary judgments on ecological values.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Edelenbos et al. (2013b), in their comparative 
study of eight complex water projects, found that externally hired project managers (with 
a consultancy background) had less trouble with making broad boundary judgments than 
managers with a governmental organizational background. The latter group, influenced 
by political boundary choices, enacted tighter boundary judgments on substance and par-
ticipation because of their bias towards predefined project results. It seems that managers 
with a governmental background are more inclined to represent the perspectives of their 
own organization and (could) experience more pressure to follow internal guidelines and 
routines. This difference in connective capacity due to organizational background was also 
found in my survey research on boundary spanners in urban development projects, which 
is further discussed in conclusion 5. Actors with a non-governmental background showed 
more boundary-spanning activity than actors with a governmental background. More 
research on the opportunity structure for managers to enact broad boundary judgments 
and to engage in connective activities, and the way in which managers are influenced by 
this opportunity structure or deal with it, are interesting questions for further research. The 
organizational background of managers is at least one important variable to include in such 
a research effort.
Conclusion 4: Boundary-spanning activities by community leaders are crucial for governance networks driven by 
self-organizing citizens to become established and effective
Governance networks around complex public issues driven by self-organizing citizens are 
increasingly seen as an interesting societal development by both academics and govern-
ments. In these self-governance networks, citizens take a more leading role in governance 
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activities. The UK case study (chapter 5) and the Dutch case study (chapter 4) showed that 
the boundary-spanning activities of community leaders were of crucial importance for self-
governance to become accepted by, and anchored within, local governmental institutions. 
There are striking similarities between the activities of the chairman of the Trust in the UK 
Caterham Barracks case (chapter 5) and the chairman of the Federation in the Dutch Broek-
polder case (chapter 4). They both engaged substantially in connecting different individuals, 
their viewpoints, and interests across the boundaries of governmental institutions, the local 
community, and private/societal organizations. They invested in inter-organizational and 
interpersonal relationships between key individuals across the domains of administrative, 
political, and local community boundaries. Furthermore, they took a leading role in coor-
dinating the activities of the self-organizing citizens and connecting the ideas and plans 
of these more or less informal citizen groups with related local government policies and 
decision-making procedures.
The community leaders were able to perform these high level boundary-spanning ac-
tivities because of their well-connectedness (existing network and network position), their 
‘institutional experience,’ and their relational capacities. They were strongly linked within 
the local community by their network activities, but they were also strongly linked at the 
governmental side of the boundary because of their previous work experience within gov-
ernmental institutions. This provided them a variety of contacts within the governmental 
institutions; but, probably even more important, they had tacit knowledge about how policy 
and political processes work. This enabled them to embed the citizens’ initiative across ad-
ministrative, political, and local community boundaries (cf. Feldman & Khademian, 2008). 
Adapting to and translating institutional practices across these boundaries was a particular 
boundary-spanning activity in this respect (see below).
Furthermore, they were taken seriously at the other side of the boundary. They had a 
specific status across the administrative, political, and local community domain. In both the 
Caterham Barracks case and the Broekpolder case, the community leaders had in the past 
been members of the local council. They were taken seriously by councilors coming from 
different political backgrounds, and, through their established connections with aldermen 
and key administrative individuals, they were also taken seriously by civil servants. This 
increased their legitimacy across these boundaries – an important element enhancing their 
ability to perform boundary-spanning activities (cf. Perrone et al., 2003). Next, through 
their established relationships in the local community and their network activities with 
local community organizations and residents, they were also well-connected within the lo-
cal community. Hence, they were strongly linked within the local community and strongly 
linked within governmental institutions (cf. Tushman & Scanlan, 1981 on the importance of 
the internal and external linkage of boundary spanners).
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translating and transforming as key boundary-spanning practices within governance networks stemming from citizen 
initiatives
These boundary spanners connected not only actors operating in the different public, private, 
and societal spheres, but also institutionalized structures to the emerging self-governance 
structures. The boundary spanners connected different institutional logics and played a 
crucial role in organizing how to embed new patterns of behavior in existing institutional 
structures. They merged new ways of organizing with existing institutional procedures. 
Hence, in addition to their role in information exchange and building relationships, their 
translating and transforming institutional practices were found to be important boundary-
spanning activities (cf. Levina & Vaast, 2005). Again, their experience and status were 
crucial here. The community leaders in the self-governance networks had tacit knowledge 
about how policy and political processes work. They knew what was important for these 
institutions. They adopted institutionalized practices (e.g. procedures or working formats) 
in order to make effective and legitimate connections. At the same time, they adapted these 
practices in line with the practices and goals of the proto-institutions they represented.
Interplay of boundary-spanning activities on both sides of community-government boundary
In this adaptation and translation of institutionalized practices, the community leaders 
were certainly not acting alone. Boundary-spanning activities at both sides of the boundary 
were performed in order to align a governmental logic with the proto-institution of self-
governance (see specifically chapter 4 in this regard). The trustful relationships between 
the community leaders and civil servants played an important role, and the civil servants’ 
boundary-spanning activities also were important in the facilitation, consolidation, and 
embedding of self-governance. These civil servants were instrumental in guiding the citizen 
initiative through the administrative organization and connecting the ideas and proposals 
with the different policy departments; and, as became clear from the Dutch Broekpolder 
case, they also provided important cues for the citizen initiative to make their proposals 
more acceptable and in line with administrative and political rules and practices.
This corresponds with other recent research on practices of self-governance. In his re-
search on three citizen initiatives, Specht (2012) also observed the importance of facilitating 
civil servants’ boundary-spanning activities. These civil servants acted as ‘translators’ and 
‘connectors’ between these citizen initiatives and governmental institutions, and this was 
important for the facilitation and consolidation of the citizen initiatives. Whereas Specht 
focused on the translation activities of boundary spanners located primarily within the 
institutions of government (he used the term professionals), my research also signaled the 
performance of these translation activities by community leaders. These non-governmental 
boundary spanners had often previous work experience within governmental institutions 
and could in this sense also be called professionals.
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Hence, a combination of translating and connecting activities on both sides of the bound-
ary was observed. This contributed to mutual adaptation of local government practices and 
the citizens’ proto-institution. This was coined as institutional co-evolution in chapter 4, 
suggesting that translating boundary-spanning activities are not passive activities. They play 
an important role in transforming existing institutionalized practices and organizational 
change (cf. Honig, 2009; Yanow, 2004). This combination contributed to the legitimacy and 
the effectiveness of the self-governance initiatives. Translation as an important boundary-
spanning activity between the different worlds of more informal governance network 
processes on the one hand, and governmental institutions on the other, has not yet attracted 
much attention from governance network scholars. This is further addressed below when I 
discuss a future research agenda for the topic of boundary spanning.
It can be concluded from the case studies that it was not only the boundary-spanning 
activities of either a community leader or of an engaged public manager, but the combina-
tion of their boundary-spanning activities, which played an important part in the establish-
ment and performance of self-governance. This was further tested by survey research in 
governance networks around complex urban development projects.
Conclusion 5: The performance of governance networks and trust between network actors are enhanced by the 
interplay of boundary-spanning activities by public, private, and societal actors
A fifth conclusion following from the survey research on complex urban development 
projects (chapter 6) is that boundary spanners with both a governmental and a non-gov-
ernmental background positively affect governance network performance. Furthermore, 
boundary-spanning activities are strongly related to the level of trust between actors in 
the network; and the results indicate that the relationship between boundary-spanning 
activities and performance is partly mediated by trust. I found a standardized effect of 
boundary spanners on governance network performance of 0.34, which is quite strong (at 
the 5% significance level). Competent boundary spanners are relationship builders and 
have a feeling for the interests and social constructions of other actors in the governance 
network. Through their informational and coordinating activities, they positively influence 
the performance of governance networks.
Connective activities beyond governmental organization: the importance of non-governmental boundary spanners
In line with the studies on self-governance networks, this finding stresses the importance of 
the connective capabilities of different individuals interacting in governance networks. Be-
cause of the complex, multi-actor, and compounded character of these networks, the role of 
people who intentionally aim at crossing organizational borders and connecting people and 
organizations is highly important in realizing network performance and trust building. This 
is often assumed in the literature (cf. Williams, 2002) but seldom substantiated by empirical 
research (cf. Van Hulst et al., 2012); and attention is mainly directed at the role of (repre-
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sentatives of) central and/or governmental actors (e.g. lead organizations, network manag-
ers, politicians) (e.g. Meier & O’Toole, 2007; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009; Klijn et al., 2010; 
Cristofoli et al., 2014). The results of the survey research show that network performance is 
positively affected by the presence of multiple people practicing boundary-spanning activi-
ties. As governance processes dealing with complex societal issues evolve at the boundaries 
of different public, private, and societal organizations, the boundary-spanning activities of 
a variety of individuals matter for the performance of governance networks. These people 
operate actively on the boundary of their organization, improve the coordination between 
network and intra-organizational processes, build sustainable inter-organizational relation-
ships, and collect and disseminate relevant information on both sides of the organizational 
boundary. In this way, trustful relationships can be developed and network performance 
can be improved.
According to the public managers’ responses, these boundary spanners originated mainly 
from private and societal organizations, and less from governmental organizations (at all 
levels: national, regional, and – especially – local). This provides the insight that represen-
tatives from private and societal organizations are important in spanning the boundaries 
among private, societal, and public organizations in the governance network, and bring-
ing these organizations more closely together, thereby potentially enhancing throughput 
legitimacy and network effectiveness. If one focuses on the interaction process between a 
diversity of stakeholders and considers their self-organizing behavior, boundary-spanning 
activities are the concern not only of (formal) public managers, but also of (informal) com-
munity leaders and representatives of NGOs and private businesses who are able and willing 
to cross their organizational boundaries.
In line with previous comments on the opportunity structure of public managers (see 
conclusion 3), it seems more difficult for governmental agents to operate at the borders of 
their home organization. The internal fragmentation of their bureaucratic organization or 
agency turf may both be explanatory factors, hampering their connective capacity towards 
other organizations in the governance network (cf. McGuire & Agranoff, 2011).
Boundary spanners have a strong positive effect on the level of trust between actors in governance networks
Besides their (direct) effects on network performance, boundary spanners positively 
influence the level of trust between actors in the network. The relationship between the 
presence of boundary spanners and trust was very strong: I found a standardized regression 
coefficient of .65 (at the 1% significance level). Through their relational activities and their 
empathic skills, boundary spanners could enhance trustful relationships between actors in 
the governance network. This result is in line with theoretical assumptions and case study 
research about the role of boundary spanners in developing sustainable and trustful inter-
organizational relationships (e.g. Ferguson et al., 2005; Perrone et al., 2003; Williams, 2002). 
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Trustful relationships in governance networks enhance the sharing of information and 
resources. This could in turn increase the performance of governance networks.
As trust is also positively related to network performance, the results indicate that bound-
ary spanners enhance the performance of governance networks also indirectly via trust. 
This mediating relationship was tested but was not found significant. The indirect effect of 
boundary spanners on network performance via trust was just above the significance level 
of 0.05 (p = 0.053). The relatively weak relationship between trust and network performance 
compared to findings in previous research (Klijn et al., 2010) (I found a standardized regres-
sion weight of .28 (p < 0.05)) could be an important factor here.
7.3 implicaTions of research finDings anD pracTical 
recommenDaTions
Implications
This research stresses the importance of the boundary-spanning role in giving shape to 
democratic legitimacy in the ‘new democratic spaces’ (Warren, 2009) offered by governance 
networks. The articles in part II of this research and the first three conclusions elaborated 
in this chapter specifically stress the role that public managers can play in this respect. 
Governance networks offer potential in giving shape to new democratic practices that 
complement representative democracy in realizing democratically legitimate and more ef-
fective responses to complex public issues. As argued in chapter 1 and chapter 3, governance 
networks follow a different logic than representative democracy in terms of democratic 
legitimacy. In contrast to representative democracy, constituencies are more dynamic and 
come into existence in response to specific policy issues and often dissolve when those issues 
are resolved (Warren, 2009). This means that the inclusive nature (the ‘all affected’ principle) 
and deliberative quality of the governance process are more useful and appropriate criteria 
for assessing the democratic legitimacy of policy- and decision making within governance 
networks. As shown in this thesis, public managers can play a key role in enhancing this. 
Their boundary-spanning activities positively affect the deliberative and inclusive quality 
of governance network processes. Furthermore, they play an important role in connecting 
governance network processes with formal institutions of representative democracy.
An important question then arises: how could this become more transparent? Should 
public managers be held accountable for the extent to which they perform boundary-
spanning activities and enhance the throughput legitimacy of governance networks? And, 
if so, accountable to whom? If they play such a key role in shaping democratic legitimacy, 
this should be an important focus for both governmental organizations and academics. That 
is not to say that this has not been a focus of academics at all, but further research could 
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make this role more explicit and address the role dilemmas of boundary-spanning public 
managers (cf. Torfing et al., 2012).
The same holds for the boundary-spanning activities of non-governmental actors, es-
pecially when these actors are in a leading role. A frequently raised danger of giving more 
room to self-organizing citizens is that this could lead to forms of exclusion in which the 
better educated or the well-organized ‘few’ take over at the expense of the less educated or 
less organized ‘many’ (Warren, 2009). This is an important question for further research. 
According to recent empirical studies on self-governance networks in local neighborhoods, 
this inequality in participation seems to be overstated (e.g. Bakker et al., 2011; Van de Wi-
jdeven, 2012). Furthermore, meta-governance activities by politicians and public managers 
could control for these potential dangers (e.g. Torfing et al., 2012). The boundary-spanning 
activities of community leaders could also be held to account in this respect. To what extent 
do local self-governance networks pay attention to an inclusive sample of interests, values, 
and views? In the Dutch Broekpolder case, the self-organizing citizens showed themselves 
to be responsive to various community groups and were also held accountable in this re-
spect by the local government.
Practical recommendations
A first recommendation for the practice of public administration is that governmental or-
ganizations need to acknowledge the importance and value of boundary-spanning persons 
and activities in improving organizational and network performance. In our contemporary 
complex society, the role of specific connecting individuals is increasing in importance (cf. 
Edelenbos et al., 2013b; Van Hulst et al., 2012). Many policymaking processes evolve in a 
network context; this stresses the importance of people who develop connections among 
different parts in the network in finding common ground, mutual understanding, and co-
ordinated action. Whereas many governments have a tendency to invest in new structures 
(reorganization) or organizational forms to deal with complex governance issues (cf. Kort 
& Klijn, 2011), this study provides the insight that this one-dimensional approach is not 
enough and needs at least to be accompanied by investment in the connective and relational 
capabilities of people dealing with complex, cross-sectoral, and multi-actor policy issues.
As the boundary-spanning activities of public managers are positively related to network 
performance and democratic throughput legitimacy, careful selection of public managers 
with boundary-spanning capacities is an important recommendation for governmental 
organizations dealing with complex public issues. The competency of public managers to 
perform boundary-spanning activities and deploy boundary-spanning strategies should be 
considered an important aspect in the selection of public managers who are engaged in 
dealing with complex urban or water management projects. An effective selection proce-
dure for competent boundary spanners could for example be implemented by competence 
assessment and training. Previous research has shown that emotional and social intelligence 
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competences are related to boundary-spanning activities (e.g. Davis, 2010; Williams, 2008). 
High-level boundary spanners have a broad repertoire of emotional and social intelligence 
competences, which enables them to operate more effectively in a more complex environ-
ment.
A second recommendation is to facilitate and support the organization’s boundary span-
ner. Next to careful selection of boundary spanners, governmental organizations can invest 
in careful crafting of the boundary-spanner’s organizational position. This is especially 
relevant if governments want to be responsive to citizen initiatives. Governmental bound-
ary spanners have an important, but difficult task to perform in this respect. For example, as 
followed from the studies on self-governance networks, governmental boundary spanners 
often need organizational units to adapt their practices in order to provide room for citizen 
self-organization and to make effective connections with the citizen’s initiative. They have 
to be connected both externally and internally. Next to their personal competency and 
capacity needed to connect different worlds, they need authority to do their job. Next to 
one’s personal character and experience (informal authority), one’s organizational position 
and formal authority could be very useful in this respect. The importance of this supporting 
and facilitating of boundary spanners will become more severe if the amount and diversity 
of bottom-up citizen initiatives grows and if governments want to be responsive to these 
initiatives.
A third recommendation is addressed to initiators of citizen initiatives who want to invest 
in self-organization and self-management in the public domain. Investing in connections 
with a diverse set of actors coming from the public, private and societal sphere can enhance 
the sustainability and effectiveness of a citizen initiative. This is often a difficult and bal-
ancing act, as citizen initiatives also need time to develop their own identity and to build 
their own group of committed people. However, investing in connections with a diverse set 
of actors can enhance the support (for example, in terms of volunteers, finance, political 
legitimacy) of the local community and subsequently the sustainability and effectiveness of 
citizen initiatives. Hence, citizen initiatives which are concerned with self-organization and 
self-management in the public domain also need to invest in particular boundary-spanning 
activities as they are not acting in an institutional vacuum. Boundary spanning (for example 
informing and translating activities) between local government practices and the citizen’s 
organization can enhance the support for and legitimacy of the citizen’s initiative. Involving 
someone who has institutional experience and knows the way within local government 
(politically and/or administratively) is very useful in this respect.
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7.4 limiTaTions anD recommenDaTions for fuTure research on 
bounDary spanning
In this section, I address several research limitations on the conceptual, theoretical, and 
methodological level. In addressing these limitations, I also discuss suggestions for future 
research. These directions for future research focus specifically on a research agenda with 
respect to the role of boundary spanners, their struggles, and their value for organizations 
operating in governance networks.
Methodological limitations
As also addressed in the individual articles, an important methodological limitation 
with regard to internal validity relates to the measurement of network performance and 
democratic throughput legitimacy. The measurement of these variables in the survey-
based articles (chapters 3 and 6) used the perceptions of participants within the different 
networks. Although such an approach is certainly not unusual (e.g. Moynihan & Pandey, 
2005; Klijn et al., 2010) and enabled the inclusion of a large number of networks in our 
analysis, we have to be careful about making generalizations based on these findings. With 
regard to the relationship between boundary-spanning management and good network 
performance, the results are in line with comparative case study research on comparable 
water and environmental projects (see Edelenbos et al., 2013b; Verweij et al., 2013). These 
studies also found that boundary-spanning management activities are positively related to 
good network performance, specifically with regard to complex public issues.
However, these studies also used participants’ perceptions (stakeholder satisfaction) to 
evaluate the outcomes of the various networks. The question is whether respondents are 
likely to provide reliable answers. Individuals’ assessments of network performance run 
the risk of reflecting the relative gains of respondents rather than the performance of the 
network as a whole (Torfing et al., 2012). Furthermore, the level at which different stake-
holders are included (an important criterion in the measurement of democratic throughput 
legitimacy) is difficult for network participants themselves to judge. Asking about specific 
indicators of the performance of the network as a whole, such as its integrative nature, 
problem-solving capacity, and innovative character, partly reduces this issue. Next – and 
this holds particularly for the case study research – the bias towards individual network 
participants’ gains is balanced by using the more in-depth evaluations of various network 
participants. Nevertheless, improvements can certainly be made in relation to measur-
ing network performance. Using the evaluations of external experts and external actors 
in addition to those of network participants could be one such improvement (cf. Torfing 
et al., 2012). This would enhance the chance of providing a more sophisticated picture of 
democratic throughput legitimacy and network performance.
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In relation to external validity, an important methodological limitation concerns the 
focus on specific kinds of networks within – mostly – one specific country. All the networks 
studied were in the field of urban development and restructuring. These results cannot 
automatically be assumed to hold also for other types of public projects or policy domains, 
such as (social) service delivery networks (Meier & O’Toole, 2007). Secondly, the study was 
conducted in The Netherlands, and the projects were all Dutch. The results may differ in 
other countries with different decision-making cultures (e.g. Skelcher et al., 2011). In The 
Netherlands there exists a consensual political and administrative culture in which delib-
eration and consultation among stakeholders is relatively common practice. Connective 
capabilities may therefore have a more direct effect on the level of democratic throughput 
legitimacy and network performance (cf. Torfing & Triantafillou, 2011).
Enabling and constraining conditions for boundary spanners to act
Future research should consider more carefully the context factors that impact on boundary-
spanning behavior in governance network settings. Organizational literature on boundary 
spanning shows, for example, that a higher level of boundary-spanner autonomy is related 
to a higher level of external agents’ trust in the boundary spanner (Perrone et al., 2003). In 
addition, macro-structural context variables, such as the political opportunity structure, 
should be included in further research, as such context factors influence the effectiveness 
of boundary-spanning activities and the willingness of agents to perform such activities 
(Stevenson & Greenberg, 2000). My research focused mainly on the interaction process 
between different actors in governance networks and how this related to democratic legiti-
macy and network performance.
Buffering activities of boundary spanners
A conceptual limitation concerns the concept of boundary spanners. This conceptualization 
(see in particular chapter 1, chapter 3, and chapter 6) focuses on the connective (‘spanning’) 
activities of boundary spanners. Within the organizational literature on boundary span-
ning, buffering activities of boundary spanners have also been addressed. This may sounds 
somewhat paradoxical, but because boundary spanners manage the interface between 
organization and environment, buffering activities in order to protect the organization are 
also part of the job. Buffering activities are aimed at protecting the organization or system 
from external disturbances in order to enhance the possibility of rational action (Yan & 
Louis, 1999).
An important reason for not including buffering activities concerns the theoretical points 
of departure, which were strongly influenced by interdependency theories in the field of 
governance networks. Interdependencies between organizations dealing with complex 
public issues and the increased functional differentiation within the state apparatus put the 
need for connective capacity on the research agenda. Realizing connections in networks 
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characterized by differing interests and embedded within a functionally differentiated insti-
tutional landscape is a difficult task. Consequently, a strong case can be made for focusing 
on boundary spanning as a connective activity. Hence, the question arises as to whether 
buffering activities are needed at all, because organizations are often strongly tempted to fo-
cus on their core task or to fall back into their institutionalized routines (e.g. Edelenbos and 
Teisman, 2011). I do think, however, that examining more explicitly the buffering activities 
of boundary spanners could be of added value: for example, how boundary spanners buffer 
their organization from network processes or protect the governance network process from 
disturbances coming from their organization or institutional environment (for example the 
political system).
The inappropriateness of boundary spanners
Different characteristics of boundary spanners have already been mentioned both in the 
literature and in this thesis (particularly in chapter 1 and chapter 6), such as being an 
active listener, an entrepreneur, and a relationship builder. However, within governance 
networks, institutionalized patterns of behavior are often challenged one way or another. 
More research could be done on the role of boundary spanners in this respect. In the citizen 
initiative cases, both governmental and non-governmental boundary spanners conducted 
entrepreneurial activities to align or adapt institutional practices in order to facilitate pro-
ductive cooperation between citizens and local government. In this respect, performing 
boundary-spanning activities means implicitly, or sometimes explicitly, critically reflecting 
on the organizational and governmental rules of conduct. A boundary spanner acts on the 
border of his/her own organization and its institutional structure. Rephrasing the famous 
terms of March and Olsen’s logic of appropriateness: boundary spanners often show inap-
propriate rather than appropriate behavior (cf. Peeters et al., 2010). Such a view on boundary 
spanners could be more elaborated, underlining the particular value of boundary spanners 
for organizations to reflect and to innovate in order to keep connected with the environ-
ment and to adapt towards the environment (which is of course related to the contingency 
perspective on organization and what this means for boundary spanners, see for example 
Baker, 2008). Such a perspective could also elucidate how boundary spanners often face 
forces of resistance or forces of institutional rigidity. Furthermore, boundary spanners 
could easily become isolated by performing such a critical role. In this sense, they often take 
personal risks, leading to the following point for future research.
Personal problems for boundary-spanning actors: the issue of the isolated connector
In their boundary-spanning activities, boundary spanners could, paradoxically, feel or 
become relatively isolated. In their spanning activities, they are constantly crossing bound-
aries, translating outside information and constructions internally, and vice versa. In this 
way, they could become someone who belongs neither to the environment nor to the of-
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ficial organization that they represent. This could in turn lead to negative attitudes towards 
their own job or organization. For example, in a recent study on negative consequences of 
boundary-spanning contact in uncertain multi-organizational contexts, Ramarajan et al. 
(2011) found that frequent contact of boundary spanners with other organizations’ person-
nel was related to negative attitudes towards their own job and organization.
The relatively strong difference in institutional logic between governmental organiza-
tions and governance networks makes this issue even more apparent. Civil servants who 
perform boundary-spanning activities are likely to encounter such struggles. Some of these 
boundary-spanning struggles are reported in a recent study by Peeters et al. (2010) on the 
role and work of neighborhood managers. These managers sometimes feel as if they are 
not really part either of the governmental organization or of one of the other organizations 
in the governance network in which they operate. They defend the different perspectives 
in these different contexts. This further stresses the importance of boundary spanners’ 
personal characteristics and competences, as they have to be confident, experienced, and 
authoritative enough to be able to perform boundary-spanning activities.
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main quesTion, conTexT, anD relevance of The sTuDy
Dealing with contemporary public issues in fields such as water management, urban devel-
opment, healthcare, poverty reduction, employment policy, and environmental protection 
asks for interaction between a plurality of governmental and non-governmental actors. 
Many contemporary policy- and decision-making processes therefore unfold in networks 
of actors crossing the boundaries of public, private, and societal spheres. This has given rise 
to debates and research about how to realize effective and legitimate policy- and decision-
making in these governance networks which, in contrast to the institutions of representative 
democracy, are more dynamic and come into existence in response to specific public issues. 
The focus of this thesis is on the management of interactions between governmental and 
non-governmental actors within governance networks in the fields of urban development 
and water governance. The concept of boundary spanning is used to examine this man-
agement of interactions across organizational and institutional boundaries. The research 
objective of this thesis is to describe the role of boundary spanners in these governance 
networks and to test their effects on the performance and democratic legitimacy. The ques-
tion addressed in this thesis is: In what way and with which effects do boundary-spanning 
activities impact upon the democratic legitimacy and performance of governance networks in 
the fields of urban development and water governance?
This research is embedded in the changing context of policy- and decision-making in 
the last decades. In the contemporary age of late modernity, the classical modernistic 
institutions of policy- and decision making are increasingly facing difficulties in realizing 
legitimate and effective political responses by themselves. A number of transformations in 
contemporary societies can be identified as important factors in this diagnosis of which 
two main changes are elaborated in this thesis. The first concerns the increasing complexity 
of public issues accompanied by a highly fragmented institutional landscape. The second 
concerns a changing societal context in which traditional political authority is increasingly 
questioned and in which citizens are less participating in traditional forms of political en-
gagement attached to the representative system of democracy. In contrast, alternative forms 
of civic engagement are on the rise. Citizens have become more assertive and are increas-
ingly capable to challenge governmental measures which affect their living environment 
and to come up with alternative plans. There is a rise of alternative civic engagement, based 
on citizens’ self-organization, which emerges outside the realm of traditional institutions of 
representative democracy, but which often interacts with these institutions.
Partly in response to these challenges, network forms of governance have arisen in the 
last decades. Governance networks refer to a web of relationships between government, 
business, and civil society actors, which form around public issues, and which are formed, 
maintained, and changed through interactions between the involved actors. These network 
forms of governance are often born out of frustration with modernistic institutional prac-
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tices and growing mutual interdependencies in contemporary society. They can be initiated 
by governmental actors, but also provoked by self-organizing citizens. In this thesis I focus 
on these two types of governance networks around water management projects and urban 
development projects: governance networks in which governmental actors have a more 
leading and initiating role and governance networks which are driven by self-organizing 
citizens. Self-organization of citizens refers to bottom up initiatives which are citizen or 
community driven, which aim to deal with a specific set of public issues and which have the 
ambition to set up sustainable cooperation among citizens in this respect.
This thesis aims to contribute to the literature on governance networks in at least two 
important ways. Firstly, previous research has indicated the importance of boundary 
spanning activities of network managers or meta-governors as a factor for enhancing the 
performance of governance networks, but the issue of democratic legitimacy is not much 
addressed in this relationship. According to several authors, a fundamental cause is that the 
nature of governance networks does not fit with the assumptions of traditional models of 
democracy, complicating empirical analyses in this respect.
Secondly, as policy and decision-making processes in governance networks evolve at the 
boundaries of different public, private, and societal organizations, the boundary spanning 
activities of a variety of individuals are likely to matter for the performance of governance 
networks. While this is recognized in the literature, by far, most of the attention goes to 
the role of (representatives of) central and/or governmental actors (e.g. lead organizations, 
network managers, politicians). Therefore, and in addition to many literature on network 
management, this research will examine the influence of boundary spanners with various 
organizational backgrounds, especially non-governmental, to empirically examine their in-
fluence on the legitimacy and the performance of governance networks. This is specifically 
important, given the increasing interest of both governments and academics in the self-
organizing capacities of citizens in dealing with public issues. Particularly, the discourse 
of the so-called Participation Society in the Netherlands and the Big Society in the UK are 
clear examples in this respect.
sTrucTure of The Thesis anD meThoDology
To answer the main research question, five studies have been conducted, including both 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Four of the five studies have been published within 
international peer-reviewed journals and one study has been published as a book chapter in 
an international edited volume. These five studies are structured into two parts (part II and 
III of the thesis). Part II focuses on the boundary-spanning activities of governmental ac-
tors, i.e. public managers, within water governance networks and their effects on democratic 
legitimacy and network performance. It contains two studies. The first one is an in-depth 
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qualitative study in which (a lack of) boundary-spanning around a contested complex water 
issue is examined. The second one is a quantitative study among respondents involved in 
complex water projects. In this study the effects of boundary spanning activities of public 
managers on throughput legitimacy and network performance are tested.
Part III goes deeper into the boundary-spanning activities of non-governmental actors in 
governance networks. It contains three studies. The first two are case studies (one single and 
one comparative case study) about governance networks driven by citizen self-organization. 
In these studies the evolution of citizen self-organization and the boundary spanning activi-
ties of community leaders are examined. Part III closes with a quantitative study (chapter 
6), testing the effects of both governmental and non-governmental boundary spanners on 
trust and network performance within urban governance networks. This study is based on 
survey-research among managers of urban projects in the four largest cities in the Nether-
lands.
conclusions
In this thesis, boundary spanners are understood as persons who actively work on the 
boundary of their organization. They are able to recognize and exploit opportunities for 
building inter-organizational relationships and have a developed feeling for the other side 
of the organizations’ boundary. This means that they are able to empathize with others 
and that they have a feeling for the social construction of other actors. Boundary spanners 
understand other actors’ needs, which enables them to search for shared meanings and 
to merge self-interests into joint interests. They are skilled networkers and specialized in 
crossing different structures. Besides these interpersonal and inter-organizational skills, 
boundary spanners are considered to be entrepreneurs and innovators in the sense that 
they try to link different policy issues and policy streams across boundaries.
Boundary spanning is understood as a combination of interrelated activities concerned 
with connecting different actors from the realm of government, society, and business, 
building sustainable relationships between these actors, and connecting governance 
network processes with intra-organizational processes. In this respect, they are engaged 
in three main (and interrelated) activities: 1) connecting different people and processes 
across organizational boundaries, 2) selecting relevant information on both sides of the 
boundary, and 3) translating this information to the other side of the boundary. In line 
with network-oriented interdependency approaches, I focus on ‘boundary spanners-
in-practice’, as they are also called. These boundary spanners are actively involved in a 
two-way information and communication flow: from the network to the organization and 
vice versa. This means that boundary spanners should be both strongly linked inside and 
outside the organization.
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The first conclusion of this thesis is that the boundary-spanning activities of public managers 
play a key role in, and have a strong effect on, realizing democratic throughput legitimacy of 
governance networks. The concept of democratic throughput legitimacy is about evaluating 
the democratic quality of the interaction process which evolves within governance networks 
(see next conclusion). Governance networks have democratic potential, as several authors 
argue, because they can engage a variety of affected stakeholders more directly in policy- 
and decision making and because they are better fine-tuned to the specific issue at stake. In 
order to make this potential manifest, the boundary-spanning activities of public managers 
play a key role. I found a strong positive effect of a management style based on boundary-
spanning activities on the level of throughput legitimacy (see in particular chapter 3). 
Boundary-spanning public managers focus on connecting different actors and different 
domains. They create opportunities for citizens, civil society organizations, and businesses 
to participate in the governance process and to connect this process with the administrative 
and political domain and to perform the necessary translating activities between these two 
domains. They have a feel for the diversity of interests, for what is relevant for the different 
stakeholders involved, and provide opportunities for these stakeholders to engage. In this 
way, connections between actors can emerge in ways that include different perspectives and 
different ways of understanding and addressing the problem. In this way, public managers 
can play a key role in facilitating a constructive dialogue between actors in a governance 
network and to make policy- and decision making processes transparent. Moreover, such 
managers take responsibility for connecting this debate and communication in informal 
governance networks’ throughput to formal decision-making structures and processes.
The second conclusion of this thesis is that throughput legitimacy positively affects the 
performance of governance networks dealing with complex societal issues. I found a strong 
positive effect of throughput legitimacy on network performance within decision-making 
processes around Dutch regional water governance projects (see chapter 3). A high level of 
throughput legitimacy reflects a high level of inclusion of affected stakeholders, transpar-
ency of the policy- and decision-making process, and a high level of communication and 
constructive dialogue among stakeholders in the network. There is interaction across the 
boundaries of governmental organizations, societal interest groups, and local community 
organizations with a high democratic quality. As deliberation increases the exchange of 
information, perceptions, and preferences, a learning process can take place by which 
network performance can be enhanced.
As a result, throughput legitimacy partly mediates the relationship between boundary-
spanning public managers and the performance of governance networks. In line with 
previous literature on network management, I found a positive direct effect of boundary-
spanning public managers on network performance (see chapter 3). By cutting across 
conventional boundaries of organization, sector and policy boundary-spanning public 
managers can enhance the problem-solving capacity and the integrated nature of policy- 
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and decision making in governance networks. In addition to this literature I also found 
a strong, indirect effect of boundary-spanning public managers on network performance 
via throughput legitimacy. This finding nuances and clarifies the assumed and previously 
tested relationship between the boundary-spanning activities of public managers and the 
performance of governance networks. Public managers could play a key role in connecting 
relevant stakeholders to the policymaking process and building and managing a platform 
of inter-organizational interaction. This contributes to network performance. However, the 
results indicate that public managers will substantially improve their impact on network 
performance if they succeed in organizing an inclusive, deliberative, and transparent 
policy- and decision-making process. This deliberative quality of the interaction process 
between network actors has a strong impact on the performance of governance networks.
The third conclusion of this thesis is that realizing throughput legitimacy and improving 
network performance require broad boundary judgments by project managers with regard to 
the content, process, and structure. As can be concluded from the Haringvliet Sluices case 
(see chapter 2), the boundary judgments of project managers matter with regard to the 
connections in which they invest and the way they approach the context of their project. 
Through these boundary judgments, managers influence the inclusion and exclusion of 
actors (public, private, societal), domains (e.g. water safety, environment, economic vitality, 
infrastructure), and frames (problems, solutions, interests). Broad boundary judgments 
allow greater room to discover more integral means of dealing with complex societal is-
sues. Making broad boundary judgments fits with a complexity-sensitive approach towards 
complex public issues in which the cross-cutting characteristics of such issues are taken as 
the point of departure. Managers with broad boundary judgments focus on the interde-
pendencies of issues, actors, processes, and structures. Such managers acknowledge that 
the boundaries between project and context are not objectively definable but are the result 
of choices, and that these boundaries need deliberate legitimation. This means that the 
project is managed as an open system in which the boundaries between project and context 
are perceived as dynamic, fluid, and permeable, which requires more boundary spanning 
activities. This could lead then to a higher level of throughput legitimacy and network 
performance. However, the opportunity structure for managers to enact broad boundary 
judgments is important to consider, as this can be constrained by the institutional context 
of governmental organizations.
Next to the boundary-spanning activities of public managers, this thesis has examined the 
boundary-spanning activities of community leaders in governance networks driven by self-
organizing citizens. The fourth conclusion of this thesis is that boundary-spanning activities 
by community leaders are crucial for governance networks driven by self-organizing citizens to 
become established and effective. There are striking similarities between the activities of the 
chairman of the Trust in the UK Caterham Barracks case (chapter 5) and the chairman of 
the Federation in the Dutch Broekpolder case (chapter 4). They both engaged substantially 
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in connecting different individuals, their viewpoints, and interests across the boundaries of 
governmental institutions, the local community, and private/societal organizations. They 
invested in inter-organizational and interpersonal relationships between key individuals 
across the domains of administrative, political, and local community boundaries. Further-
more, they took a leading role in coordinating the activities of the self-organizing citizens 
and connecting the ideas and plans of these more or less informal citizen groups with related 
local government policies and decision-making procedures.
Adapting to and translating institutional practices across these boundaries was a particu-
lar boundary-spanning activity in this respect. The boundary spanners connected different 
institutional logics and played a crucial role in organizing how to embed new patterns of 
behavior in existing institutional structures. They merged new ways of organizing with 
existing institutional procedures. Hence, in addition to their role in information exchange 
and building relationships, their translating and transforming institutional practices were 
found to be important boundary-spanning activities. The community leaders were able to 
perform these high level boundary-spanning activities because of their well-connectedness 
(existing network and network position), their ‘institutional experience,’ and their relational 
capacities. They were strongly linked within the local community by their network activi-
ties, but they were also strongly linked at the governmental side of the boundary because 
of their previous work experience within governmental institutions. This not only provided 
them a variety of contacts within the governmental institutions, but also provided them 
knowledge about how policy and political processes work. This enabled them to embed the 
citizens’ initiative across administrative, political, and local community boundaries.
In this adaptation and translation of institutionalized practices, the community leaders 
were certainly not acting alone. Boundary-spanning activities at both sides of the bound-
ary were performed in order to align a governmental logic with the citizens’ community 
organization (see chapter 4 in this regard). The trustful relationships between the commu-
nity leaders and civil servants played an important role, and the civil servants’ boundary-
spanning activities also were important in the facilitation, consolidation, and embedding of 
self-governance. These civil servants were instrumental in guiding and navigating the citizen 
initiative through the administrative organization and connecting the ideas and proposals 
with the different policy departments; and, as became clear from the Dutch case, they also 
provided important cues for the citizen initiative to make their proposals more acceptable 
and in line with administrative and political rules and practices. Hence, a combination of 
translating activities on both sides of the boundary was observed. Boundary-spanning be-
came a co-production between key civil servants and community leaders. This contributed 
to mutual adaptation of local government practices and the citizens’ community organiza-
tion.
The fifth conclusion of this thesis is that the performance of governance networks and trust 
between network actors are enhanced by the interplay of boundary-spanning activities by 
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public, private, and societal actors. In line with the studies on self-governance networks, 
this finding stresses the importance of the connective capabilities of different individuals 
interacting in governance networks and their mutual interplay. The results of the survey re-
search among public managers operating in complex urban development projects show that 
network performance is positively affected by the presence of multiple people practicing 
boundary-spanning activities (see chapter 6 in this regard). As governance processes deal-
ing with complex societal issues evolve at the boundaries of different public, private, and 
societal organizations, the boundary-spanning activities of a variety of individuals matter 
for the performance of governance networks. These people operate actively on the boundary 
of their organization, improve the coordination between network and intra-organizational 
processes, build sustainable inter-organizational relationships, and collect and disseminate 
relevant information on both sides of the organizational boundary.
Besides their (direct) effects on network performance, boundary spanners positively 
influence the level of trust between actors in the network. I found a strong positive effect 
of boundary spanners on trust in the governance network (see chapter 6). Through their 
relational activities and their empathic skills, boundary spanners could enhance trustful re-
lationships between actors in the governance network. Trustful relationships in governance 
networks enhance the sharing of information and resources, which could in turn increase 
the performance of governance networks. Although the results indicate that boundary 
spanners enhance the performance of governance networks also indirectly via trust, this 
mediating relationship was not found significant.
These boundary spanners originated mainly from private and societal organizations, and 
less from governmental organizations (at all levels: national, regional, and – especially – lo-
cal). This provides the insight that representatives from private and societal organizations 
are important in spanning the boundaries among private, societal, and public organiza-
tions in the governance network, and bringing these organizations more closely together, 
thereby potentially enhancing throughput legitimacy and network effectiveness. If one 
focuses on the interaction process between a diversity of stakeholders and considers their 
self-organizing behavior, boundary-spanning activities are the concern not only of (formal) 
public managers, but also of (informal) community leaders and representatives of NGOs 
and private businesses who are able and willing to cross their organizational boundaries.
closing off
This research stresses the importance of the boundary-spanning role in enhancing the 
democratic legitimacy in the new democratic spaces offered by governance networks. Gov-
ernance networks offer potential in giving shape to new democratic practices that comple-
ment representative democracy in realizing democratically legitimate and more effective 
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responses to complex public issues. Governance networks follow a different logic than 
representative democracy in terms of democratic legitimacy. In contrast to representative 
democracy, constituencies are more dynamic and come into existence in response to specific 
policy issues. This also means that we need other criteria to assess the democratic legitimacy 
of policy- and decision making within governance networks. The notion of throughput 
legitimacy, which emphasizes inclusiveness, transparency, and the deliberative quality of 
the interaction process between network actors, offers an important contribution in this re-
spect. As has been demonstrated in this thesis, public managers can play an important role 
in strengthening this form of legitimacy and therefore play an important role in increasing 
the democratic legitimacy of governance networks.
Whereas many governments have a tendency to invest in new structures (reorganization) 
or organizational forms to deal with complex governance issues, this study provides the in-
sight that this one-dimensional approach is not enough and needs at least to be accompanied 
by investment in the connective and relational capabilities of people dealing with complex, 
cross-sector, and multi-actor public issues. Careful selection of staff at these qualities and / 
or investment in these skills can have a beneficial effect on coping with boundary-crossing 
issues. Another important recommendation for governmental organizations is to invest 
in careful design of the boundary spanner’s organizational position. Boundary spanners 
have a difficult role to play and often have to face intra-organizational resistance or rigidity. 
In order to make connections across various institutional and organizational boundaries, 
boundary spanners often challenge existing organizational structures and routines. Appro-
priate support, such as a certain degree of autonomy and formal authority, could be helpful 
in this respect. The importance of this supporting and facilitating of boundary spanners will 
become more severe if the amount and diversity of bottom-up citizen initiatives grows and 
if governments want to be responsive to these initiatives.
In this respect, more research is needed to the enabling and constraining conditions 
of boundary-spanners to act effectively and to their willingness to perform boundary-
spanning activities. Boundary spanners perform an important, but difficult task. In order 
to make connections across different institutional and organization boundaries, they often 
challenge existing organizational routines and structures. In their boundary-spanning 
activities, boundary spanners could, paradoxically, become relatively isolated. In their span-
ning activities, they could become someone who belongs neither to the environment nor to 
the official organization that they represent. Future research can focus on how boundary-
spanners cope with environmental stress and/or intra-organizational forces of resistance 
and how they deal with role conflicts in this respect.


Summary in Dutch
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hoofDvraag, conTexT en relevanTie van heT onDerzoek
Veel hedendaagse publieke vraagstukken op gebieden als watermanagement, stedelijke 
ontwikkeling, gezondheidszorg, armoedebestrijding en milieubescherming vragen  om in-
teractie tussen een veelheid van overheden, maatschappelijke en private partijen. Veel 
hedendaagse beleid- en besluitvormingsprocessen ontvouwen zich daarom in netwerken 
van actoren over de grenzen van publieke, private en maatschappelijke sferen. Dit heeft aan-
leiding gegeven tot onderzoek over hoe effectieve en legitieme beleids- en besluitvorming te 
realiseren in deze zogenoemde governance netwerken: netwerken die ontstaan  als reactie op 
specifieke publieke kwesties en die, in tegenstelling tot de instituties van de representatieve 
democratie, dynamisch en meer horizontaal van karakter zijn. De focus van dit proefschrift 
ligt op het management van interacties tussen overheidspartijen enerzijds en maatschap-
pelijke en private partijen anderzijds in governance netwerken op het gebied van stedelijke 
ontwikkeling en watermanagement. Het concept boundary-spanning wordt gebruikt om dit 
management van interacties over organisatorische en institutionele grenzen heen te onder-
zoeken. De onderzoeksdoelstelling van dit proefschrift is het beschrijven van de rol van 
boundary spanners in deze governance netwerken en hun effecten op de prestaties en de 
democratische legitimiteit van deze netwerken te toetsen. De hoofdvraag die centraal staat 
is: Op welke wijze en in welke mate hebben boundary-spanners effect op de democratische 
legitimiteit en de prestaties van governance netwerken op het gebied van stedelijke ontwikke-
ling en watermanagement?
Dit onderzoek vindt zijn oorsprong in de veranderende context van beleids- en besluit-
vorming in de laatste decennia. In het hedendaagse, laat moderne tijdperk staan de klassiek 
modernistische instituties van beleids- en besluitvorming in toenemende mate onder druk 
om maatschappelijke vraagstukken effectief en legitiem het hoofd te bieden. Diverse veran-
deringen en ontwikkelingen in de hedendaagse samenleving kunnen daarvoor als belang-
rijke factoren worden geïdentificeerd. Twee belangrijke ontwikkelingen worden specifiek 
uitgelicht en uitgewerkt in dit proefschrift. De eerste betreft de toenemende complexiteit 
van publieke vraagstukken in wisselwerking met een sterk gespecialiseerd, maar daardoor 
ook gefragmenteerd institutioneel landschap. De tweede betreft de maatschappelijke context 
waarin betrokkenheid van burgers in de traditionele politieke instituties sterk is afgenomen. 
Burgers zijn bovendien steeds kritischer geworden ten opzichte van deze politieke instituties. 
Daarentegen zijn burgers assertiever geworden en nemen ze vaker het heft in eigen handen 
wanneer hun belangen op het spel staan. Burgers zijn steeds beter in staan om zich snel 
en effectief te organiseren en niet zelden ontwikkelen deze burgerinitiatieven alternatieve 
plannen voor overheidsmaatregelen die ingrijpen in hun directe leefomgeving waarmee zij 
de concurrentie met overheden tot op zekere hoogte aangaan. We zien een opkomst van 
alternatieve burgerparticipatie, die sterke geënt is op zelf-organisatie, die ontstaat buiten de 
traditionele instituties om, maar die wel in interactie staat met deze instituties.
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Mede naar aanleiding van deze uitdagingen is er in de laatste decennia een sterke opkomst 
van netwerkachtige vormen van governance. Een governance netwerk verwijst naar een 
web van relaties tussen overheid, maatschappelijke organisaties, burgergroeperingen en/
of bedrijfsleven dat ontstaat rond een publiek vraagstuk en dat gevormd, onderhouden en 
veranderd wordt door de interactie tussen de betrokken actoren. Deze interactieve vormen 
van bestuur ontstaan door groeiende onderlinge afhankelijkheden tussen actoren in de 
hedendaagse samenleving, maar ook door ontevredenheid over traditionele vormen van 
bestuur. Ze kunnen worden geïnitieerd door overheidspartijen, maar ze kunnen ook worden 
aangewakkerd door initiatief van zelforganiserende burgers, zogeheten burgercollectieven 
(De Moor, 2013).9 In dit proefschrift richt ik me op twee typen governance netwerken rond 
watermanagement vraagstukken en stedelijke ontwikkeling: netwerken waarin overheids-
partijen een meer leidende en initiërende rol spelen en governance netwerken die worden 
aangedreven door zelforganiserende burgers. Met zelforganisatie van burgers doel ik op 
bottom-up initiatieven geleid door burgers, die ontstaan als reactie op een, veelal lokaal, 
publiek vraagstuk en die de ambitie hebben om middels een duurzame samenwerking tus-
sen burgers dit vraagstuk aan te pakken.
Dit proefschrift beoogt bij te dragen aan de literatuur over governance netwerken op ten 
minste twee belangrijke punten. Alhoewel eerder onderzoek heeft gewezen op het belang 
van boundary-spanning activiteiten van netwerkmanagers of meta-governors als factor 
voor het verbeteren van de prestaties van governance netwerken, is hierin de democrati-
sche legitimiteit nog weinig aan bod gekomen, zeker wat empirische studies betreft. Een 
belangrijke reden hiervoor is dat de aard van governance netwerken niet aansluit bij de 
uitgangspunten van traditionele modellen van democratie. Naast wetenschappelijke debat-
ten over de betekenis van governance netwerken in termen van democratische legitimiteit, 
compliceert dit empirische analyses.
Ten tweede gaat verreweg de meeste aandacht in de literatuur uit naar de rol van publieke 
netwerkmanagers en leidende politici, terwijl beleids- en besluitvormingsprocessen in go-
vernance netwerken evolueren op de grenzen van verschillende publieke, private en maat-
schappelijke organisaties. Dit maakt dat de boundary-spanning activiteiten van een groot 
aantal individuen van belang zijn voor de prestaties van governance netwerken. Daarom zal 
dit onderzoek ook de rol van boundary spanners met diverse organisatorische achtergron-
den, met name die met een maatschappelijk en private achtergrond, in ogenschouw nemen 
en ook hun effecten op de prestaties van governance netwerken toetsen. Gezien de toene-
mende belangstelling van zowel overheden als academici op het zelforganiserend vermogen 
van burgers in het omgaan met publieke vraagstukken is dit een belangrijke bijdrage. Denk 
in dit kader bijvoorbeeld aan het discours van de Participatiesamenleving in Nederland en 
de Big Society in het Verenigd Koninkrijk.
9  Zie de literatuurlijst van hoofdstuk 1 voor de volledige referentie
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sTrucTuur van heT proefschrifT en meThoDen
Dit proefschrift bevat vijf verschillende studies die verschillende aspecten van de centrale 
onderzoeksvraag behandelen. Zowel kwantitatieve als kwalitatieve methoden zijn hierbij 
gebruikt. Deze vijf studies zijn allen gepubliceerd en kunnen op zichzelf gelezen worden: 
vier van de vijf studies zijn gepubliceerd in internationaal peer-reviewed tijdschriften en 
een studie is gepubliceerd als een hoofdstuk in een internationaal geredigeerd boek. De vijf 
studies zijn opgedeeld in twee delen (deel II en III van het proefschrift). Deel II richt zich 
op de boundary-spanning activiteiten van publieke managers binnen netwerken rondom 
complexe waterprojecten en hun effecten op de democratische legitimiteit en de prestaties 
van het netwerk. Dit deel bevat twee studies. De eerste is een kwalitatieve enkelvoudige 
studie waarin (een gebrek aan) boundary-spanning activiteiten omtrent een omstreden 
watervraagstuk wordt onderzocht. De tweede is een kwantitatief onderzoek, gebaseerd op 
een survey onder betrokkenen in de ontwikkeling van complexe waterprojecten. In deze 
studie worden de effecten van boundary-spanning activiteiten van publieke managers op de 
democratische legitimiteit en de prestaties van het netwerk onderzocht.
Deel III gaat dieper in op boundary-spanning activiteiten van actieve burgers, maat-
schappelijke en private partijen in governance netwerken. Dit deel bevat drie studies. De 
eerste twee betreffen case studies (een enkelvoudige en een vergelijkende case study) over 
governance netwerken geïnitieerd door zelf-organiserende burgers. In deze studies wordt 
de evolutie van de burgercollectieven en de boundary-spanning activiteiten van de leiders 
van deze burgercollectieven onderzocht. Deel III sluit af met een kwantitatief onderzoek 
waarin de effecten van boundary spanners op vertrouwen en prestaties van governance 
netwerk rondom stedelijke ontwikkeling getoetst worden. Deze studie is gebaseerd op 
survey onderzoek onder managers van stedelijke projecten in de vier grootste gemeenten 
van Nederland.
conclusies
In dit proefschrift worden boundary spanners opgevat als  personen die actief werken op 
de grens van hun organisatie. Ze zijn in staat om mogelijkheden tot het opbouwen van 
inter-organisatorische relaties te herkennen en te benutten. Ze hebben een sterk ontwikkeld 
gevoel voor de andere kant van de grens van de organisatie en het netwerk waarin hun 
organisatie zich begeeft en dat ze deels zelf opbouwen. Dit betekent dat zij in staat zijn zich 
in te leven in andermans belangen en in andere structuren en dat ze een gevoel hebben voor 
de sociale constructies van andere actoren. Boundary spanners begrijpen de behoeften van 
andere partijen, wat hen in staat stelt om te zoeken naar gedeelde betekenissen en individu-
ele organisatorische belangen samen te smelten met gezamenlijke belangen. Ze zijn ervaren 
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netwerkers en gespecialiseerd in het doorkruisen van verschillende domeinen (overheid, 
maatschappelijk en bedrijfsleven). Naast deze interpersoonlijke en inter-organisatorische 
vaardigheden, worden boundary spanners beschouwd als ondernemers en vernieuwers in 
de zin dat ze proberen om verschillende gerelateerde vraagstukken en beleidsprocessen te 
koppelen over grenzen heen.
Boundary-spanning wordt opgevat als een combinatie van samenhangende activiteiten 
die gericht zijn op het verbinden van verschillende actoren uit het domein van de overheid, 
het maatschappelijk veld en het bedrijfsleven, het opbouwen van duurzame relaties tussen 
deze actoren, en evoluerende netwerkprocessen te verbinden met intra-organisatorische 
processen. In dit opzicht zijn ze bezig met drie belangrijke activiteiten: 1) het verbinden 
van verschillende mensen en processen over organisatiegrenzen heen, 2) het selecteren van 
relevante informatie aan beide zijden van de grens, en 3) het vertalen van deze informatie 
naar de andere kant van de grens. In dit proefschrift richt ik me op personen die in een 
hoge mate boundary-spanning activiteiten in praktijk brengen. Deze boundary spanners 
zijn actief betrokken in een tweezijdige informatie- en communicatiestroom: vanuit het 
netwerk naar de organisatie toe en vice versa. Dit houdt in dat boundary spanners zowel 
sterk verankerd moeten zijn binnen als buiten de organisatie.
De eerste conclusie van dit proefschrift is dat de boundary spanning activiteiten van publieke 
managers een belangrijke rol spelen in, en een sterk effect hebben op, het realiseren van demo-
cratische throughput legitimiteit van governance netwerken. Het concept van democratische 
throughput legitimiteit gaat over de democratische kwaliteit van het interactie proces 
dat zich ontvouwt in governance netwerken (zie ook de tweede conclusie). Governance 
netwerken hebben democratisch potentieel omdat ze, zoals verschillende auteurs stellen, 
verschillende belanghebbenden rechtstreeks kunnen laten participeren in gezamenlijke 
beleids- en besluitvorming en ze meer flexibel en toegespitst zijn op het specifieke publieke 
vraagstuk in kwestie. Om dit potentieel manifest te maken, spelen de boundary-spanning 
activiteiten van publieke managers een belangrijke rol. Ik vond een sterk positief effect 
van een managementstijl gebaseerd op boundary-spanning activiteiten op de throughput 
legitimiteit van governance netwerken rondom complexe waterprojecten (zie hoofdstuk 3). 
Boundary-spanning activiteiten van publieke managers richten zich op het verbinden van 
verschillende actoren uit verschillende domeinen. Ze creëren kansen voor burgers, maat-
schappelijke organisaties en bedrijven om te participeren in beleids- en besluitvorming. 
Daarnaast verbinden ze dit proces met het bestuurlijke en politieke domein en maken hier-
bij de nodige wederzijdse vertaalactiviteiten. Op deze manier spelen publieke managers een 
belangrijke rol in het faciliteren van constructieve interactie en een constructieve dialoog 
tussen de actoren in governance netwerken en spelen ze een belangrijke brugfunctie tussen 
netwerkprocessen en formele besluitvormingsprocedures en structuren.
De tweede conclusie van dit proefschrift is dat throughput legitimiteit een sterk positief 
effect heeft op de prestaties van governance netwerken rondom complexe maatschappelijke 
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vraagstukken. Ik vond een sterk positief effect van throughput legitimiteit op de netwerk-
prestaties van besluitvormingsprocessen rondom complexe waterprojecten (zie hoofdstuk 
3). Een hoog niveau van throughput legitimiteit weerspiegelt een hoge mate van inclusie 
van betrokken belanghebbenden, transparantie van de beleids- en besluitvorming, en een 
constructieve dialoog tussen de belanghebbenden in het netwerk. Er is interactie over de 
grenzen van overheidsorganisaties, maatschappelijke belangengroepen en lokale burgercol-
lectieven heen met een hoog democratisch gehalte. Deliberatieve praktijken verhogen de 
uitwisseling van informatie, percepties en voorkeuren, waardoor een leerproces kan plaats-
vinden dat vervolgens de netwerkprestaties kan verbeteren.
Throughput legitimiteit medieert hierdoor gedeeltelijk de relatie tussen boundary-
spanning publieke managers en netwerkprestaties. In lijn met de literatuur over netwerk-
management, vond ik een direct positief effect van boundary-spanning publieke managers 
op de prestaties van het netwerk (zie met name hoofdstuk 3). In aanvulling op deze litera-
tuur vond ik ook een sterk, indirect effect van boundary spanning publieke managers op 
netwerkprestaties via throughput legitimiteit. Deze uitkomst nuanceert en verduidelijkt 
de veronderstelde en eerder geteste relatie tussen de boundary-spanning activiteiten van 
publieke managers en de prestaties van governance netwerken. Publieke managers kun-
nen een belangrijke rol spelen in het verbinden van relevante belanghebbenden bij de 
beleidsvorming en het opbouwen en beheren van een platform van inter-organisatorische 
interactie. Hierdoor kunnen verschillende sectoren met betrekking tot het voorliggende 
vraagstuk met elkaar in verbinding raken. Dit draagt  bij aan de prestaties van het netwerk. 
Echter, de resultaten geven aan dat publieke managers hun impact op de prestaties van 
het netwerk aanzienlijk kunnen verbeteren als ze erin slagen om een goed georganiseerde, 
inclusief, deliberatief en transparant beleids- en besluitvormingsproces weten te creëren 
waarin er een goede feedbackrelatie bestaat met formele beleids- en besluitvormingsarena’s.
De derde conclusie van dit proefschrift is dat het realiseren van throughput legitimiteit en 
het verbeteren van prestaties van netwerken rondom complexe maatschappelijke vraagstuk-
ken vraagt om brede en flexibele projectafbakeningen van publieke managers wat betreft de 
reikwijdte van het project (inhoud), het proces (wie er betrokken is) en de structuur (pro-
jectonderdelen, rollen en verantwoordelijkheidsverdeling). In de casus Haringvlietsluizen 
(hoofdstuk 2) is er nader ingegaan op de projectafbakeningen van projectmanagers en hoe 
die van invloed zijn op de verbindingen waarin zij investeren en de manier waarop ze stake-
holders benaderen in het kader van hun project. Door deze projectafbakeningen (‘boundary 
judgments’), oefenen managers invloed uit op de in- en uitsluiting van actoren (publiek, 
privaat, maatschappelijk), domeinen (bv. waterveiligheid, milieu, economische vitaliteit, in-
frastructuur), en frames (problemen, oplossingen, interesses). Affiniteit voor het complexe, 
grensoverschrijdende karakter van water vraagstukken resulteert in brede en meer flexibele 
projectafbakeningen waarin er meer ruimte ontstaat voor het ontdekken van een meer in-
tegrale aanpak van deze vraagstukken. Managers met brede grensoordelen richten zich op 
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de onderlinge verwevenheid van problemen, actoren, processen en structuren. Dergelijke 
managers erkennen dat de grenzen tussen project en context niet objectief bepaalbaar zijn, 
maar het resultaat zijn van (politieke) keuzes, en dat deze grenzen voortdurende legitimatie 
vragen. Dit betekent dat het project wordt beheerd als een open systeem, waarin de grenzen 
tussen het project en de context worden gezien als dynamisch, vloeiend en doorlaatbaar, 
wat gepaard zal gaan met meer boundary-spanning activiteiten. Dit kan vervolgens leiden 
tot een hogere throughput legitimiteit en betere netwerkprestaties. Echter, de mogelijkheid 
voor managers om brede projectafbakeningen in praktijk te brengen is belangrijk om te 
overwegen, omdat dit sterk kan worden beperkt door de institutionele context van over-
heidsorganisaties.
Naast de boundary-spanning activiteiten van publieke managers, heeft dit proefschrift 
de boundary-spanning activiteiten van de leiders van burgercollectieven nader onderzocht. 
De context van deze activititeiten betreffen de governance netwerken gedreven door zelf-
organiserende burgers. De vierde conclusie van dit proefschrift is dat de boundary-spanning 
activiteiten van deze leiders van cruciaal belang zijn om zelf-organisatie van de grond te 
krijgen (te laten beklijven) en te verankeren. Er zijn opvallende gelijkenissen tussen de activi-
teiten van de voorzitter van de het burgercollectief (de Community Trust) in de Britse casus 
Caterham Barracks (hoofdstuk 5) en de voorzitter van het burgercollectief (de Federatie) 
in de Nederlands casus Broekpolder (hoofdstuk 4). Beiden investeerden aanzienlijk in het 
verbinden van verschillende individuen, hun standpunten en belangen over de grenzen 
van overheidsinstellingen, de lokale gemeenschap en particuliere en maatschappelijke 
organisaties heen. Zij investeerden in interorganisatorische en interpersoonlijke relaties 
tussen sleutelfiguren in de lokale gemeenschap, het bestuurlijke en het politieke domein. 
Bovendien namen ze een leidende rol bij de coördinatie van de activiteiten van de zelfor-
ganiserende burgers en het verbinden van ideeën en plannen die binnen deze informele 
groepen ontstaan met de formele beleidscircuits binnen de lokale overheid en de formele 
besluitvormingsprocedures.
Naast hun mobiliserende en relationele activiteiten, waren het vertalen van institutio-
nele praktijken tussen lokale overheid en burgercollectief en het verankeren van de nieuwe 
governance structuur belangrijke boundary-spanning activiteiten. De boundary spanners 
speelden een cruciale rol in het verbinden van nieuwe gedragspatronen met bestaande 
institutionele structuren. Ze versmolten nieuwe manieren van organiseren met bestaande 
institutionele procedures (zie hoofdstuk 4 en 5). De leiders van de burgercollectieven waren 
in staat om deze hoogwaardige boundary-spanning activiteiten uit te voeren vanwege hun 
verbondenheid (binnen het bestaande netwerk en hun specifieke netwerkpositie), hun 
‘institutionele ervaring’, en hun relationele capaciteiten. Ze waren sterk verbonden binnen 
de lokale gemeenschap door hun netwerk activiteiten, maar ze waren ook sterk verbonden 
met het bestuurlijke en politieke domein vanwege hun eerdere werkervaring binnen de 
lokale overheid. Dit voorzag hen niet alleen in een verscheidenheid aan contacten binnen 
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de lokale overheid, maar voorzag hen ook van de nodige kennis over hoe beleidsproces-
sen en politieke processen werken. Hiermee konden ze het burgerinitiatief verbinden over 
bestuurlijke, politieke, en lokale gemeenschapsgrenzen heen.
In dit vertalingswerk omtrent geïnstitutionaliseerde praktijken, stonden de leiders van 
de burgercollectieven zeker niet alleen. Boundary-spanning activiteiten aan beide zijden 
van de grens werden uitgevoerd om een  betere fit te creëren tussen de werkwijze en gang-
bare regels van de lokale overheid en die van het burgercollectief (zie hoofdstuk 4 in dit 
verband). Betrokken ambtenaren speelden een belangrijke rol in het begeleiden en loodsen 
van het burgerinitiatief door de ambtelijke organisatie en het politiek-bestuurlijke domein. 
In dit opzicht was boundary-spanning een co-productie tussen individuen aan burgerzijde 
en aan overheidszijde. De betrokken ambtenaren vervulden een belangrijke brugfunctie in 
het laten landen van het burgerinitiatief binnen de ambtelijke organisatie (de verschillende 
beleidsafdelingen); en, andersom, gaven ze belangrijke feedback en suggesties aan de leiders 
van het burgercollectief om hun voorstellen meer aanvaardbaar en in overeenstemming 
met de bestuurlijke en politieke regels en praktijken te maken. De co-productie tussen 
boundary-spanning activiteiten aan weerszijde van de grens droeg bij aan begrip en weder-
zijdse aanpassing van gedragspatronen tussen overheid en burgercollectief.
De vijfde conclusie van dit proefschrift is dat de prestaties van governance netwerken en 
het vertrouwen tussen netwerk actoren worden versterkt door het samenspel van boundary-
spanning activiteiten tussen publieke, private en maatschappelijke actoren. In lijn met de 
voorgaande conclusie, benadrukt deze bevinding het belang van de boundary-spanning 
activiteiten van verschillende individuen in governance netwerken en hun onderlinge wis-
selwerking. De resultaten van het survey onderzoek onder publieke managers van stedelijke 
projecten tonen aan dat netwerkprestaties positief worden beïnvloed door de aanwezig-
heid van boundary-spanners die afkomstig zijn van verschillende organisaties binnen het 
netwerk (zie hoofdstuk 6 in dit verband). Deze mensen opereren actief op de grens van 
hun organisatie en spelen een belangrijke rol in het verbeteren van de coördinatie tussen 
netwerk- en intra-organisatorische processen, het opbouwen van duurzame interorganisa-
torische relaties, en het verzamelen en vertalen van relevante informatie aan beide zijden 
van de organisatorische grens.
Naast hun (directe) effect op de netwerkprestaties, hebben boundary spanners een sterk 
positief effect op het vertrouwen tussen actoren in het netwerk (zie hoofdstuk 6). Door hun 
relationele activiteiten en hun inlevingsvermogen in de belangen en sociale constructies van 
andere actoren dragen boundary spanners bij aan het creëren van vertrouwensvolle relaties 
tussen actoren in governance netwerken. Vertrouwensvolle relaties tussen actoren in gover-
nance netwerken dragen op hun beurt bij aan de uitwisseling van informatie en middelen, 
die de prestaties van governance netwerken kunnen verhogen. Hoewel de resultaten een 
sterke indicatie geven dat boundary spanners in dit kader ook de prestaties van governance 
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netwerken verhogen via hun sterke effect op vertrouwen, werd dit mediërende effect van 
vertrouwen niet significant bevonden.
Volgens de managers van de stedelijke projecten waren de boundary spanners voorna-
melijk afkomstig uit particuliere en maatschappelijke organisaties, en werden ze minder 
sterk vertegenwoordigd door overheidspartijen (op alle niveaus: nationaal, regionaal, en 
lokaal). Het is voor vertegenwoordigers van overheidsorganisaties blijkbaar moeilijker om 
boundary-spanning activiteiten te vervullen. Dit draagt bij aan het inzicht dat vertegen-
woordigers van particuliere en maatschappelijke organisaties belangrijk en creatief zijn 
in het leggen van effectieve verbindingen tussen private, maatschappelijke en publieke 
organisaties in het governance netwerk. Dit laat zien dat ook deze partijen een belangrijke 
brugfunctie kunnen vervullen tussen actoren en vraagstukken en dat dit niet alleen is weg-
gelegd voor publieke managers. Dit onderstreept dat boundary-spanning niet alleen een 
verdienste kan zijn van managers in dienst van de overheid, maar ook van meer informele 
leiders in dienst van burgercollectieven, vertegenwoordigers van non-profit organisaties 
en private bedrijven die bereidwillig zijn om op zoek te gaan naar gedeelde belangen in 
governance netwerken en een integrale aanpak van complexe stedelijke projecten, en die 
capabel zijn om over verschillende organisatorische grenzen heen verbindingen te creëren.
afsluiTing
Dit onderzoek benadrukt het belang van boundary-spanning in het vergroten van de de-
mocratische legitimiteit van de nieuwe democratische ruimtes die geboden worden door 
governance netwerken. Governance netwerken hebben potentieel in het vormgeven van 
nieuwe democratische praktijken die de representatieve democratie completeren in het 
vormgeven van democratisch legitieme en effectieve antwoorden op complexe publieke 
vraagstukken. Governance netwerken volgen een andere logica dan de representatieve 
democratie in termen van democratische legitimiteit. In vergelijking met de representatieve 
democratie, zijn de beleids- en besluitvormingsarena’s van governance netwerken dyna-
mischer en ontwikkelen ze zich  als reactie op specifieke collectieve besluitvormingsvraag-
stukken. Dit betekent ook dat andere criteria aan belang winnen om de democratische 
legitimiteit van governance netwerken te toetsen. De notie van throughput legitimiteit, die 
nadruk legt op het inclusieve karakter, de transparantie en de deliberatieve kwaliteit van het 
interactieproces tussen netwerk actoren, biedt in dit opzicht een belangrijke bijdrage. Zoals 
aangetoond in dit proefschrift, kunnen publieke managers een belangrijke rol spelen bij het 
versterken van deze vorm van legitimiteit en in dit opzicht dus een belangrijke rol spelen in 
het vergroten van de democratische legitimiteit van governance netwerken.
Overwegende dat veel overheden doorgaans de neiging hebben om voornamelijk te 
investeren in nieuwe structuren (reorganisatie) of organisatievormen om hun responsiviteit 
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jegens complexe maatschappelijke vraagstukken en veranderingen te verhogen, levert deze 
studie de aanbeveling op dat investeren in de boundary spanning competenties van publieke 
managers hieraan een belangrijke bijdrage kan leveren. Gerichte selectie van personeel op 
deze kwaliteiten en/of investeren in deze competenties kan een gunstig effect hebben op de 
omgang met grensoverschrijdende vraagstukken. Een tweede belangrijke aanbeveling voor 
overheidsorganisaties is om te investeren in zorgvuldige vormgeving van de organisatori-
sche positie van boundary spanners. Boundary spanners hebben namelijk een moeilijk rol 
te vervullen en lopen niet zelden tegen de nodige intra-organisatorische obstakels aan. Om 
verbindingen over verschillende institutionele en organisatie grenzen heen te maken, drui-
sen boundary spanners vaak in tegen bestaande organisatorische routines en structuren. 
Hierdoor kan een zekere ondersteuning met een bepaalde mate van autonomie en formele 
autoriteit behulpzaam zijn. Het belang van dit ondersteunen en faciliteren van boundary 
spanners zal toenemen wanneer de hoeveelheid en diversiteit van bottom-up initiatieven 
van burgers groeit en als overheden responsief en ontvankelijk willen zijn jegens deze 
initiatieven.
In dit verband is nader onderzoek nodig naar de versterkende en beperkende condities 
waaronder boundary-spanners opereren en die van invloed kunnen zijn op hun bereidwil-
ligheid en effectiviteit. Daarnaast kan toekomstig onderzoek zich richten op hoe boundary 
spanners omgaan met tegenwerkende krachten, rolconflicten en spanningen die voortko-
men uit de specifieke rol die ze vervullen. Hierbij valt te denken aan de boundary-spanning 
ambtenaar die een brugfunctie probeert te vervullen tussen de organisatie en het instituut 
dat hij vertegenwoordigt en het burgerinitiatief dat hij probeert te ondersteunen. In zijn 
verbindende activiteiten kan hij zich – paradoxaal – relatief geïsoleerd voelen, omdat hij 
geen vast of regulier onderdeel vormt van de structuren die hij probeert te verbinden.
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